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State, Religiosity and Church Participation
Federico Masera
Abstract
While most of the western world has faced a rapid process of secularization over recent
generations, many other countries, especially in Latin America and the Muslim world,
have maintained high levels of religiosity. Here, I propose a model of intergenerational
transmission of religious values and competition between the state and the church that
links changes in state eﬃciency to this dynamics. I show how, if the state becomes
more eﬃcient, agents vote for a higher size of the state. As the size of the state
increases participation in church activities decreases and the next generation becomes
less religious reinforcing the eﬀect of the initial increase in the eﬃciency of the state.
Because of this mechanism agents may have incentives to destroy part of the eﬃciency
of the state in order to favor the church. I then provide some empirical evidence of this
mechanism and show how it is only present for services provided by the state that are
in direct competition with the church.
4
1 Introduction
Religious organizations and the state often provide goods and services that answer needs that
are similar in nature. The provision of food and clothes to the poor, caring for sick patients
at the hospital, job training and other services dispensed by religious organizations can be
considered alternatives to many social programs of modern welfare states. In the US alone,
more than 70 million Americans enjoy goods or services provided by church organizations
[Tompkins and Webb (2008)]. As reported by the last National Congregations Study, almost
all congregations are involved in some social services [Chaves, Anderson and Byassee (2009)].
Approximately half of the congregations have food programs, one-quarter reported home
building, 20% have clothing programs and 15% oﬀer help to the homeless. Similar results
can be found in the Faith Communities Today national survey [Roozen (2008)]. In the
year 2000, 84% of congregations had conducted some community service program, and this
number rose to 94% in 2008.
In developing countries, the competition between the state and religious organizations
is present in even more areas of daily life. For example, a 2006 UNDP report [Wojkowska
(2006)] shows how the competition between informal religious justice systems and the formal
judicial system of the state is wide-spread around the world. In many countries, these
informal courts resolve between 80 and 90 percent of all disputes. As noticed by Berman
and Laitin (2008), radical religious groups are often eﬃcient providers of valuable local
public goods. For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan gained popularity in the late 90's by
providing security against bandits who were stopping trade to Pakistan and Iran. Hezbollah
has provided schools, charities and hospitals. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the pervasiveness of
religious organizations is even more striking. Religious organizations provide many basic
health and educational services in Tanzania [Jennings (2014)], Nigeria [Aremu (2015)] and
Congo [Seay (2013)].
An important feature of these goods and services is that religious organizations tend
to serve their own church-goers. As stated by Huber and Stanig (2011), social services
provided by churches are overwhelmingly religious, and that churches tend to cater to their
own members. Additionally, it has been shown that religious organizations behave like a
club by creating an insider-outsider identity [Lichterman (2008)]. There can be multiple
reasons for this diﬀerence in treatment in the provision of services. Churches may decide
to impose costs on religious participation and then provide some services as a club good to
avoid incurring a free-riding problem [Iannaccone (1992); Berman (2000); Berman and Laitin
(2008)]. Additionally, church-goers may have some informational advantage with respect to
the services oﬀered by the church. To rationalize why churches may decide to restrict access
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to their goods and services, it has been observed by Dehejia, DeLeire and Luttmer (2007) that
by doing so, religious organizations may be able to overcome some of the adverse selection
and moral hazard problems that can arise in informal insurance contracts. This happens
because churches may be better equipped to monitor the behavior of those that are part of
their organization given the pervasiveness that this organization can have in the daily lives
of church-goers. As a results of this, as shown by Lipford (1995), the free-rider problem is
usually not an issue for religious organizations.
To study this competition between church and the state, I construct a model in which
agents decide whether or not to participate in a religious organization. If an agent partici-
pates in a religious organization, he has to pay a participation fee. The religious organization
use participation fees to provide goods. Some of these goods are exclusive to church-goers,
while others are distributed publicly to all citizens. Agents also pay taxes that are then
distributed back by the state as a publicly provided good. The amount of goods provided
depends on the eﬃciency of the state. As discussed previously, goods provided by the church
and the state are, at least in part, answering the same needs. There are two types of agents:
secular and religious. They diﬀer in the intrinsic value they attach to church participation.
The timing is as follows: agents observe their type and vote for their preferred size of the
state. After elections are resolved, they pay their taxes and decide whether to participate in
church.
I ﬁrst solve this model in a simple static framework in which both the eﬃciency of the
state and the religiosity of individuals is exogenous. Here, I show that as the size of the state
increases, the needs fulﬁlled by the church are, at least partially, already taken care of by
the state. Because of this, an increase in the size of the state reduces church participation.
The model exhibits heterogeneous responses of church participation decisions to changes in
the size of state. Secular individuals go to church only if the size of the state is small, while
religious individuals always go to church. Furthermore, the model predicts lower levels of
participation in church activities as the eﬃciency of the state increases. This result links
church participation to the institutions that govern the quality of goods produced by the
state or restrains the possibilities of wasting resources by the state through corruption.
At the voting stage, religious individuals prefer the state to be a smaller size. The reason
for this is two-fold. First, given that religious individuals participate more often in church
activities, they do not need a large state, as some of their needs are already fulﬁlled by
the church. Second, religious individuals use voting as a proselytization tool. When voting,
religious individuals take into account that with a lower size of state, secular individuals will
participate in church activities and more goods will be produced by the church.
The model is then included in an overlapping generations framework in which religiosity
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is made endogenous by linking the religiosity of a child to the participation decisions and
religiosity of the parent. Two stable equilibria are found: an equilibrium in which a large
share of individuals are religious, everybody goes to church, and the state is very small,
and one in which in the long-run, everybody becomes secular, nobody goes to church, and
the state is large. The model suggests that the main driver of secularization in a society
is an increase in the relative eﬃciency of the state with respect to the church in providing
goods and services. This result may oﬀer some new insights on the determinants of the
secularization in the Western world, while high levels of religiosity are maintained in many
ineﬃcient or failed states.
Given the importance of the eﬃciency of the state in determining the joint dynamics of
religiosity and the size of the state, it is essential to understand what may determine the
state eﬃciency of a country. To do so, I extend the basic static framework, by giving citizens
the possibility of decreasing the eﬃciency of the state. Citizens could do so by voting for a
corrupt politician or one that would decrease the state eﬃciency, damaging public property,
doing violent acts against the state, and so on. Without the presence of the church, no
citizen would want to damage the eﬃciency of the state because, in such a case part of the
goods provided by the state would be wasted by this ineﬃciency. With the presence of the
church, there may instead be an incentive for damaging the eﬃciency of the state, because
a more ineﬃcient state creates higher incentives for citizens to go to church. This then
leads to more participation fees for the church and more goods provided by the religious
organization, ultimately favoring church-goers. The presence of this mechanism may create
a situation in which agents have incentives to destroy part of the eﬃciency of the state.
This is especially true for religious individuals who are the ones usually beneﬁting from the
increased production of the church. This mechanism helps explain why some states are stuck
in a cycle of ineﬃcient states produced by inept politicians or acts of violence against the
state, low levels of public goods provided by the state and high levels of religiosity.
I then empirically explore the relationship between religiosity and the size of the state by
using diﬀerent waves of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which collects data
on religious habits and preferences over the size of the state. The results are in line with the
comparative statics of the model. I document a negative correlation between the size of the
state and the frequency of participation in church activities. This correlation persists after
controlling for many observable country characteristics, country ﬁxed eﬀects and individual
characteristics. As predicted by the model, this negative correlation only exists for secular
individuals. Furthermore, this negative correlation is only observed when examining dimen-
sions of state spending that are in direct competition with goods and services provided by
churches. I also show how measures of state eﬃciency in providing public goods are neg-
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atively correlated to participation in church activities, even after controlling for the size of
the state. Finally, preferences over the size of the state are shown to be negatively correlated
to religiosity but only if the spending is directly in competition with goods provided by the
church.
These results ﬁrst contribute to the literature that studies the determinants of religiosity.
Trends towards a more secular society have been attributed to changes in characteristics of
countries such as income per capita [Paldam and Gundlach (2012)], credit availability [Chen
(2010)], growth [McCleary and Barro (2006)], education [Franck and Iannaccone (2009)],
Human Development Index [Gaskins, Golder and Siegel (2013)], poverty [Berman (2000)] and
laws regarding the use of the veil [Carvalho (2013)]. More closely related to this paper, I build
on the empirical insights of Hungerman (2005), Gruber and Hungerman (2007) and Gill and
Lundsgaarde (2004) which study how an increase in the size of the state, especially if directly
related to goods and services are provided by the church, can explain the secularization of a
society.
Secondly, the results of this paper contribute to the literature on the diﬀerences in the
preferences and decisions of religious individuals. For example Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2003) show how several economic attitudes and preferences are strongly correlated to the
strength of one's religious beliefs. They ﬁnd that religious individuals trust others more,
trust the government and the legal system more, are less willing to break the law and
are more likely to believe that markets' outcomes are fair. On the other hand, religious
individuals have been found to be more intolerant of foreigners and less sympathetic to
women's rights. Religiosity has also been shown to negatively inﬂuence growth [McCleary
and Barro (2006)], preferences for the redistribution of income [Huber and Stanig (2011);
Stegmueller et al. (2012); Gaskins, Golder and Siegel (2013)] and the rate of innovation
[Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni (2015)]. More in line with my research question, Scheve and
Stasavage (2006) have found that welfare expenditure in a country is negatively correlated
both with average religiosity and participation in religious activities in these countries. They
ﬁnd that in high-income OECD countries, individuals that participate more often in church
activities also prefer less social spending by the state. Stegmueller (2010) shows that religious
individuals indeed prefer lower social spending but only when it is aimed at individuals who
are thought to be deservingly in that condition (like the unemployed). In this paper, I provide
a theoretical model to rationalize these results in which individuals who diﬀer in religiosity
may vote diﬀerently on the size of the state. Furthermore, I also study the feedback loop that
the decisions about the size of the state create on the religiosity and church participation of
individuals.
Additionally, this paper also contributes to the literature that identify the determinants of
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preferences over the role of the state. As shown by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), the
amount of redistribution varies systematically across countries. Benabou and Tirole (2006)
and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) that diﬀerences in preferences for redistribution and the
size of the welfare state can be explained by how much individuals think the world is just or
markets are fair, respectively. In an extensive literature review, Alesina and Giuliano (2009)
show how there are many determinants of preferences for redistribution. Income, education,
employment status, race, sex, and belief in the fairness of the markets are all shown to have a
sizable eﬀects on preferences for redistribution. Other determinants include the possibility of
upward mobility of income [Ravallion and Lokshin (2000); Benabou and Ok (2001); Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005)], or culture [Luttmer and Singhal (2011)]. The contribution of this
paper is to theoretically propose and empirically test a new mechanism that explains how
religiosity and the presence of the church may also inﬂuence preferences over the role of the
state.
Finally, these results also add to the literature on the causes of state failure or ineﬃciency.
Many factors have been shown to be important determinants of state failure: civil violence
generated by natural resource richness [Ploeg (2011)] or ethnic diversity [Alesina and Ferrara
(2005)], monetary resource windfall [Brollo et al. (2013)], limited morality cultural values
[Tabellini (2007)], patronage politics [Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2011)], the absence
of the absence of the right kind of judicial and ﬁscal institutions [Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012); Besley and Persson (2011)]. Here, I show how the presence of a competitor of the
state (the church) may create incentives for citizens to damage state eﬃciency to favor this
competitor making it impossible to have an eﬃcient state.
In the next section I build the basic theoretical framework and then extend it to make
religiosity and state eﬃciency endogenous. In Section 3 I present the main empirical results
that explore the links between church participation, religiosity and the size of the state.
I conclude with a discussion on how the mechanisms discussed could be present in other
similar situations in which a non-state organization and the state compete in the provision
of certain goods. These other non-state organizations include maﬁas, terrorists or violent
groups and local gangs.
2 Model
2.1 The Static Model
Consider a measure one of agents that can be of two types: secular or religious. The type is
denoted by τ and measures the intrinsic value (λτ ) that an agent attaches to participating in
9
church activities. Religious types are an exogenous fraction q of the population. All agents
decide simultaneously whether to participate in church activities (pi = 1) or not (pi = 0).
With P , I denote the measure of church-goers. If an agent decides to participate he has
to pay a participation fee normalized to 1. This participation fee includes all the monetary
costs, time invested in church activities and societal restrictions that need to be endured to
be recognized by the religious organization as a church-goer. The church then distributes
h1(P ) goods to all agents, regardless of whether they participate in church activities or not,
and h2(P ) goods only to church-goers. As discussed in the introduction, this is meant to
capture the fact that some of these goods and services tend to cater to church-goers. Agents
also pay taxes (t) that are then transformed by the state into αf(t) units of a publicly
provided good. The basic state production function is f(.). Countries may diﬀer by the
state eﬃciency α. The timing is as follows: each agent i ﬁrst observes his own type and the
share of religious agents q, then votes sincerely on the level of taxation1 t∗i . The taxation
preferred by the majority is implemented. After observing the voting results, each agent i
pays taxes and decides whether to participate in church activities.
The utility of agent i of type τ with participation decision pi when a measure P agents
participates in church activities and t is the size of the state is as follows:
Ui,τ (pi, P, t) = W (αf(t) , h1(P ) + h2(P ) pi)− t− pi + λτpi (1)
The utility of agent i depends on the consumption of goods produced by the state and
the church. As discussed in the introduction, part of the goods produced by the church are
only accessible if a person participates in church activities. However, the state distributes
goods in an equal manner to all agents. The utility of agents depends on how much they
have to pay in taxes, the fee for participation in church activities and the intrinsic value
that the agent gives to participating in church. This value is completely independent of the
amount of goods produced by the church and only depends on the agent's type. The main
interaction between these factors that I want to study is the substitutability between state
and church provided goods. To capture this, I use the functionW (.) and the cross-derivative
of this function as a way of modeling this substitutability.
Assumption 1. λR > 1, λS = 0
Assumption 2. W
′
1,W
′
2 > 0 , W
′′
22,W
′′
11,W
′′
12 < 0, limx→∞W
′
2(x, y) = 0
1As there is a one to one function that matches taxes (t) to the size of the welfare state (αf(t)) we can
also view this as voters voting over the size of the state.
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Assumption 3. α > 0, f
′
, h
′
1, h
′
2 ≥ 0, f ′′ , h′′1 , h′′2 ≤ 0, and f(0) = h1(0) = h2(0) = 0
Assumption 1 deﬁnes an agent as religious if it is willing to go to church only motivated by
the intrinsic value associated with going to church. On the other hand, secular agents only
care about the goods and services provided by the church when making the participation
decision. Assumption 2 states that the utility function is increasing with the amount goods
consumed by the agent (either produced by the state or the church). The assumptionW
′′
12 < 0
captures the fact that goods provided by the church and those provided by the state answer
similar needs (i.e., these goods are strategic substitutes). What these goods and services are
depends on the context studied. In a developed country, these goods include basic education,
health services, help to the poor and, more generally, the welfare system. In many developing
countries, these goods may include the justice system, public safety and many other more
basic publicly provided goods. This is an important assumption to consider when bringing
the results to the data and selecting which type of state spending to focus on. The last
assumption (limx→∞W
′
2(x, y) = 0) speciﬁes that in the limit where the state is inﬁnitely big
the utility is not aﬀected by what the church does. This assumption is just needed to rule
out some unusual equilibrium behavior that may happen at the limits even if in reality the
state will never be inﬁnitely sized. Finally, assumption 3 describes the production function
of the state and the church. The amount of goods provided by the state is increasing with
the taxes paid. The amount of goods delivered by the church is increasing with the number
of church-goers. Importantly, here I assume that congestion economies in the church are not
strong enough to reduce production by the church as more agents go to church. In particular,
h
′
2 ≥ 0 states that the amount of goods that every church-goer receives is increasing with
the number of church-goers. This assumption is in line with the type of services provided
by the church. In particular, these services can be considered as a general form of insurance
based on the network created by the church. In these situations (especially with idiosyncratic
shocks), larger pools are preferred. Furthermore, goods and services provided by the church
are also generally local (risks and beneﬁts are shared locally). This makes it diﬃcult to reach
a congestion productivity peak, even if all the citizens go to a particular church, because the
total pool of citizens is typically small. Furthermore, if this peak were ever to be reached,
there would always be the possibility of splitting into smaller geographical areas. Finally,
taking into account that the empirical analysis is based on developed countries, it is safe to
assume that these countries are far from reaching high levels of congestion in the church.
The production functions of the state and the church are both concave.
We now solve the game backwards, ﬁrst searching for the optimal participation behavior
of the agents for each possible realization of the voting stage. One important thing to notice
is that the incentives to participate in church activities may increase as an increasing number
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of agents decide to go to church. Intuitively, if more agents participate in church activities,
given assumption 3, more goods are delivered by the church, and this further increases the
incentive to go to church. These strategic complementarities between player actions create
a coordination problem with a multiplicity of equilibria for some values in the parameter
space. I select a unique equilibrium using the global game methodology. The main intuition
behind this methodology is to add a speciﬁc type of noise to the payoﬀ function of the
original game. As ﬁrst shown by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and then extended to
inﬁnite player games by Morris and Shin (2003) and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003),
under certain regularity conditions, as the noise goes to zero and we approach the original
payoﬀ function, a unique strategy survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies. A
detailed explanation of the implementation of this methodology is left for the Web Appendix.
To comply with the usual regularities conditions of the global game, a last assumption is
necessary.
Assumption 4.
∂Ui,τ
∂P
(1, P, t) >
∂Ui,τ
∂P
(0, P, t)
Assumption 2 and 3 state that as the number of church-goers increases, more goods are pro-
duced by the religious organization and the utility of all agents increases. What Assumption
4 adds is that these utility gains are higher for church-goers. In other words, church-goers
are the ones gaining the most as the church produces more goods and services. Assump-
tion 4 is a natural assumption that guarantees that the strategic complementarities between
participation decisions are present in all the parameter space. With assumptions 1 to 4 I
can identify the optimal participation in church activities for all agents. Any indiﬀerence is
resolved in favor of not participating in church.
Proposition 1.
Under Assumptions 1 to 4 participation strategies in equilibrium are symmetric for agents
of the same type. All secular agents participate in church activities with probability p∗S while
religious agents have probability p∗R.
Where (p∗S, p
∗
R) =
(1, 1) if t < tˆ(0, 1) if t ≥ tˆ
and tˆ is (weakly) decreasing in α and (weakly) increasing in q. 2
In equilibrium, religious agents always participate in church activities, while secular agents'
optimal strategy depends on the size of the state. The ﬁrst new testable hypothesis is that
2Proofs for all propositions can be found in appendix.
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only secular agents react to changes in the size of the state. In particular, they decide to
participate in church activities whenever the size of the state is under a certain threshold
(tˆ). As the size of the state increases, the needs fulﬁlled by the goods provided by the church
are, at least partially, already taken care of by the state and secular agents no longer need
to participate in church activities. In contrast, religious agents, given Assumption 1, always
have an incentive go to church.
Additionally, we can study how the threshold tˆ changes with some parameters of the
model. This is interesting because as tˆ increases, for the same size of the state t, we could
transition from a situation in which only religious agents go to church to a situation in which
secular agents also participate. First, notice that the share of religious agents in a country (q)
positively inﬂuences tˆ. This is because as the share of religious agents increases, more goods
are produced by religious organizations, ultimately increasing the incentives to participate
in church activities for secular agents. The eﬀect of state eﬃciency (α) on tˆ is exactly the
opposite. In this case, as the state become more eﬃcient, the state can distribute more goods
and services with the same amount of taxation. As α increases, it reaches a point at which
it crowds out the services provided by the church, and secular agents start to not participate
in church activities.
Now, I solve the optimal voting decision in the ﬁrst stage, taking into account the partic-
ipation decisions of the second stage. Given the previous results, we can rewrite the optimal
participation rules as a function of the taxation level p∗S(t), p
∗
R(t). Notice that p
∗
R(t) = 1 for
every level of t. With a slight abuse of notation, we can re-write the utility function to be
only a function of taxes as follows
Ui,τ (t) = W (αf(t) , h2(q + (1− q)p∗S(t)) p∗τ (t) + h1(q + (1− q)p∗S(t)))− t− pi + λτpi (2)
The voting process works as follows: after observing their type and the share of religious
agents, agents vote sincerely for their preferred size of the state. After the voting takes place,
the majority winner is implemented.
Formally, I deﬁne (t∗S, t
∗
R, t
∗) as a voting equilibrium in which t∗τ is the preferred size of
the state for agents of type τ . Given that agents vote sincerely, we have t∗τ argmaxt≥0 Ui,τ (t)
t∗ is the implemented size of the state, and given the majority rule, we have:
t∗ =
t∗R if q > 12t∗S if q ≤ 12
Proposition 2. Under assumptions 1 to 4: t∗S ≥ t∗R
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Proposition 2 states that secular agents prefer a (weakly) larger state than religious
agents. The reason is two-fold. The ﬁrst, more direct reason, is that religious agents always
participate in church activities, an thus they do not need a large state, as the church is
already taking care of many of their needs. Interestingly, there is also a second reason for
this equilibrium result that has not been discussed before in the literature. Religious agents
can use voting as a proselytization tool. In other words, when voting, religious agents take
into account that a smaller state induces secular agents to participate. This ultimately
increases the production of the church and favors religious agents. This means that religious
agents can use voting for a small state as a way of convincing secular agents to participate
and ultimately increase their own utility.
Furthermore, Proposition 2 gives a new theoretical explanation to a phenomenon that has
often been observed by many political scientists: individuals who are socially conservative
(in the model religious agents) tend to be more liberal in decisions on the role of the state
(in the model low taxes and small size of the state). Empirical evidence of this can be found
looking at the location of political parties or candidates in a 2-dimensional political space.
In this political space, one dimension concerns economic issues (Left-Right) and the other
one concerns social issues (Authoritarian-Libertarian). Political scientists have noticed that
in many elections, parties and candidates are located in a line instead of occupying all the
political space. The usual disposal of parties in this political space is that economically right
wing parties also tend to be more conservative on social issues, while economically left wing
parties tend to be socially liberal. This behavior has been observed in US congressional
voting by Poole and Rosenthal [Poole and Rosenthal (1984), Poole and Rosenthal (1991)].
The website policalcompass.org provides many examples of this phenomenon for modern
elections in Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US.
In order to explore the dynamics of religiosity, it is useful to ﬁnd the close form of the
optimal voting functions for secular (t∗S) and religious agents (t
∗
R). To have a well-behaved
solution, the following assumption is introduced.
Assumption 5. ∂W (αf(t),(h1(1)+h2(1))
∂t
< 1
This assumption states that in a situation in which all agents go to church, the marginal
beneﬁt of increasing the size of the state is lower that the marginal cost, which is one. In
other words, under the extreme situation in which all agents participate in church activ-
ities, additional state expenditure is ineﬃcient. To identify optimal voting behavior, any
indiﬀerence is resolved in favor of voting for the greater size of the state.
Proposition 3.
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Under assumptions 1 to 5 the voting equilibrium is:
For religious types: t∗R = 0
For secular types: t∗S =
0 if α < α˜t˜ if α ≥ α˜
t∗ =
0 q > 12 or α < α˜t˜ q ≤ 1
2
and α ≥ α˜
Where α˜ : W (0, h1(1) + h2(1))−W (α˜f(t˜(α˜)), h1(q))− 1 + t˜ = 0
and t˜(α) : αf
′
(t˜)W
′
1(αf(t˜), h1(q))− 1 = 0
As observed previously in Proposition 2, t∗R ≤ t∗S. Additionally, with Assumption 5, we
have a closed form solution of the voting strategies for both types of agents. In equilibrium,
religious agents always vote for the smallest state possible, while secular agents vote for a
small or a large state depending on the eﬃciency parameter α. In particular, in a situation
in which the state is very ineﬃcient, both secular and religious agents agree on voting for a
small state. The disagreement starts as soon as the eﬃciency of the state exceeds a certain
threshold, and in this case, elections are resolved in favor of the largest group.
2.2 The Dynamics of Secularization
I now present a dynamic version of the model in which the type of the agents is made
endogenous. Agents live for 2 periods the ﬁrst as children and the second as adults. Every
child has one adult parent. When the agents are children, they make no active decision
and just acquire their level of religiosity (τ). Their level of religiosity will depend on both
the participation decision and religiosity of the parent. Then, at the beginning of their
adulthood, every agent has a child. The rest of their adult life follows the static version of
the model; agents take their level of religiosity (τ) as given, vote on the size of the state and
decide whether to participate in church activities.
The inter-generational transmission of religious values works as follows. First, if the
parent participates in church activities, the child will become religious with probability c.
This captures church socialization of religious norms. This type of socialization is based
on the fact that children often follow their parent to church where they may be introduced
to religious ideas. This type of socialization then inﬂuences religiosity as an adult [Francis
and Brown (1991); Francis (1993)]. Second, religious parents may also transmit religious
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belief directly to children at home; I call this home socialization. This captures the usual
socialization inside the family, also known as direct vertical transmission of cultural traits
and social norms [Bisin and Verdier (2010)]. The main idea behind vertical transmission of
norms is that parents transmit with some probability their own type directly to their child.
In my model, b represents the probability that religious values are successfully transmitted
at home. For the theoretical analysis, the probability of the success of church and home
socialization are considered independent. A child will not be religious as an adult if both
church socialization and home socialization fail. In the Web Appendix, I present empirical
evidence that the intergenerational transmission of religious values is linked to religiosity
and church participation of the parents. Using retrospective questions found in the ISSP
dataset 3, I show that even controlling for many observables, being raised in a religious family
and having parents that participated in church activities is always positively correlated with
being religious as an adult. Being raised in a religious family increases probability of being
religious as an adult by 8 percentage points (an increase of 55%) and having a parent who
went to church when a person was a child increase that probability by 3 percentage points
(an increase of 20%).
Before writing down the dynamic model is useful to deﬁne the function that links par-
ticipation equilibrium behavior to the share of religious individuals q. Using the function
t∗(q) from Proposition 3 and p∗τ (t) from Proposition 1, we can deﬁne the following function
P ∗τ (q) ≡ p∗τ (t∗(q)). We can then use the deﬁnition of intergenerational transmission and
P ∗τ (q) to link the share of religious individuals at generation g (qg) to the share of religiosity
of the next generation (qg+1) in the following way:
qg+1 = (1− (1− b)(1− c)) qg + c P ∗S(qg) (1− qg)
What this dynamic equation states is that the next generation's share of religious indi-
viduals (qg+1) will be some of the children of the religious individuals of this generation (qg).
The children of religious parents that are not religious upon reaching adulthood are only
the ones for whom both church and home socialization fail, which happens with probability
(1− b)(1− c). In addition, some children of the secular parents of generation g may become
religious in generation g + 1. These are the children of secular parents who go to church
(P ∗S(qg)(1− qg)) and are made religious by church socialization.
Deﬁnition 1. q∗ is a (locally) stable equilibrium if:
1. q∗ = (1− (1− b)(1− c)) q∗ + c P ∗S(q∗) (1− q∗)
3A complete description of the ISSP dataset and the waves used is provided in the Web Appendix.
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2. ∃δ > 0 : if qg ∈ (q∗ − δ, q∗ + δ) then limg→∞ qg = q∗
Where part 1. deﬁnes q∗ as a ﬁxed point of the equation that describes the dynamics of
intergenerational transmission of religiosity. Then, part 2. introduces the concept of local
stability.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions 1 to 5 the stable equilibria are:
1. q∗ = 0 if α ≥ α˜ (Secular Equilibrium)
2. q∗∗ = c
1−b+cb if α < α˜ or
c
1−b+cb >
1
2
(Religious Equilibrium)
Where q∗∗ is increasing in c.
Proposition 4 states that two stable equilibria exist: One in which all the individuals are
secular and another in which religious individuals are the majority. The main determinant
of long-run religiosity is the state eﬃciency α. To illustrate the dynamics of this process in
Figure 1, I present 3 examples of possible phase diagrams. The top-left graph of Figure 1
shows a phase diagram in which the only equilibrium is the religious one. This occurs when
α is small (α < α˜). In this case, independent of the starting situation, all agents vote for
the smallest size of the state possible, and the dynamics will move to an equilibrium where
c
1−b+cb share of the individuals are religious
4. As α increases, secular individuals start voting
for a bigger state. The top-right graph of Figure 1 shows a situation in which both stable
equilibria co-exist. This situation is possible when α > α˜, leading secular individuals to
vote for a large state. At the same time, church and home socialization are very eﬀective
( c
1−b+cb >
1
2
) pushing the dynamics in the other direction. Finally, the bottom graph of
Figure 1, depicts a situation in which the dynamics slowly move towards a situation where
in the long-run, all individuals will be secular and there will be a large state independent
of the starting point. This is possible when the state is very eﬃcient and at the same time
socialization at home and at church are not. These results show that changes in the eﬃciency
of the state and the strength of religious socialization are important factors when trying
to understand the secularization of much of the western world in the last few generations.
Conversely, these dynamics may be able to explain the persistence of high levels of religiosity
in so many developing or failed states.
4Notice that c1−b+cb is a properly deﬁned share given that b and c are the probabilities of 2 independent
events.
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2.3 Endogenous State Eﬃciency
Given the central role that state eﬃciency plays in determining the dynamics of religiosity
and the size of the state, it is important to understand how state eﬃciency (α) can be
determined. In this extension of the basic model, I study which is the preferred level of state
eﬃciency for religious and secular agents. When studying the preferred state eﬃciency, the
agent religiosity τ , the share of religious individuals q and the size of the state t are taken
as given. What I show is that agents, particularly religious ones, may be willing to choose a
level of eﬃciency of the state lower than the maximum obtainable one. This provides another
channel that may link religiosity to the presence of a small and potentially ineﬃcient state.
Formally, the preferred level of state eﬃciency can be written as following:
argmaxα[o,α]W (αf(t) , h2(P (α)) pi(α) + h1(P (α)))− t− pi(α) + λτpi(α)
The parameter α represents the maximum obtainable state eﬃciency. Agents could lower
the state eﬃciency below the maximum obtainable level by voting for a corrupt or inept
politician, damaging public property, doing violent acts against the state, and so on. Notice
that here, there are no direct gains from accepting state ineﬃciencies but only direct costs (a
reduction of the goods produced by the state αf(t)). Because of this, if one looks only at the
direct eﬀect of reducing α, no agent would ever agree to reduce the level of eﬃciency of the
state below the maximum obtainable level (α). The reason that a reduction of α below the
maximum obtainable level may be proﬁtable is the existence of indirect beneﬁts of a reduction
of α. As shown in Proposition 1, a lower α may convince some individuals to participate
in church activities. The reason for this is that as the state eﬃciency decreases, services
provided by the state no longer completely crowd-out the church. Because of this, more
individuals go to church, more goods are produced by this religious organization, proﬁting
some agents. To better understand these indirect beneﬁts of lowering α, it is helpful to
re-write the optimal participation in church activities found in Proposition 1 in the following
way:
Corollary 1.
Under Assumptions 1 to 4 participation strategies in equilibrium are symmetric for agents
of the same type. All secular agents participate in church activities with probability p∗S, while
religious agents do so with probability p∗R.
(p∗S, p
∗
R) =
(1, 1) if α < αˆ(0, 1) if α > αˆ
Where αˆ :
´ 1
0 W (αˆf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αˆf(t), [h2(q+(1−q)pS)+h1(q+(1−q)pS)])dpS+1 = 0
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The threshold structure of Proposition 1 is maintained. Taking into account both the direct
and the indirect eﬀects of changes in state eﬃciency the optimal level of α for secular and
religious agents is shown below.
Proposition 5. α∗τ =
α if α < αˆ or α > αταˆ otherwise
and αR > αS
The results show how there are indeed some values of α for which individuals are willing
to accept some level of state ineﬃciency. State ineﬃciency is optimal for an agent only if
the loss in goods that the state produces is more than compensated by the gains that would
come from convincing other agents to participate in church activities. In the case that α is
already very low (for α < αˆ), there are no incentives in further reducing the eﬃciency of the
state because as shown in Corollary 1, everybody is already participating. In the case that α
is very high (for α > αR), the state eﬃciency has to be reduced by too much to make secular
individuals start participating in church activities. In other words, the costs of a reduction
in state ineﬃciency is too high with respect to the indirect gains. For intermediate values of
α (for α[αˆ, αR]), state ineﬃciency is optimal. For these values of α the cost of convincing a
secular agent to participate is lower than the gains from more people participating in church
activities.
Finally, notice how this intermediate region can be further separated into two distinct
subregions. For some values of α (for α[αˆ, αS]), all the individuals agree that they should
have a certain level of ineﬃciency. In this case, a known corrupt politician could actually win
the elections even if he keeps all of the gains from the corruption for himself. For some other
values found in this intermediate region (for α[αS, αR]), there is some disagreement. In
particular, only religious types would like some form of ineﬃciency while secular individuals
are better oﬀ if the state produces at its maximum eﬃciency.
These results demonstrate that is possible for individuals to want corruption and inef-
ﬁciencies in the state even if they do not have directly beneﬁt from them. There are two
reasons why this is the case. First, religious individuals would like secular individuals to
participate in church activities (because of h′2 > 0). As shown in Corollary 1, one way of
convincing secular individuals to do so is by decreasing α. Second, reducing the eﬃciency
of the state can solve the coordination problem that secular individuals face when decid-
ing whether to participate in church activities. This coordination problem exists because for
some values in the parameters space, there is the possibility for gains if all secular individuals
coordinate and start going to church even if individually it is not rational. This coordination
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can be solved by reducing the eﬃciency of the state to the point that all secular individuals
decide to go to church.
3 Empirical Application
The objective of this chapter is to present some evidence of the prediction of the model ob-
tained in the previous section. I ﬁrst look at church participation, particularly how it relates
to spending by the state. Second, I study the relationship between voting preferences over
the size of the state and religiosity. Special care is taken in controlling for other alternative
explanations of the determinants of participation in church activities and preferences of over
the size of the state found in the literature.
3.1 Participation in Church Activities
For this analysis, I use information from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP),
which is a compilation of cross-country surveys devoted each year to diﬀerent speciﬁc topics.
In 3 years (1991, 1998 and 2008), the survey was devoted to the study of religious behaviors
and beliefs across 38 countries. This particular dataset has been used by other authors in
the literature such as Iannaccone (2003); McCleary and Barro (2006); Scheve and Stasavage
(2006); Stegmueller (2010) because of the numerous types of questions that are available
assessing diﬀerent aspects of the religious life of individuals. Of particular importance for
this analysis is the possibility of having measures both of attendance at religious service
and intensity of religious beliefs. This is an important distinction between religious actions
(pi) and religious types (τ) that is made in the model and has previously been neglected in
this empirical literature. The Web Appendix contains a careful description of the variables
used in the empirical analysis with a complete list of countries of countries with summary
statistics of the most important variables
I run the ﬁrst set of regressions aimed at understanding the factors associated with church
participation and ﬁnding whether empirical regularities are in line with the results found in
Proposition 1. The preferred speciﬁcation for this set of regressions takes the following form:
Prob(pi,c,t = 1 | Zi,c,t) = φ(θ1ri,c,t+θ2Wc,t+θ3ri,c,t∗Wc,t+θ4r¯c,t+θ5GEc,t+θXi,t,c+i,c,t > 0) (3)
Where i identiﬁes the individual, c the country and t the year. On the left-hand side,
pi,c,t is a dichotomous variable that is one if the individual goes in church several times a
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year. The theoretical counterpart of this variable is the participation to church (variable
pi,τ in the model). On the right-hand side, I control for various regressors Zi,c,t that include
ri,c,t, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual describes himself as very
or extremely religious. In the theoretical model, this represents the type of individual τ
that is either R if religious and S if secular. Wc,t is the welfare expenditure. For the main
results, the OECD measure of total social spending as a percentage of GDP is used. For
the countries in this dataset, these are goods and services that answer needs similar with
respect to the ones provided by religious organizations. The theoretical counterpart is t.
Furthermore, the interaction between these 2 regressors is added (ri,c,t∗Wc,t) to check whether
correlations between church participation and the size of the state varies between religious
and secular individuals as suggested by Proposition 1. Additionally, I control for the share
of religious individuals in a country (r¯c,t) and the state eﬃciency index from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators produced by the World Bank (GEc,t). These 2 observables are proxies
in the model for the variables q and α that represent the share of individuals that are
of type R and the eﬃciency of the state, respectively. Many other observable individual
and country characteristics are added to the regression (Xi,t,c). Furthermore, in my most
preferred speciﬁcation, I add country ﬁxed eﬀects. This implies that the variation exploited
in the estimation are changes of the variables of interest inside a country between diﬀerent
years or individuals.
Table 1 contains the marginal eﬀects of some regressors of interest of the PROBIT es-
timates of the equation (3). Column (1) contains the most basic regression in which the
individual participation decision is regressed only on observable individual characteristics,
time ﬁxed eﬀect and the size of the welfare state. Column (2) introduces country ﬁxed
eﬀects. Finally, column (3) is the preferred speciﬁcation and also includes the interaction
between welfare spending and religiosity.
First, not surprisingly religiosity is positively correlated to participation decisions of
individuals. Welfare state spending is negatively correlated to church participation. The
marginal eﬀect of the interaction term is positive as observed in column (3). In other words,
the correlation between welfare spending and participation in church is more negatively
correlated for secular individuals. The share of religious individuals is positively correlated to
church participation, while state eﬃciency is negatively correlated. All these correlations are
in line with the comparative statics shown in Proposition 1 that demonstrates that religious
individuals go to church more often and that increases in state eﬃciency (α) decrease the
probability of going to church, while increases in the share of religious individuals (q) increase
this probability. All these results are highly statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, increases in the
welfare state make secular individuals participate in church activities more often while not
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aﬀecting religious individuals. This last result is in line with the coeﬃcients shown in column
(3) in which the correlation between the size of welfare spending and participation for secular
individuals is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while the correlation between the
size of the welfare state and participation in church for religious individuals is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (test for θ2 + θ3 6= 0 not reported in Table 1 has p− value = 0.53).
To have an idea of the size of these eﬀects I use the estimates of column (3) and present
the degree to which a one standard deviation change in some variables of interest aﬀect
the probability of participating in church activities. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in the share of GDP spent on the welfare state implies a 4 percentage point decrease
less in the probability of participating in church activities for non-religious individuals and
only a 0.8 percentage point decrease for religious ones. The decrease for religious individuals
is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Finally, a one standard deviation increase in state
eﬃciency implies a 4 percentage point decrease in the average probability of participating in
church activities. Additionally, I show how these results are robust to a diﬀerent deﬁnition
of being religious and participation to church activities. I also provide evidence of how
the results are robust to diﬀerent measure of the size of the state and estimation strategies
(results found in the Web Appendix).
Finally, to provide further evidence of the mechanism, I run a series of placebo regressions
in which I include measures of the size of the state in sectors that do not compete with
what religious organizations provide for the countries in my sample. These public expenses
are military expenditures, tertiary education and R&D. I also include the sum of all state
expenses that are not welfare expenditures. In Table 2, we can see how all these measures of
public spending are either positively or not statistically correlated to church participation.
These results give further evidence to the fact that the main driver of the results shown
in Proposition 1 is the direct competition of some state goods and services with the ones
provided by the church. In terms of the model, W ′′12 is equal to zero for state expenditures
unrelated to the welfare state in the countries included in the sample. Because of this, I do
not observe the eﬀects of state spending on participation in church.
3.2 Preferences Over the Size of the State and Religiosity
I now study the empirical relationship between preferences over the size of the state (PSS)
and religiosity to determine if the results are in line with Proposition 2. For studying the
determinants of the preferences over the size of the state, I merge the 1990, 1996 and 2006
waves of the ISSP, which include 32 countries and approximately 50,000 observations.
The econometric speciﬁcation has the following form:
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PSSi,c,t = δ1ri,c,t + δ2Xi,t,c + δ3Zt,c + δ4FEc + i,c,t (4)
Where, as before, i identiﬁes the individual c the country and t the survey year. As
a dependent variable, PSSi,c,t measures the preferences over the size of the state. I only
include preferences over the size of the state in areas of the state in which it competes
with goods and services that the church provides. In the context of the countries analyzed,
these areas are health, education, old age pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. The higher
this number is, the more spending individual i wants with respect to how much is given
in country c at time t. On the right-hand side, ri,c,t is a dichotomous variable that takes
the value one if individual i is religious and is the empirical counterpart of the type τ in
the model. The variable Xi,t,c contains some observable individual characteristics and Zt,c
contains country-speciﬁc characteristics. Finally, I also include country ﬁxed eﬀects FEc.
Table 3 contains the results of the estimations of equation (4). Columns (1) to (4) present
the marginal eﬀect of a PROBIT estimation in which PSSi,c,t is equal to 1 if the individual
thinks the state should spend more or spend much more, while it is 0 if he thinks the
state should spend less or spend much less in the particular category of state spending. In
column (5), OLS estimates are provided in which PSSi,c,t is the principal component of the
answer to all 4 previous categories of spending. This number has been normalized to have a
mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In all the speciﬁcations, religious individuals
have in average lower preference for additional state spending than the secular ones. These
results are highly statistically signiﬁcant. This is perfectly in line with the comparative
statics of Proposition 2, which predicts that religious individuals should vote for a state of
a smaller size in areas directly competing with the church. The results of column (5) show
that being religious lowers one's preferences for state spending by approximately 7% of a
standard deviation. To comprehend the magnitude of this coeﬃcient, I compare it to the
eﬀect that income has on preferences over spending by the state on these social issues. In
previous research [Ravallion and Lokshin (2000); Corneo and Grüner (2002); Alesina and
Giuliano (2009)], personal and family income has been shown to be a very good predictor of
preferences over the size of social spending by the state. Being religious instead of secular
has approximately the same eﬀect of increasing one's income position by one quartile (result
not reported).
Finally in Table 4, I run a series of placebo regressions. In these regressions, I again
estimate equation (4), studying the correlation between religiosity and preferences over the
size of the state for the areas of military, law and enforcement, research and environmental
protection spending. For the countries in the sample, these are areas that do not compete
with the church. The results in Table 4 show that most of the correlations between religiosity
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and preferences for additional public spending are positive (the only exception is public
spending on environmental protection). This provides partial evidence of the fact that the
negative correlation between religiosity and preferences for additional welfare previously
observed is due to the competition between the goods provided by the church and speciﬁc
areas of state spending.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects of competition between the state and a religious organization.
What links the two institutions is the fact that the state and the church provide goods
and services that answer similar needs. The mechanism explored in this paper could be
present in more situations in which goods provided by the state and those provided by a
non-state organization (in this paper, the church) answer similar needs. In particular, this
paper shows that the rise and fall of this non-state organization is determined by government
eﬃciency. If the state is highly ineﬃcient, individuals vote for a small size of the state. This
leaves a void that is ﬁlled by the provision of goods and services by the non-governmental
organization. Finally, this cycle is reinforced by the intergenerational transmission of norms
conductive to participation in the non-governmental organization (in this paper religiosity)
and by endogenous destruction of state eﬃciency that may happen due to the existence of
this non-state organization.
Examples of these other non-state organizations can be found in the Italian Maﬁa that
provides protection in areas in which the state cannot or is not able to do so. The Maﬁa
has been shown to have developed in order to ﬁll the void left by the newly formed Italian
state protecting the citrus sector [Dimico, Isopi and Olsson (2012)] or the sulfur industry
[Buonanno et al. (2015)]. Similarly, especially in Latin America, criminal groups are domi-
nant in many areas, as they are able to provide better social services and public goods than
the state and can even provide socio-economic services such as health clinics and trash
disposal [Felbab-Brown (2011)]. Examples of this can be observed in Sao Paulo's favelas,
where organized crime groups as Primero Comando da Capital also provide unoﬃcial courts
and dispute resolution mechanisms. More generally, as observed in a recent UNDP report
[Wojkowska (2006)], non-state informal justice systems that compete with the formal system
are wide-spread around the world. Notable examples are the sharia courts in Afghanistan
that substituted formal courts after the failure of the state to provide a proper resolution
mechanism [Barﬁeld, Nojumi and Thier (2006)] or the Masai groups in Uganda that provide
law and order as an informal police force [Titeca (2009)]. As noted by the UNDP report,
the reasons for the emergence of these non-state justice systems are mistrust in the formal
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law, lack of understanding of the language, physically or ﬁnancially inaccessibility, culturally
uncomfortable or long process time. These are all instances of very low state eﬃciency in
the provision of a formal justice system. Berman and Laitin (2008) show how many terror-
ists and violent groups behave as clubs, providing goods and services states are not able to
provide. For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan gained popularity in the late 90s by pro-
viding security against bandits that were stopping trade to Pakistan and Iran. Hamas gained
support by providing many social services that where not provided the Israeli occupational
government. Hezbollah provided schools, charities and hospitals. The US Institute of Peace
[Onuoha (2014)] found in a survey that almost 70% of the participants cited the Nigerian
government's high rate of corruption as an important factor in the success of the terrorist
group Boko Haram. As shown in Masera and Yousaf (2015), the Taliban in Pakistan has
increased its support by providing ﬂood relief and dispute resolution mechanisms where the
state is not able to.
More research remains to be conducted to understand whether the mechanisms described
in this paper are also able to explain these situations. Two important caveats arise with
respect to applying the mechanism described in this paper to these situations of competition
between state and non-state actors. First, in many of the situations described, the size of
the state is decided in a non-democratic way. Nevertheless the under-provision of goods by
the state may not be caused by the outcome of majority rule but rather by the decision of an
elite or the ruling class. Second, in many of the situations described above, these non-state
actors may use force to gain supporters and weaken the state. At the same time, the state
may use violence to undermine or eliminate the non-state competitor. This adds another
layer to the competition between state and non-state actor in which they compete not only
through the provision of goods and services but also through the use of force.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Tables and Figures
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Figure 1: Top-Left: Only Religious Equilibrium, Top-Right: Secular Equilibrium and
Religious Equilibrium Bottom: Only Secular Equilibrium
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Table 1: Participation in Church Activities: PROBIT regression, Marginal
Eﬀects at the Mean
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Model Country FE Preferred
Religiosity Dummy (τ) 0.432 0.382 0.269
(0.00693) (0.00682) (0.0263)
Welfare Spending (t) -1.201 -0.692 -0.739
(0.0409) (0.209) (0.210)
Welfare Spending * Religiosity 0.587
(0.133)
Share Religious Individuals (q) 0.519 0.528
(0.176) (0.176)
Goverment Eﬃciency (α) -0.0396 -0.0391
(0.0171) (0.0171)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes
Observations 50890 50890 50890
Note: The table reports the PROBIT marginal eﬀects at the mean and
robust standard errors (in brackets). The dependent variable in all
speciﬁcation is a participation dummy that takes value one if the in-
dividual goes to church several times a year. Religiosity is a dummy
that takes value one if the individual condsider himself very religious
or extremely religious. Welfare Spending is the public expenditure in
welfare as a percentage of GDP. Share of religious individuals is the
percentage of religious individuals in a country-year. State eﬃciency
is the ﬁrst principal component of the "Government Eﬀectiveness",
"Regulatory Quality" and "Corruption" indexes with standardinzed to
have zero mean and standard deviation of 1. Individual characteristics
include sex, age, marital status, work status, education degree, size
of the household, type of occupation, hours worked, if you supervise
somebody at the job and income quartile. Country characteristics in-
clude GDP and the share of religious individuals that follow the main
religion.
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Table 2: Participation in Church Activities: PROBIT Regression, Marginal Eﬀects at the Mean, Placebo
Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Military Tertiary Education Research Non Welfare
Religiosity Dummy (τ) 0.196 0.337 0.228 0.300
(0.0349) (0.0338) (0.0296) (0.0362)
Other Government Spending 0.187 0.00675 -0.0000572 0.0254
(0.0201) (0.00181) (0.0178) (0.00232)
Other Government Spending * Religiosity 0.0200 0.00367 0.0457 0.000380
(0.00727) (0.00103) (0.00801) (0.00136)
Goverment Eﬃciency (α) -0.0324 -0.0398 0.0132 -0.282
(0.0171) (0.0317) (0.0210) (0.0317)
Share Religious Individuals (q) 0.268 0.224 0.194 -1.141
(0.179) (0.214) (0.283) (0.324)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50890 35964 38173 36079
Note: The table reports the PROBIT marginal eﬀects at the mean and robust standard errors (in brack-
ets). The dependent variable in all speciﬁcation is a participation dummy it takes value one if the
individual goes to church several times a year. Religiosity is a dummy that takes value one if the in-
dividual condsider himself very religious or extremely religious. In column 1 government expenditure
indicates the public military expenditure as a percentage of GDP as provided by SIPRI. In column 2
government expenditure indicates public expenditure in tertiary education per pupil as a percentage
of GDP per capita as produced by UNESCO. In column 3 government expenditure indicates public
expenditure for research and development as a percentage of GDP as produced by UNESCO. Finally
in column 4 non welfare indicates the diﬀerence between total public expenses as a percentage of GDP
as produced by the IMF and welfare ecxpenditure as a percentage of GDP as produced by the OECD
SOCX. Share of religious individuals is the percentage of religious individuals in a country-year. Gov-
ernment eﬃciency is the ﬁrst principal component of the "Government Eﬀectiveness", "Regulatory
Quality" and "Corruption" indexes standardinzed to have zero mean and standard deviation of 1.
Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, work status, education degree, size of the
household, type of occupation, hours worked, if you supervise somebody at the job and income quar-
tile. Country characteristics include GDP and the share of religious individuals that follow the main
religion.
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Table 3: Preference over the Size of the State: The Eﬀects of Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Health Education Old Age Pens. Unem. Ben. PSS
Religious Dummy (τ) -0.00527 -0.00855 -0.00199 -0.0394 -0.0722
(0.00233) (0.00240) (0.00280) (0.00631) (0.0107)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41921 38603 35455 27105 44854
Note: The table reports the estimates and robust standard errors (in brackets). The depen-
dent variable in column (1) to (4) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual answer
that the state should "spend more" or "spend much more" while is 0 if he think the state
should "spend less" or "spend much less". The categories of spending are public health in
column (1), education in column (2), old age pensions in column (3) and ﬁnally unemploy-
ment beneﬁts in column (4). In column (5) OLS estimates are provided where the depen-
dent variable is the principal component of the answer to all 4 previous categories of public
spending. This number has to normalized to have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation
of 1. Religiosity is a dummy that takes value one if the individual declares himself as re-
ligious. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, work status, education
degree, size of the household, type of occupation, hours worked, if you supervise somebody
at the job, income quartile. Country characteristics include GDP, the share of religious
individuals that follow the main religion, state eﬃcicency, voice and accountability index,
political stability index, share of religious individuals.
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Table 4: Preference for Additional Welfare: The Eﬀects of Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Military Law Enforcement Research Environment Non Welfare
Religious Dummy (τ) 0.0607 0.0384 0.0123 -0.0184 0.107
(0.00594) (0.00474) (0.00268) (0.00474) (0.0115)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30970 31563 43817 31199 46030
Note: The table reports the estimates and robust standard errors (in brackets). The dependent
variable in column (1) to (4) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual answer that the
state should "spend more" or "spend much more" while is 0 if he think the state should "spend
less" or "spend much less". The categories of spending are military spending in column (1), law
enforcement in column (2), spending in reasearch in column (3) and ﬁnally defence of the environ-
ment in column (4). In column (5) OLS estimates are provided where the dependent variable is
the principal component of the answer to all 4 previous categories of spending. This number has
to normalized to have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation of 1. Religiosity is a dummy that
takes value one if the individual declares himself as religious. Individual characteristics include
sex, age, religious group, marital status, work status, education degree, size of the household, type
of occupation, hours worked, if you supervise somebody at the job and income quartile. Coun-
try characteristics include GDP, share of religious individuals that follow the main religion, state
eﬃcicency, voice and accountability index, political stability index, share of religious individuals.
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5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First notice that given Assumption 1 - 4 religious individuals always participate in church
activities. Even in the worst case scenario for a religious individual (nobody goes to church)
the costs of going to church is lower than the gains. Formally:
Ui,R(1, 0, t) = W (αf(t), [h2(0) + h1(0)])− t− 1 + λ > UR(0, 0, t) = W (αf(t), h1(0))− t ∀t
Given this result we can redeﬁne with a slight abuse of notation the utility of a secular
individuals as a function of its own participation decision (pi), the share of secular individuals
that participate (PS) and taxation level (t).
Ui,S(pi, PS, t) = W (αf(t), [h1(q + (1− q)PS) + h2(q + (1− q)PS)pi])− t− pi
Following the global game procedure described in the Web Appendix the modiﬁed utility
function for the secular citizens is:
UMODi,S (pi, PS, t) = W (αf(t), [h1(q + (1− q)PS) + h2(q + (1− q)PS)pi])− t− (1 + σi)pi
It can be shown that UMODi,S satisﬁes all the global game conditions found in Morris and Shin
(2003) :
• A1: Action monotonicity comes directly from assumption 4
• A2: State monotonicity, A3: Strict Laplacian State monotonicity and A4: Limit Dom-
inance come from the fact that the noise enters linearly the utility function
• A5: Continuity comes directly from the global game assumption on the distribution of
i to be continuous
Then optimal strategy for secular individuals when σ → 0 is:
p∗S =
1 if F (t, α, q) < 00 if F (t, α, q) > 0
F (t, α, q) =
´ 1
0
W (αf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)+h1(q+(1−q)pS))dpS+1
Given Assumption 2 and 3 we have:
∂F (t, α, q)
∂t
=
1ˆ
0
αf
′
(t)(W
′
1(αf(t), h2(q + (1− q)pS)−W
′
1(αf(t), h2(q + (1− q)pS)
+ h1(q + (1− q)pS))dPS > 0
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This already completely characterize all the equilibria and the comparative statics. In par-
ticular the fact that as t increases the relevant equilibrium passes from being p∗S = 1 to
p∗S = 0.
Now for exposition purpose is very helpful to rewrite the results as a threshold strategy
around tˆ. This will come at a cost of the introduction of a slight simpliﬁcation but increase
clarity in the exposition of the results.
Deﬁne tˆ :
´ 1
0 W (αf(tˆ), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αf(tˆ), [h2(q+(1−q)pS)+h1(q+(1−q)pS)])dpS+1 = 0
Given that F (t, α, q) is always increasing in t if tˆ exists it is unique.
tˆ doesn't exists under 2 scenarios:
1. Either F (t, α, q) is always negative. This could never happen given Assumption 2
2. Either F (t, α, q) is always positive. This happens when the production of the state is
incredibly eﬃcient with respect to the church. In this case, no matter what are the
values of the parameters t, α, q, secular never go to church and religious individuals
always go.
For the remainder of the proof case 2. is left out as it do not introduce any type of strategic
decisions for the citizens as in this case their choice do not change with any of the parameters
values. This simpliﬁcation is also reasonable as this is a paper about competition between
the state and the church and case 2. there is no competition as the eﬃciency state is too
high for the church to matter. Readers interested also in case 2. can go back to the more
cumbersome presentation of the results with the function F (t, α, q).
So when tˆ now we can rewrite the optimal participation strategy as:
(p∗S, p
∗
R) =
(1, 1) if t < tˆ(0, 1) if t > tˆ
Deriving this with respect to α and using implicit function theorem we get:
αf
′
(tˆ)
∂tˆ
∂α
ˆ 1
0
W
′
1(αf(tˆ), h2(q + (1− q)pS)−W
′
1(αf(tˆ), [h2(q + (1− q)pS) + h1(q + (1− q)pS)])dpS
+f(tˆ)
ˆ 1
0
W
′
1(αf(tˆ), h2(q + (1− q)pS)−W
′
1(αf(tˆ), [h2(q + (1− q)pS) + h1(q + (1− q)pS)])dpS = 0
So given Assumption 2 and 3 ∂tˆ
∂α
< 0
Again deriving this with respect to q and using implicit function theorem we get:
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αf
′
(tˆ)
∂tˆ
∂q
ˆ 1
0
W
′
1(αf(tˆ), h2(q + (1− q)pS)−W
′
1(αf(tˆ), [h2(q + (1− q)pS) + h1(q + (1− q)pS)])dpS
+
ˆ 1
0
(1− PS)[h′2(q + (1− q)pS)W
′
2(αf(tˆ), h2(q + (1− q)pS) −
−(h′2(q + (1− q)pS) + h1(q + (1− q)pS))W
′
2(αf(tˆ), [h2(q + (1− q)pS) + h1(q + (1− q)pS)]) = 0
So given Assumption 2 and 3 ∂tˆ
∂q
> 0
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The utility function for secular individuals is:
Ui,S(t) =
UAi,S(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 for t < tˆUBi,S(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q))− t for t > tˆ
Deﬁning t¨ : UAi,S(t¨) = U
B
i,S(t¨) or
t¨ : R1(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))−W (αf(t), h1(q)) = 1
Is useful to introduce a new function R2 in relationship with tˆ deﬁned as follows
tˆ : R2(t) ≡
´ 1
0 W (αf(tˆ), [h2(q+ (1− q)pS) +h1(q+ (1− q)pS)])−W (αf(tˆ), h2(q+ (1− q)pS)dpS = 1
Given Assumptions 2 and 3 we have that R1(t) > R2(t) ,
∂R1
∂t
< 0 and ∂R2
∂t
< 0 then t¨ exists
is unique and t¨ > tˆ
The utility function for religious individual is:
Ui,R(t) =
UAi,R(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 + λ for t < tˆUBi,R(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))− t− 1 + λ for t > tˆ
Let's ﬁrst deﬁne t˜ :
∂UAi,S
∂t
(t˜) = 0 or equivalently t˜ :
∂UAi,R
∂t
(t˜) = 0 , ˜˜t :
∂UBi,S
∂t
(˜˜t) = 0 and
˜˜˜
t :
∂UBi,R
∂t
(
˜˜˜
t) = 0
Notice that given Assumptions 2 and 3 ˜˜t >
˜˜˜
t > t˜
First I study the extreme case where tˆ < 0 or in other words even when the welfare state
doesn't exist secular individuals prefer to not go to church. As in Proposition 1 this case
is not particularly interesting as participation decisions of individuals do not vary with any
of the other variables of the model. I still will explicitly study it as this does not provide a
more cumbersome presentation of the results.
When tˆ < 0 the problem simpliﬁes and only the second part of the utility function (UBi,S, U
B
i,R)
matters for the maximization problem and the problem can be rewritten as
t∗S  argmaxt≥0 W (αf(t), h1(q))− t
and t∗R  argmaxt≥0 W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))− t− 1 + λ
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Given Assumptions 2 and 3 t∗S ≥ t∗R, where it is equal when the constraint at zero binds for
both maximization problems
Now I study the more interesting case where tˆ > 0 and divide the analysis in 2 sub-cases:
1. If
∂UAi,S
∂t
(0) < 0:
We have also
∂UAi,R
∂t
(0) < 0 and given UAi,R(t) > U
B
i,R(t) ∀t t∗S = 0 ⇒t∗S ≥ t∗R
2. If
∂UAi,S
∂t
(0) > 0
(a) and if t˜ < tˆ and UAi,S(t˜) < U
B
i,S(
˜˜t) we have t∗S = t
∗
R = t˜ as they are both the solution
of the same maximization problem
(b) and if t˜ < tˆ and UAi,S(t˜) > U
B
i,S(
˜˜t) we have t∗S =
˜˜t > t∗R = t˜
(c) ﬁnally if t˜ > tˆ is useful to modify the utility function of a religious individual in
the following way:
Umodi,R (t) =
U
A,mod
i,R (t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 for t < tˆ
UB,modi,R (t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))− t− 1 for t > tˆ
Given that this is an aﬃne transformation it has no eﬀect in the maximization
problem.
Now notice that given the optimality of participation decision of secular individ-
uals we have that for t > tˆ : UBi,S(t) > U
B,mod
i,R (t), or in other words there are no
incentive to not participate for secular individuals.
Because of this we have 2 possibilities:
Either UBi,S(
˜˜t) < UAi,R(tˆ) ⇒ UB,modi,R (
˜˜˜
t) < UAi,R(tˆ) = U
A,mod
i,R (tˆ) ⇒ t∗R = t∗S = tˆ
Or UBi,S(
˜˜t) > UAi,R(tˆ) ⇒ t∗S = ˜˜t > t∗R given that for t > tˆ : UBi,S(t) > UB,modi,R (t)
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Finding t∗S:
rewrite Ui,S(t) =
UAi,S(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 for t < tˆUBi,S(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q))− t for t > tˆ
Taking derivatives we have:
∂UAi,S
∂t
(t) = αf
′
(t)W
′
1(αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− 1 < 0 given Assumption 5
∂UBi,S
∂t
(t) = αf
′
(t)W
′
1(αf(t), h1(q))− 1
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Deﬁning t¨ : UAi,S(t¨) = U
B
i,S(t¨) or
t¨ : R1(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))−W (αf(t), h1(q)) = 1
Is useful to introduce a new function R2 in relationship with tˆ deﬁned as follows
tˆ : R2(t) ≡
´ 1
0 W (αf(tˆ), [h2(q+ (1− q)pS) +h1(q+ (1− q)pS)])−W (αf(tˆ), h2(q+ (1− q)pS)dpS = 1
Given Assumptions 2 and 3 we have that R1(t) > R2(t) ,
∂R1
∂t
< 0 and ∂R2
∂t
< 0 then we can
show that it exists is unique and t¨ > tˆ
Deﬁning t˜ : αf
′
(t˜)W
′
1(αf(t˜), h1(q))− 1 = 0 noticing in that
∂UAi,S
∂t
(t) <
∂UBi,S
∂t
(t) ∀t then
Then: t∗S =
0 UAi.S(0) > UBi,S(t˜)t˜ UAi.S(0) < UBi,S(t˜)
or alternatively: t∗S =
0 S(α) > 0t˜ S(α) < 0
Where S(α) ≡ W (0, h1(1) + h2(1))−W (αf(t˜), h1(q))− 1 + t˜
Given assumption 5 then ∂t˜
∂α
> 0 and is easy to show that ∂S
∂α
< 0
Then we can ﬁnally write: t∗S =
0 α < α˜t˜ α > α˜
where α˜ : W (0, h1(1) + h2(1))−W (α˜f(t˜(α˜)), h1(q))− 1 + t˜
Finding t∗R:
rewrite Ui,R(t) =
UAi,R(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 + λ for t < tˆUBi,R(t) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))− t− 1 + λ for t > tˆ
Taking derivatives we have:
∂UAi,R
∂t
(t) = αf
′
(t)W
′
1(αf(t), βh(1))− 1 < 0 given Assumptions 5
Notice that UAi,R(t) > U
B
i,R(t)
Then t∗R = 0
5.5 Proof of Proposition 4
First we ﬁnd conditions for the local stability of p∗S = 1
Substituting in Deﬁnition 2 we get: qg+1 = (1− (1− c)(1− b))qg + c(1− qg) = b(1− c)qg + c
So a candidate stable equilibrium is q∗ = c
1−b+cb and is stable because b(1− c) < 1
Proposition 1 shows that p∗S = 1 when t
∗ < tˆ and as shown in Proposition 2 this happens
when q > 1
2
or α < α˜. Because of this q∗ = c
1−b+cb is a stable equilibrium when either
q∗ = c
1−b+cb >
1
2
or α < α˜.
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Now we ﬁnd conditions for the local stability of p∗S = 0
Substituting in Deﬁnition 2 we get: qg+1 = (1− (1− c)(1− b))qg
So a candidate stable equilibrium is q∗ = 0 and is stable because (1− (1− c)(1− b)) < 1
Proposition 1 shows that p∗S = 0 when t
∗ ≥ tˆ and as shown in Proposition 2 this happens
when q ≤ 1
2
and α ≥ α˜. Because of this q∗ = 0 is a stable equilibrium if α ≥ α˜.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The strategy of this proof is to write the optimal participation strategy p∗τ explicitly as a
function of α. Then rewrite the utility functions of both religious and secular individuals as
a function of α and ﬁnd the optimal level for both types.
Deﬁne αˆ :
´ 1
0 W (αˆf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αˆf(t), [h2(q+(1−q)pS)+h1(q+(1−q)pS)])dpS+1 = 0
Notice that:
F (t, α, q) =
´ 1
0 W (αf(t), h2(q+ (1− q)pS)−W (αf(t), h2(q+ (1− q)pS) +h1(q+ (1− q)pS))dpS + 1
is increasing in α. Given this if αˆ exists then it is unique.
As in Proposition 1 the only time where αˆ doesn't exist is the uninteresting scenario where
secular individuals never go to church independently of the parameters of the model. As in
Proposition 1 for exposition purposes I do not report what would happen in this scenario.
Is easy to see that they do not provide any interesting insight in the eﬀects of α on any
participation choice decision. In this scenario given that α has no eﬀect on participation is
easy to see that α∗ for both types would be always α¯.
Now looking at the other cases we can then rewrite Proposition 1:
(p∗S, p
∗
R) =
(1, 1) if α < αˆ(0, 1) if α > αˆ
The utility function for religious individual is:
Ui,R(α) =
UAi,R(α) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 + λ for α < αˆUBi,R(α) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))− t− 1 + λ for α > αˆ
Notice that both functions are increasing in α and UAi,R(α) > U
B
i,R(α) ∀α
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Because of this maxα[0,α¯]Ui,R has 3 types of solutions. Before going trough the 3 possible
type equilibria let me deﬁne αR such that: αR : U
A
i,R(α¯) = U
B
i,R(αR). Given that U
B
i,R is
increasing in α and Assumption 2 then αR exists and is unique.
1. If α¯ < αˆ then UAi,R is the only relevant part of the utility function and the optimal α
isα∗R = α¯
2. If α¯ > αˆ and α¯ < αR then given the deﬁnition of αR the maximum is located in the
part where UAi,R is relevant and given that this function is increasing the optimal α is
α∗R = αˆ
3. If α¯ > αR then given both U
A
i,R and U
B
i,R are increasing and the deﬁnition of αRwe have
that the optimal α is α∗R = α¯
The utility function for secular individuals is:
Ui,S(α) =
UAi,S(α) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(1) + h2(1))− t− 1 for α < αˆUBi,S(α) ≡ W (αf(t), h1(q))− t for α > αˆ
Notice that both functions are increasing in. Now let's deﬁne α˜ : UAi,S(α˜) = U
B
i,S(α˜). Using
Assumption 2 we can show that UAi,S(α˜)−UBi,S(α˜) is decreasing and because of this α˜it exists
and is unique. Furthermore notice that α˜ > αˆ. This comes directly from the comparison of
the explicit function that deﬁne these 2 thresholds.
For making the comparison more explicit let me deﬁne:
1. αˆ :
´ 1
0 W (αˆf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αˆf(t), [h2(q+(1−q)pS)+h1(q+(1−q)pS)])dpS+1 = 0
2. α˜ : W (α˜f(t), h1(q))−W (α˜f(t), h1(1) + h2(1)) + 1 = 0
Deﬁne F1(α) =
´ 1
0 W (αf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αf(t), [h2(q+(1−q)pS)+h1(q+(1−q)pS)])dpS+1
and F2(α) = W (αf(t), h1(q))−W (αf(t), h1(1) +h2(1)) + 1 then we can notice that F2(α) >
F1(α) ∀α > 0 and both function are increasing in α. Then we can conclude that, as stated
before, α˜ > αˆ. With this information the problem results very similar to the one of the
religious individual. In particular because of this maxα[0,α¯]Ui,S has 3 types of solutions.
Before going trough the 3 possible type equilibria let me deﬁne αR such that: αR : U
A
i,S(α¯) =
UBi,S(αS). Given that U
B
i,S is increasing and Assumption 2 then αR exists and is unique.
1. If α¯ < αˆ then UAi,S is the only relevant part of the utility function and the optimal α is
α∗S = α¯
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2. If α¯ > αˆ and α¯ < αS then given the deﬁnition of αS the maximum is located in the
part where UAi,S is relevant and given that this function is increasing the optimal α is
α∗S = αˆ
3. If α¯ > αS then given both U
A
i,S and U
B
i,S are increasing and the deﬁnition of αSwe have
that the optimal α is α∗S = α¯
Now is just left to prove that αS ≤ αR.
First compare the deﬁnition of αS and αR :
1. αS : W (αˆf(t), h1(1) + h2(1)) = W (αSf(t), h1(q)) + 1
2. αR : W (αˆf(t), h1(1) + h2(1)) = W (αRf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))
Given W ′ > 0 for proving that αS ≤ αR we just need to prove that W (αf(t), h1(q)) ≥
W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q)) − 1. Notice that from the deﬁnition of αS and αR we have that
αS andαR > αˆ then in our region of interest
´ 1
0
W (αf(t), h2(q+(1−q)pS)−W (αf(t), h2(q+
(1− q)pS) + h1(q+ (1− q)pS))dpS + 1 > 0. Using this information and assumption 5 we get
that W (αf(t), h1(q)) ≥ W (αf(t), h1(q) + h2(q))− 1.
42
5.7 Data
The merged 1991, 1998 and 2008 waves of the ISSP comprise data for 38 countries that
total 66,000 observations (more than 50,000 coming from OECD countries). To identify
the religiosity of an individual, I use the following question: Would you describe yourself
as... (Extremely non-religious, Very non-religious, Somewhat non-religious, Neither
religious nor non-religious, Somewhat religious, Very religious or Extremely religious).
The question How often do you attend a religious service? (Never, Less frequently
than once a year, Once a year, Several times a year, Once a month, 2-3 times a
month, Once a week or Several times a week) is used as a measure for participation in
church activities. Table 5 presents the complete list of countries. In the second column of
Table 5, the high heterogeneity of the average participation in church activities is shown.
There are countries such as Finland in which only 21% of the citizens are regular church-
goers 5, while in the Philippines, 88% of the population regularly goes to church. High
levels of heterogeneity are also observed in total welfare expenditure as percentage of GDP.
Mexico spends approximately 7% of their GDP, while many Northern European and Central
European countries spend more than 4 times as much, with countries such as France spending
approximately 30% of the GDP on welfare. Additionally, redistribution levels are widely
heterogeneous. Countries such as Sweden reduce the Gini coeﬃcient by 0.22 points using
taxes and transfers, while countries such as Croatia even increase it. The most represented
main religion is Catholicism, with 47% of the observations, 28% of the observations come
from countries without a main religion6.
I also use the ISSP Role of the Government surveys conducted in 1990, 1996 and 2006
for data on the preferred size of the state. These are a collection of diﬀerent international
surveys from 32 countries on the opinions held by individuals about the role of the state. For
identifying preferences over the size of the state, I use the following question: Listed below
are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more
or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might
require a tax increase to pay for it. The possible answers are Spend much more, Spend
more, Spend the same as now, Spend less or Spend much less. The state spending
areas in developed countries that are more closely related to goods and services provided
by the church are health, education, old age pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Table 6
5A regular church-goer is deﬁned as an individual that answers the question How often do you attend a
religious service? with several times a year or more. Robustness of the results to this deﬁnition is provided
later in the paper.
6A country has no main religion if out of the religious population no religion denomination has more than
70%
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Country % Church % Religious % Welfare Redistribution Gov Eﬀ
Australia 30.2 41.9 15.9 0.24 0.73
Austria 51.6 55.2 25.4 0.36 0.84
Belgium 28.8 50.1 26.7 0.20 0.37
Chile 63.3 51.3 10.7 0.03 0.33
Croatia 74.9 76.6 . -0.03 -0.88
Cyprus 83.9 75.2 . 0.33 0.29
Czech Republic 29.7 21.4 17.9 0.34 -0.34
Denmark 30.6 22.8 26.2 0.47 1.30
Dominican R. 79.7 68.5 . 0.04 -1.94
Finland 20.8 38.1 24.3 0.41 1.13
France 24.1 28.3 29.2 0.39 0.35
Germany 35.6 32.8 24.5 0.40 0.75
Hungary 33.6 40.1 23.1 0.34 -0.31
Ireland 83.2 69.7 18.0 0.25 0.80
Israel 46.7 35.6 16.1 0.21 0.10
Italy 64.9 66.0 23.6 0.26 -0.53
Japan 48.6 25.3 17.3 0.15 -0.04
Latvia 42.2 34.8 . 0.30 -0.72
Mexico 76.6 69.4 7.2 0.05 -1.20
Netherlands 37.3 35.4 22.4 0.33 1.12
New Zealand 34.6 38.3 20.4 0.13 1.13
Norway 19.2 36.7 22.1 0.41 0.93
Philippines 88.5 83.9 . 0.01 -1.41
Poland 86.8 79.8 20.6 0.29 -0.55
Portugal 70.0 72.0 19.6 0.32 0.07
Russia 13.5 29.4 . 0.14 -2.11
Slovakia 59.3 57.7 17.0 0.31 -0.59
Slovenia 52.4 37.5 21.5 0.31 -0.06
South Africa 77.1 78.3 . 0.06 -0.83
South Korea 48.7 42.8 8.2 0.10 -0.43
Spain 63.3 50.1 21.6 0.23 0.23
Sweden 31.1 15.3 28.6 0.47 0.96
Switzerland 46.0 39.4 18.0 0.26 1.06
Turkey 79.5 87.6 11.1 0.07 -1.09
Ukraine 61.9 64.6 . 0.16 -2.18
United States 59.8 73.1 15.0 0.20 0.67
Uruguay 25.9 31.6 . 0.11 -0.61
Venezuela 69.7 70.4 . 0.05 -2.88
Note: % church is the share of individuals that goes to church several times a year, %
religious is the share of religious individuals in a country. % Welfare is the share of
the GDP spend in social services as measured by SOCX. Redistribution measures the
diﬀerence in pre and post taxes Gini income index. Gov Eﬀ is an index that measures
the state eﬀectiveness of the country as measured by the World Bank.
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presents the list of countries and some of the country characteristics.7
I control for many observable individual characteristics. In particular, I control for the
following: sex, age, marital status, work status, education degree, size of the household,
type of occupation, hours worked and whether the person supervises somebody at their job.
Furthermore, family income is used to identify the income quartile of each individual. All
data comes from the ISSP surveys. At the country level, I control for the log of the GDP
per capita.
As a measure for the size of the state, I use the Social Expenditure dataset (SOCX) by
the OECD, which presents the public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Public
social expenditure is deﬁned as follows: The provision by public institutions of beneﬁts
to, and ﬁnancial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide
support during circumstances which adversely aﬀect their welfare. For the OECD countries
in this dataset, these are goods and services that answer needs similar with respect to the
ones provided by religious organizations.
Unfortunately, the SOCX welfare state measures are available only for OECD countries.
Because of this, I also use an alternative measure of services provided by the states that is in
competition with the church and is available for all the countries in my sample. This mea-
sure is the diﬀerence between the pre-tax and post-tax Gini income coeﬃcients as produced
by the Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset (SWIID), developed in Solt (2009):
Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database, Social Science Quarterly,. This mea-
sure captures the degree to which the state redistributes income between individuals. In an
indirect way, churches are also trying to redistribute money across citizens by making rich in-
dividuals who participate in church activities pay donations that ﬁnance services speciﬁcally
targeted at the poor.
Finally, as a measure of the amount and quality of the goods provided by the state, I
control for indicators of state eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality and corruption constructed by
the World Bank.8.
7In the 1990, 1996 and 2006 ISSP waves the question Would you describe yourself as... (Extremely non-
religious, Very non-religious, Somewhat non-religious, Neither religious nor non-religious, Somewhat
religious, Very religious, or Extremely religious) is not available. To identify whether the individual is
religious, the following question is used: Do you belong to a religion? If yes, to which one?, and you are
considered religious if you answer yes. Using this question to identify religiosity tends to overestimate the
level of religiosity compared to the measure used in the ISSP waves of 1991, 1998 and 2008.
8The World Bank Governance indicators are available beginning in 1996. Because of this, I impute the
1996 value of the governance indicator to observations before 1996.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics
Country % Religious % M Health % M Educ. % M Pension % M Unem.
Australia 78.1 95.7 97.1 93.2 19.1
Bulgaria 99.6 99.1 98.4 97.6 89.7
Canada 84.7 93.0 94.8 84.1 45.3
Chile 88.6 99.4 98.9 99.1 95.6
Croatia 92.9 98.5 99.0 98.9 91.1
Cyprus 100.0 99.0 99.0 93.3 82.0
Czech Republic 47.6 96.5 94.4 94.0 32.8
Denmark 88.1 98.8 97.9 93.4 49.8
Finland 83.7 98.1 91.6 97.7 68.8
France 63.2 85.1 88.5 82.1 30.9
Germany 76.9 92.7 91.6 92.9 71.4
Hungary 93.2 99.2 98.4 97.9 60.5
Ireland 96.9 98.9 98.2 99.6 81.1
Italy 94.8 94.3 94.2 93.5 72.8
Japan 37.6 89.3 89.8 91.2 68.3
Latvia 60.2 99.4 99.0 99.2 83.1
Netherlands 60.9 97.2 98.2 87.4 25.0
New Zealand 69.8 98.7 99.0 93.3 13.3
Norway 91.0 98.7 95.6 97.8 46.6
Poland 92.1 98.8 98.5 98.6 74.3
Portugal 92.8 99.5 99.0 99.3 86.4
Russia 72.5 99.1 99.0 99.0 87.7
Slovenia 77.1 97.6 98.1 91.5 70.3
South Africa 85.5 97.5 96.5 95.7 90.6
South Korea 60.1 97.7 90.8 94.5 79.8
Spain 81.6 99.0 99.1 98.6 89.4
Sweden 77.0 98.3 94.5 95.4 64.2
Switzerland 87.5 73.3 92.0 88.1 55.6
United States 88.3 92.6 95.3 85.0 61.7
Uruguay 74.2 98.0 98.7 97.4 90.2
Venezuela 86.3 95.0 96.6 97.9 91.4
Note: % Religious is the share of religious individuals in a country. % M health is the percentage
of individuals that want more spending in health services by the state. % M Educ. is the
percentage of individuals that want more spending in educational services by the state. % M
Pension is the percentage of individuals that want more spending in old age pensions. % M Unem
is the percentage of individuals that want more spending in unemployment beneﬁts.
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5.8 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check in Table 7, I run a set of alternative regressions. In column (1), the
deﬁnition of being religious is relaxed to include also individuals who declare themselves to
be somewhat religious. In column (2), the participation dummy is changed to include only
individuals who go every month to church. Finally, in column (3), equation (3) is estimated
as a linear probability model. Qualitatively, most of the results remain unchanged.
Additionally, in Table 8, the same regression speciﬁcation as in equation (??) is esti-
mated; However, instead of using the OECD welfare state measure, I use the redistribution
measure as deﬁned by SWIID. This also expands my sample to observations from non-OECD
countries. All results are conﬁrmed and remain highly signiﬁcant. Again, all the correlations
are in line with the comparative statics of Proposition 1 even though more countries have
been included. Looking at size of these correlations, we can see how a one standard deviation
increase in the distance between pre- and post-tax Gini indexes implies a 10.5 percentage
point decrease in the probability of participating in church activities for secular individuals
while only decreasing 2.5 percentage points for religious individuals.
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Table 7: Participation in Church Activities: PROBIT regression, Marginal Eﬀects at the Mean
(1) (2) (3)
Alt. Religiosity Alt. Participation Linear Probability Model
Religiosity Dummy (τ) 0.340 0.132 0.187
(0.0144) (0.0184) (0.0196)
Welfare Spending (t) -0.594 -0.485 -0.685
(0.205) (0.180) (0.201)
Welfare Spending * Religiosity 0.161 1.017 0.876
(0.0698) (0.0940) (0.100)
Goverment Eﬃciency (α) -0.0600 0.00283 -0.0443
(0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0185)
Share Religious Individuals (q) -0.0223 -0.354 0.596
(0.0701) (0.149) (0.176)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50890 50890 50890
Note: The ﬁrst 2 columns of the table reports the PROBIT marginal eﬀects at the mean. The
last column reports the OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are found in the brackets. The
dependent variable Column 1 and 3 is a participation dummy. It takes value one if the indi-
vidual goes to church several times a year. In Column 2 an alternative deﬁnition of church
participation is included where it takes value one if the individual goes to church once a month
or more. In Column 2 and 3 Religiosity is a dummy that takes value one if the individual cond-
sider himself very religious or extremely religious. In Column 1 religiosity takes value 1 if the
individual condsider himself somewhat religious or more. Welfare Spending is the public ex-
penditure in welfare as a percentage of GDP. Share of religious individuals is the percentage of
religious individuals in a country-year. state eﬃciency is the ﬁrst principal component of the
"Government Eﬀectiveness", "Regulatory Quality" and "Corruption" indexes standardinzed to
have zero mean and standard deviation of 1. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital
status, work status, education degree, size of the household, type of occupation, hours worked,
if you supervise somebody at the job and income quartile. Country characteristics include GDP
and the share of religious individuals that follow the main religion.
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Table 8: Participation in Church Activities: PROBIT regression, Marginal
Eﬀects at the Mean, Redistribution
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Model Country FE Preferred
Religiosity Dummy (τ) 0.384 0.331 0.202
(0.00551) (0.00546) (0.0101)
Redistribution -0.578 -0.724 -0.755
(0.0145) (0.103) (0.103)
Redistribution * Religiosity 0.591
(0.0415)
Share Religious Individuals (q) 0.664 0.663
(0.138) (0.138)
Goverment Eﬃciency (α) -0.0760 -0.0771
(0.0161) (0.0161)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes No No
Country FE No Yes Yes
Observations 66484 66484 66484
Note: The table reports the PROBIT marginal eﬀects at the mean and
robust standard errors (in brackets). The dependent variable in all
speciﬁcation is a participation dummy that takes value one if the in-
dividual goes to church several times a year. Religiosity is a dummy
that takes value one if the individual declares himself as religious. Re-
distribution is the diﬀerence between the Gini coeﬃcient before and
after taxes. Share of religious individuals is the percentage of religious
individuals in a country-year. state eﬃciency is the ﬁrst principal com-
ponent of the "Government Eﬀectiveness", "Regulatory Quality" and
"Corruption" indexes standardinzed to have zero mean and standard
deviation of 1. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital sta-
tus, work status, education degree, size of the household, type of oc-
cupation, hours worked, if you supervise somebody at the job and in-
come quartile. Country characteristics include GDP and the share of
religious individuals that follow the main religion.
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5.9 Empirical Evidence of the Intergenerational Transmission of
Religiosity
As evidence of the intergenerational transmission of religious values I study retrospective
questions found in the ISSP dataset of 1991, 1998 and 2008. The ISSP is a compilation of
cross-country surveys across 38 countries that in those waves asked about information on the
religious lives of the individuals and their families. The survey asks about your religiosity
now that you are an adult and some retrospective questions about the type of family you
were raised in. In particular, if you were raised in a religious fashion and if your parents
went to church when you were a kid. Your religiosity as an adult is positively correlated to
being raised in a religious family (corr = 0.26) and that your parent went to church when
you were a kid (corr = 0.33). More formally, I can use this information to identify if there
is any statistical relationship between religiosity as and adult and religiosity and church
participation decision estimating the following regression:
Prob(ri,c,t = 1) = φ(β1parents reli,c,t + β2parents parti,c,t + βXi,c,t + i,c,t > 0)
Where i identiﬁes the individual, c the country and t the time. On the left-hand side ri,c,t
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual describes itself as very or extremely
religious nowadays. On the right-hand side, parent rel and parent part are respectively
a dummy variable that takes value 1 if you where raised in a religious home and when
the individual was a kid at least one parent participated in religious activities regularly.
Results are reported in Table 9. Even controlling for many observables, being raised in a
religious family and having parents that participated in church activities is always positively
correlated with being religious as an adult. Being raised in a religious family in average
increases probability of being religious as an adult by 8 percentage points (an increase of
55%) and having a parent that went to church when you where a kid by 3 percentage points
(an increase of 20%).
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Table 9: Religiosity as an adult: PROBIT regression, Marginal Eﬀects at the
Mean
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Model Individual Char. Country Char.
Raised Religious 0.136 0.0848 0.0818
(0.00437) (0.00651) (0.00758)
Parent Church 0.134 0.0311 0.0290
(0.00311) (0.00407) (0.00435)
Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes
Country Characteristics No No Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes
Observations 102567 63264 48705
Note: The table reports the PROBIT estimates and robust standard errors (in
brackets). The dependent variable in all speciﬁcation is a religious dummy
that takes value 1 if the individual declares to be religious. Raised Religous
takes value 1 if you where raised in a religious home. Parent Church takes
value 1 if when the individual was a kid at least one parent participated
in religious activities regularly. Individual characteristics include sex, age,
marital status, work status, education degree, size of the household, type
of occupation, hours worked, if you supervise somebody at the job and in-
come quartile. Country characteristics include GDP, share of religious in-
dividuals that follow the main religion, state eﬃcicency, share of religious
individuals and welfare state expenditure as a percentage of GDP. All the
regressions are run with individuals that are 20 years or older.
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5.10 Global Game Methodology
For implementing the global game methodology I introduce some noise in the cost of partic-
ipation to church. This leads to the following modiﬁed payoﬀ function.
U
MOD
i,τ (pi, P, t) = W (αf(t) , h1(P ) + h2(P ) pi)− t− (1 + σi)pi + λτpi
Where the only diﬀerence with the original utility function is that each individual has an
idiosyncratic cost of participation to church 1 + σi. Each individual only observes their
own idiosyncratic cost of participation. For deciding whether or not to participate in church
activities citizen i needs to predict the share of individuals that participate in church ac-
tivities. The reason is that the decision of participating or not to church of another citizen
j will depend on the idiosyncratic cost of participation (xj). The main assumption of the
global game methodology is that from the point of view of citizen i xj is a random variable
that has the following shape xj = θ + σj where θ follows an improper uniform and j fol-
lows a continuous distribution. The improper uniform assumption states that citizens are
completely uniformed about where θ is located. In other words, given the improper uniform
prior on θ, observing xi = 1 + σi gives the citizens no information on their ranking within
the population of signals. As the noise goes to zero (σ → 0), and we approach the original
problem, a unique strategy survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
52
The Charitable Terrorist: State Capacity and the
Support for the Pakistani Taliban
Federico Masera, Hasin Yousaf
Abstract
Violent, criminal or terrorist organizations are often also providers of many social
services. In this paper we show how the capacity of the state of providing similar
social services may inﬂuence the support for these organizations. We do so by studying
how the support for the Pakistani Taliban changed after two natural disasters: an
earthquake in 2005 and a ﬂood in 2010 which received diﬀerent levels of international
help. While the earthquake took place at a time when Pakistan was a close ally of the
United States and it received extensive international aid, the ﬂood occurred at a time
when Pakistan-U.S. relations had deteriorated and consequently it received insuﬃcient
funds. Support for the Taliban decreased in the areas aﬀected by the earthquake, while
it increased in the areas aﬀected by the ﬂood. This shows how a lack of state capacity
may leave a void that can be then ﬁlled by the Taliban. We then show how alternate
explanations such as anger against the incumbent for poor performance and political
substitution among non-incumbent political groups can not account for these results.
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1 Introduction
The Pakistani Taliban are often providers of goods and services close to what you would ex-
pected the formal Pakistani state to provide. They provide schools, hospitals, a legal system
and a parallel police system to enforce these rules. Many other violent, criminal or terrorist
organizations around the world behave in a similar fashion by competing with the state in
the provision of many social services. For example, criminal organizations in Latin America,
maintain the public goods infrastructure of the most disadvantaged parts of many cities
by building roads, maintaining the water distribution system and trash disposal. Around
the world maﬁas are often providers of security and a resolution mechanism, especially in
areas where the state is not present. Closer to the Pakistani case, in many majority Muslim
countries many violent religious groups provide goods and services as a parallel state. For
example, in the Middle East, groups like Hamas in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and Hezbollah in Lebanon are providers of many social services. More recently, violent
groups, like Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIS in Syria and Iraq, immediately recreate many
of the institutions that provide goods and services when they take control of new territory.
In this paper we empirically study how state capacity may inﬂuence the rise and fall of
these types of organizations. For doing so we focus on the competition between the Pakistani
state and the Taliban in the provision of natural disaster relief. Both these actors provide,
immediately after a natural disaster, food, water and medicine. In the long-run, they are
both involved in the reconstruction process and provide a legal system to resolve the many
disputes, often land-related, that arise after a natural disaster.
In this paper we empirically test in the Pakistani context how state capacity can aﬀect
the rise and fall of these violent organizations. The mechanism that is proposed and tested is
the following: In the case of insuﬃcient state capacity the needs of people are not taken care
by formal state institutions. This leaves a void that can be ﬁlled by a non-state group, in our
case the Taliban. This then leads to an increase in the popular support for this non-state
group. To the contrary, if state capacity is suﬃcient, the state is able to provide for people.
This crowds-out the terrorist organization leading to a decline in its popular support.
This hypothesis is generally diﬃcult to test without a clean source of exogenous variation.
In this paper we overcome this problem by using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence (DiD) empirical
strategy for two natural disasters that occurred at times were the capacity of the state in
providing natural disaster relief were substantially diﬀerent. For each natural disaster we
then compare the popular support for the Taliban before and after a natural disaster, between
places that were aﬀected or not by a natural disaster. As a proxy for popular support for the
Taliban we exploit the fact that in Pakistan the Taliban ideology is politically represented by
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the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) party. This provides us with a particularly accurate
measure of the support for the Taliban at a very small geographical unit for every election
year.
The natural disasters we consider are the two biggest that stroke Pakistan in the last
decades. An earthquake in 2005, the biggest earthquake in the modern history of Pakistan.
This natural disaster happened in a period where Pakistan was an essential partner in the
war-on-terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Because of this Pakistan received a high levels of
international aid and the government had extensive capacity of providing relief to all the
people aﬀected by the natural disaster. We then consider the 2010 ﬂoods in which more
than one-ﬁfth of the land was under water and more than 20 million people were aﬀected.
This natural disaster instead happened in a period of deteriorated relationship between the
US and Pakistan. This is due to many factors that include, a change in the presidency of
the US and Pakistan, the use of unauthorized drone attacks in the Pakistani territory and
the presence of many high-caliber terrorist (most famously Bin Laden) in Pakistan. Because
of these reasons the international aid response was inadequate and slow to arrive which
exacerbated the already desperate situation created by the ﬂood.
We explore the eﬀects of these natural disasters on the electoral results of the MMA
party for the national elections of 2002, 2008 and 2013. We ﬁnd that the areas exposed
to the 2005 earthquake, that happened in period of high state capacity, saw a substantial
decrease in the support for the MMA in the subsequent elections. Electoral districts aﬀected
by the ﬂood of 2010, that instead happened in a period of lack of state capacity, displayed
exactly the opposite behavior, with an increase in the votes for the MMA. In the preferred
speciﬁcation, the areas aﬀected by the 2005 earthquake witnessed a decrease of 11 percentage
points in the vote share for the MMA compared to the areas which were not aﬀected. Instead
electoral districts aﬀected by the 2010 ﬂood witnessed an increase of 3 percentage points in
the vote share for the MMA compared to the areas which were not aﬀected. These are big
changes for the MMA given that in the time period studied their average result is of 12
percentage points. These numbers are also considerable when taking into account that in an
average national Pakistani election 36 million citizens vote. This shows that state capacity
can move preferences of millions of voters away from supporting a terrorist organization like
the Taliban.
To highlight the importance of the proposed mechanism, we then use data on the per-
centage of funding which was unmet ﬁve months after the onset of the 2010 ﬂoods. We
employ similar DiD approach to identify the eﬀect of this funding gap on the support for
the MMA. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we instrument funding gap with the electoral
district intensity of exposure to the ﬂood and the distance from the provincial capital. We
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show that the areas with higher funding gap had a higher increase in the vote share of Tal-
iban parties. A 10 percentage point increase in the funding gap leads to a 0.6 percentage
points increase in the vote share of the Taliban parties.
One alternative explanation with respect to the hypothesis we are putting forward is
of a model of political competition were votes for the incumbent party and its competitors
are aﬀected by the performance of the government. We show that the results are not in
line with this explanation. The incumbent party indeed won political support after the
2005 earthquake and lost after the 2010 ﬂoods but not signiﬁcantly more in the aﬀected
areas. The main competitors to the incumbent party also observe no particular change in
the political results in places aﬀected by the earthquake or the ﬂood. The only competitor
to the incumbent party that show signiﬁcant changes speciﬁcally in places aﬀected by the
natural disasters is the MMA. This again seems indicate that these eﬀects are due to the fact
that the MMA, through the Taliban, are the only party that was directly providing goods
and services in competition with the state.
In all our preferred speciﬁcations we control for two important factors that may inﬂuence
the changes we observe in the MMA vote share and are correlated with being aﬀected by
a natural disaster. The ﬁrst factor is the Pashtun ethnicity of an electoral district. This
ethnicity is historically closely connected with the Taliban. Because of this trends in the
MMA vote share can be extremely diﬀerent in majority Pashtun areas with respect to other
electoral districts. At the same time majority Pashtun areas have been especially aﬀected
both by the ﬂood and the earthquake. Because of this in our preferred estimation we let
majority Pashtun electoral districts have diﬀerent trends with respect to the other districts
for the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the natural disaster we then use only the fact that some
of them were aﬀected by the natural disaster while others not. The results are then not
driven by the Pashtun ethnicity of an electoral district but presumably only being aﬀected
by the natural disaster. The second factor we control for is only relevant for the 2010 ﬂood
and is the ex-ante propensity of ﬂoods in an electoral district. Not controlling for this factor
can be a problem because people living in a place with high propensity of ﬂoods can have
very diﬀerent political preferences. One of the main reasons is that electoral districts that
are regularly ﬂooded base their economy on agriculture and potentially have very diﬀerent
voting patterns with respect to urban voters. Added to this, places that generally are prone
to be aﬀected by ﬂoods were almost certainly aﬀected by the 2010 ﬂoods. Because of this
reason we let trends in MMA votes be diﬀerent depending on the historical propensity of
receiving ﬂoods and only use the fact that some places with the same propensity of ﬂoods
got aﬀected by the 2010 one while others not. In other words we consider the 2010 ﬂood
a random shock after controlling for the ex-ante propensity of ﬂoods in a certain electoral
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district.
Finally, for the 2010 ﬂood we provide evidence of the validity of our identiﬁcation strategy
exploiting the availability of two pre-treament elections. For the DiD estimation we conduct
causal estimation is dependent on the parallel trends assumption. That is, in the absence of
the ﬂood, the areas which were unaﬀected by the ﬂood would have evolved in the same way
as the areas which were exposed to the ﬂood. Since, we have two pre-ﬂood periods, we can
indirectly test this assumption by studying the MMA vote trends before the ﬂood. That is,
the areas which were aﬀected by the ﬂood in 2010 had similar change in the support for the
Taliban between 2002 and 2008, compared to the areas which were not ﬂooded in 2010. This
strengthens that what we ﬁnd is indeed a causal eﬀect of ﬂood on the support for Taliban.
This paper is closely related to the literature that studies the causes of civil conﬂict,
war and terrorism (for a review of the literature refer to Blattman and Miguel (2010).
These causes may be ethnic diﬀerences (Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray,
2012), extreme climate conditions (for a review Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (2013)), political
instability (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), rise in international price shocks (Besley and Persson,
2008; Dube and Vargas, 2013) among many others.
More closely related to our paper there have been some recent studies exploring the
eﬀect of aid on conﬂict and violence. For example Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011) study
a model of competition between a government providing reconstruction program and violent
rebels. They then test the model using panel data from Iraq and ﬁnd that reconstruction
spending reduces insurgent violence. Other papers have tried to identify, causally, how
diﬀerent forms of international aid aﬀect conﬂict. Examples of this are Beath, Christia and
Enikolopov (2012) that use a randomized controlled trial, Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014)
using a regression discontinuity approach while Nunn and Qian (2014) uses an instrumental
variable approach. They all have identiﬁed that development aid has either no eﬀect or a
detrimental eﬀect on civil conﬂict. This reduced form approach to studying this problem has
brought very interesting results but one existing gap in this literature comes from the fact
that the connection between aid and violence is still a black box and is not clear which is
the mechanism that links both of them. As suggested by Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014)
then the increase of conﬂict could be a violent response to a decrease in support of insurgents
caused by development aid. The literature, however, has not analyzed the eﬀect of aid on the
support of terrorist organizations. In particular, we are the ﬁrst ones to the hypothesis that
a lack a state capacity can lead to an increase popular support for a terrorist organization.
We exploit the unique political setup of Pakistan in which we can possibly directly observe
the political support for Taliban.
Additionally, we contribute to the literature that tries to understand the support for
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terrorist or rebel groups. A very detailed review is provide by de Mesquita (2008). Some
more recent works that have dealt with this issue are Jaeger et al. (2012) that shows how
radicalization of the Palestinian population is inﬂuenced in the short-run by Israeli violence
while in the long run by major political events like the Oslo negotiations or the ﬁrst Intifada.
Berman et al. (2011) ﬁnd no evidence of the opportunity-cost theory that states that only
individuals with a low opportunity-cost (unemployed, poor) will rebel more and use violence.
Similarly Blair et al. (2013) ﬁnd that the income has no link to personal support for militant
and terrorist organizations. In a study in Iraq instead Iyengar, Monten and Hanson (2011)
ﬁnd a positive correlation at the district level between spending in labor-creating projects by
the US military and violence reduction. In this paper we try to causally identify a mechanism
similar in nature to Berman and Laitin (2008) that see the support terrorist groups as a way
of receiving local public goods when neither the government or the markets can deliver it.
More broadly our paper also contributes to the literature that studies the eﬀects of natural
disasters and aid relief. A comprehensive discussion on the topic can be found in Stromberg
(2007). For example it has been shown that international aid delivery (or the lack of) may
have economic and political consequences (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). In particular, Drury,
Olson and Belle (2005) show that large disasters if not handled properly by the international
community may destabilize local governments. More closely related to the eﬀects of natural
disasters on terrorism Berrebi and Ostwald (2011) show in a cross-country comparison that
natural disasters are positively associated with terrorist attacks. Looking speciﬁcally at
Pakistan, Fair et al. (2013) show how people more harshly aﬀected by the 2010 ﬂood in
Pakistan increased their turnout to elections, had more political knowledge and they were
more demanding towards the government.Andrabi and Das (2010) show a positive eﬀects
of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake on trust towards foreigners cause by a prompt delivery of
foreign aid. What we do here is study the potential use of international aid relief against
terrorism and radicalization of the population. We contribute to the literature by testing why
natural disasters could be related with terrorism. We show how the terrorist organizations
can gain support by helping people after the natural disaster.
In the following section, we present the detailed background of the context with focus on
the electoral system of Pakistan, a description of the natural disaster and the relief provided
by the state and the data sources. In Section 3 we outline our empirical methodology. In
section 4, we provide the baseline results, along with the mechanisms that could account for
the results and demonstrate the heterogeneity of the results. We carry out robustness checks
in the Section 5, and discuss and conclude in Section 6.
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2 Context
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the context of our setting and the data sources. Speciﬁcally,
in the ﬁrst subsection, we give an overview of the political system of Pakistan, providing
summary of the elections, major political parties and the Islamic parties. Then, we present
summary of the earthquake of 2005 and the ﬂood of 2010, followed by the overview of the
relief eﬀorts during the natural disasters.
2.1 Political System of Pakistan
Figure 1 shows the electoral districts of Pakistan along with the geographic details of its lo-
cation. Pakistan shares its borders with Afghanistan, China, India, and Iran. The provinces
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan share the border with Afghanistan, while the
provinces of Punjab and Sindh share the border with India. Islamabad is the capital city of
Pakistan. Administratively, it is also equivalent to a province known as the Federal Capital.
Lahore and Karachi are the two main urban areas of Pakistan with population of 15 million
and 25 million respectively.
The governing structure of Pakistan is a parliamentary system. The parliament of Pak-
istan has bicameral structure composed of the Senate and the National Assembly (NA).
The National Assembly has 342 members, of which 272 members are elected through voting
1. The tenure of the NA is 5 years, and the elections are held after every 5 years. In our
analysis, the elections were held in October 2002, February 2008 and May 2013 respectively.
The 272 members of the NA are elected through the general elections held in 272 National
Assembly constituencies. Out of the 272 electoral districts , 148 are in Punjab, 61 are
in Sindh, 35 are in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 14 are in Balochistan, 12 are in the Federally
Administered Tribal area (FATA), and 2 are in the Federal Capital, Islamabad 2. The
electoral districts are very heterogeneous in terms of area, but have the same population in
each electoral district 3. The voting structure is ﬁrst-pass-the-post system. Each candidate
1Out of the 70 non-elected members, 60 seats are reserved for the women and 10 seats for the minorities.
These seats are elected through an indirect proportional representation list system, whereby political parties
submit their lists of women candidates for reserved seats to the Election Commission prior to the election
(Constitution, Article 51).
2The administrative division of Pakistan has several layers. The most coarse layer is the provinces. There
are 6 provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, FATA and the Federal Capital. The
Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir are also divisions within Pakistan. Thus, Gilgit Baltistan and
Azad Jammu & Kashmir are not represented in the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan. However,
they have an autonomous government which is part of Pakistan. The second layer is of the districts. There
are roughly 30 districts in each province.
3For instance, the Karachi city has 20 electoral districts, where as the whole province of Balochistan has
only 14 electoral districts.
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can belong to at most a single political party or decide to run independently without any
political aﬃliation.
Historically, the two biggest parties in the political system of Pakistan are the Pakistan
Muslim League Nawaz Sharif, PML (N) and the Pakistan's People Party (PPP). The PML
(N) has strong base and support in the province of Punjab, while the PPP has its strength
in the province of Sindh. Since, 1989, the PML (N) and PPP has had major representation
in three governments. PPP secured the most number of votes in the 2008 elections, while
the PML (N) secured the most number of votes in the 2013 elections. Apart from the two
main parties, there are several other political parties. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) are among the other political parties.
Apart from these four major political parties, there are several political parties with
rightist and Islamic ideology. The three major Islamic parties include: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-
Islam (JUI-F), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI). Jamiat-
e-Ahle Hadith, and Pakistan Isami Tehrik (ITP) (formerly Tehriq-e-Jafaria (TeJ)) are among
the other two Islamic political parties. In 2002, these ﬁve parties had a political alliance,
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The alliance was formed as a result of direct opposition
to the policies led by President Pervez Musharraf to support for the United States' war in
Afghanistan (Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad, 2012) 4.
2.2 Islamic Parties and connections with Taliban
Since the inception of war-on-terror, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), Jamiat Ulema-
e-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI) have voiced their disapproval of the
Pakistan's support to the United State equivocally. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam has its roots
in the anti-colonial movement and pro independent Muslim state movement back in the
1920s. It has strong presence in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Jamaat-e-
Islami Pakistan also traces back its roots before the independence of Pakistan. All of these
parties have presence in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, which share
the border with Afghanistan.
The three parties merged together in 2002 as a result of common opinion and to provide
strong opposition to the President Musharraf's unconditional support to the United States
for the war-on-terror (Norell, 2007). This pro-Taliban stance was very popular among the
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in which the party gained majority. The MMA was able
to form a coalition government in the province of Balochistan.
4However, the political alliance was broken just before the 2008 elections. The JI wanted to boycott the
elections, while the other two parties wanted to run for the elections. This diﬀerence of opinion led to the
break-down of the alliance into the three political parties as they were before.
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Figure 1: The National Assembly Electoral Districts of Pakistan
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All these parties emphasis on strict Islamic morals and principles in every day life. These
parties have strong connections with the Afghan Taliban and share the same ideology:
All the individual parties in the MMA have links to militant groups, hence this
coalition is of great interest when examining Pakistani links to the Taliban.
(Norell, 2007, pg. 69)
The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which President Musharraf made the
oﬃcial opposition party in the Pakistan Parliament after the 2002 elections,
provides political cover to the extremists, openly supports the Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, and maintains close ties to its leadership
(Johnson and Mason, 2008, pg. 57-58)
Norell (2007) presents detailed historical analysis of the relations between the Taliban and
the MMA. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and FATA are the areas sharing border with
Afghanistan. The major political parties in these provinces are also the parties which are
pro-Taliban. Not only do the MMA and Taliban have connections, but they also trade
beneﬁts with each other. For instance,
When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996 it enjoyed support from
the JUI-F, which in turn gained popular support from Pashtuns living in NWFP,
Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Norell, 2007,
pg. 70)
The MMA has vociferously objected to Pakistani and U.S. operations in the
tribal areas to ferret out Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives despite knowledge that
such persons are lodged in these areas. Continued successful political evolution
of the MMA could have deleterious consequences for the U.S. led war on terror-
ism through encouraging militant recruitment, erecting operational barriers to
Pakistani and U.S. forces seeking access to the tribal areas, and continuing to
provide safe havens to Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives. (Fair, 2004, pg.498)
Despite these connections, do the individuals associate MMA with the Taliban? More
relevant question for our analysis is: do the individuals who vote for MMA are actually
voting for Taliban? There are almost no studies which try to understand the demand for the
militant groups 5. The only paper we are aware of that tries to analyze the relation is Shapiro
and Fair (2009). They found some evidence to the question above i.e. the support for the
5Almost all of them, exclusively, focus on the supply of militant groups and how it aﬀects business as
usual.
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militants is correlated with: a desire for change-positive or negative- in the perceived role of
Sharia in Pakistan (Shapiro and Fair, 2009, pg. 116), and political grievances. None of the
other conventional factors: poverty, education, religiosity and desire for stronger democracy
were correlated with the support for militant groups. They do not correlate the actual voting
behavior of the individuals, but rather rely on self-reported measures.
2.3 The 2005 Earthquake
The earthquake took place on 8th October 2005 near the city of Muzaﬀarabad, around
120 km north of Islamabad. The magnitude of the earthquake was measured as 7.6 on the
Richter magnitude scale. It was the worst earthquake to hit Pakistan ever, and the 15th worst
earthquake around the world since 1900. The earthquake caused 75,000 deaths, 70,000 were
injured and 3.5 million people were left homeless. The estimated economic damage caused
by the earthquake was around $5.2 billion.
Figure 2 shows the location of the epicenter of the earthquake. The ﬁgure also shows
the 150 km, 250km and 350 km circle radius around the epicenter. Islamabad lies within
the 150 km radius of the epicenter, Peshawar lies within the 250 Km while Lahore lie at 350
km radius of the epicenter of the earthquake. The earthquake mainly aﬀected the parts of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Federal Capital.
The earthquake show rapid response from the government, citizens and the international
donors and community.
Despite daunting challenges, including the diﬃcult mountainous terrain and the
race against time to provide basic shelter to the homeless prior to the arrival of the
Himalayan winter, the humanitarian response to the earthquake was perceived by
many to be one of the largest and most eﬀective responses to a natural disaster
to date. Wilder (2008) page 8
Within 24 hours of the earthquake the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordi-
nation (UNDAC) team ﬂew into Islamabad and worked with the Government
of Pakistan (GoP), donors, UN agencies, and NGOs to establish coordination
structures. Within three days it had prepared and issued a Flash Appeal for
$312 million to support a six-month emergency response, which two weeks later
was increased to $550 million ... Within 48 hours of the earthquake the ﬁrst of
24 US helicopters arrived in Islamabad from Afghanistan. Soon approximately
1,200 US military personnel had arrived in Pakistan to assist with relief eﬀorts,
which included a medical team to run a US Army Mobile Army Surgical Hos-
pital (MASH) in Muzaﬀarabad, and a 125-person Naval Mobile Construction
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Figure 2: The 2005 Earthquake Epicenter
64
Battalion to clear roads and debris, assist in setting up IDP camps, and rebuild
infrastructure. In addition to US military forces, the NATO Response Force
also deployed approximately 1,200 specialist personnel including engineers and
medical staﬀ from 17 NATO countries to participate in NATO's ﬁrst purely hu-
manitarian mission. NATO forces also operated two air-bridges to ﬂy relief
supplies to Pakistan from bases in Germany and Turkey Wilder (2008) page
14-15
2.4 The 2010 Flood
The 2010 ﬂoods in Pakistan have been called the greatest humanitarian crisis in recent
history by the United Nations, with more people aﬀected than were aﬀected by the South-
East Asian tsunami and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti combined Ferris (2011). In terms of
economic damages, the ﬂood of 2010 caused an estimated damage of $9.7 billion.
The ﬂood was caused by abnormal monsoon rains in late July, 2010 which resulted in
ﬂoods across all the provinces of Pakistan. In terms of the land area, almost one-ﬁfth of
Pakistan was aﬀected. While, more than 20 million people i.e. one-eighth of the population
of Pakistan was directly aﬀected by the ﬂood. It was the worst ﬂood in the history of
Pakistan, causing three times more people aﬀected than the second worst ﬂood which hit
the country in 1992. In terms of the economic costs, it is the worst natural disaster to
hit Pakistan ever. It caused more than three times the economic damage compared to the
second worst natural disaster of Pakistan: the earthquake of 2005.
Figure 3 shows the extent of the ﬂood in September 2010. As it is apparent from the
ﬁgure, the ﬂood were widespread all over Pakistan. The areas from all the major provinces
were aﬀected. Areas around the river Indus were severely aﬀected, while rest of the areas
were moderately aﬀected. Most of the eastern part of Punjab and south-western part of
Balochistan was unaﬀected by the ﬂood.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was the earliest to get aﬀected. On 20th July, Peshawar, the
capital city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa received heavy rain-fall. Soon, the rest of the province,
in series of rain-falls, was aﬀected. The ﬂood in the mid-Augusts, reached the southern part
of the country and aﬀected southern Punjab, northern Sindh and Balochistan.
The direct damages to the infrastructure was estimated to be around $11 billion, while
the cost of re-constructing the infrastructure was estimated to be around $ 8 billion. The
ﬂood caused large-scale damage not only to the houses and infrastructure of the area, but
also resulted in wide-scale agricultural damages. More than 700,000 acres (3,000 km2) of
cotton, 200,000 acres (800 km2) acres each of rice and cane, 500,000 tonnes of wheat and
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300,000 acres (1,000 km2) of animal fodder were destroyed by the ﬂood (of Pakistan, 2010).
The government response to the ﬂood was very poor. The NDMA was completely ill-
equipped and unprepared to deal with a natural disaster of such an extent. The NDMA was
in complete disarray (Ahmed, 2013). At ﬁrst, the government miscalculated the gravity of
the situation. The ﬁrst heavy rain of the monsoon which lead to ﬂooding in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa took place on 20th July 2010. However, the Flash Appeal for the relief and
early recovery was not released until 20 days after the ﬂood i.e. 9th August 2010 by that time
most of the Pakistani land was under water. The poor rehabilitation and relief eﬀorts was a
result of both government incompetence and lack of international support. The government
initially underestimated the eﬀect of the ﬂoods and did not act promptly. The President of
Pakistan at that time, Asif Ali Zardari, continued his trip to the United Kingdom despite
the gravity of the situation. As of August 9, the international governments had committed
less than $45 million. As a comparison, in the ﬁrst ten days after the earthquake in 2005,
the international governments had committed $247 million 6. The poor response by the gov-
ernment raised concerns about the stability of Pakistan and its strength to counter terrorism
(Kronstadt, 2010).
The poor rehabilitation was visible among the disaster aﬀected regions. For instance,
Doocy et al. (2013) surveyed households in the aﬀected areas six months after the 2010
ﬂood7 and showed that the need for ﬂood aid was uniformly present in all the aﬀected areas.
But, only half of the aﬀected areas reported receiving food aid ever 8.
2.5 Relations between Pakistan and U.S.
Given the importance of the US-Pakistan relationship in the determination of the interna-
tional aid response we provide here a short description of the timeline. In particular, we
focus on the time frame of the two natural disasters and give some evidence on how this
aﬀected the relief response received by the Pakistani state.
6Other natural disasters around the world received intermediate amount of funding. For instance, in the
ﬁrst ten days of Cyclone Nargis, which hit Myanmar in May 2008, the international governments committed
$110 million. Similarly, the earthquake in January 2010 in Haiti also saw a commitment of $742 million
during the ﬁrst ten days of the disaster.
7They reported that 95% of the households reported damage to their house, and 82% reported permanent
damage to the house. Moreover, 85% of the households were displaced for more than two weeks.
8While half of the respondents cited as receiving aid in the ﬁrst three months after the ﬂood, only one-
third of the respondents cited the same in the subsequent three months. More than 60% of the food needs
were unmet across the ﬂood aﬀected areas six months after the ﬂood. Farmers and daily-wage laborers were
among the worst hit by the ﬂood. They found that the common targeting practices were not kept in mind
when distributing the food aid. That is, they showed that larger households, female headed households and
internally displacement households were not signiﬁcantly more likely to receive food aid compared to other
households. The urban households were more likely to receive food aid despite the fact that rural households
were the ones worst aﬀected, both in terms of magnitude of people aﬀected and magnitude of the damage.
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Figure 3: Flood Aﬀected Districts
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The relations between Pakistan and the United States before 9/11 were tense. In 1998
Pakistan tested its nuclear technology despite strong international pressure. As a result
Pakistan faced several sanctions and limitations from the international community. In 1999,
the democratic government was overthrown by the military general, Pervez Musharraf, who
declared himself the caretaker of the country until the next elections take place. United
States disapproved the overthrow of democratic government by General Musharraf 9 .
However, after the 9/11 the image of Pakistan and Musharraf was completely trans-
formed. Pakistan quickly joined the United States on the war-on-terror and became a key
strategic ally of the U.S. As a result, image of Pakistan and General Musharraf was com-
pletely transformed from a rogue state and pariah to an ally and messiah [Fair (2012)]. The
sanctions and limitations on Pakistan was released and it received several billions in aid,
military funds and loan forgiveness.
Relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan started to quickly deteriorate in 2008 with
a change in presidency for both countries. The U.S. started to no longer trust Pakistan as
an ally because, between other things, what they claim is the misuse of the military funds
given to Pakistan in the last years. In particular instead of the use of funds to counteract
terrorism in the West of Afghanistan they claim funds have been use for the long-lasting
conﬂict with India. This was especially troublesome for the U.S. as it became evident that
many high-proﬁle terrorist were safely living in Pakistan. At the same time Pakistan lost
trust in the U.S. as the new administration increased the drone attacks in Pakistani territory,
many times without informing the Pakistani government.
2.6 Data sources
We use data sets from several diﬀerent sources. The political outcome data set is constructed
using the oﬃcial election outcomes from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The
electoral outcome in each electoral district is hand collected from the ECP website and
recorded. For each district, we have the information on the number of votes won by each
candidate and his/her political aﬃliation. The candidates do not need to have a political
aﬃliation to run; they can choose to run as independent candidates. In the 2002 elections,
the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) participated as a single political party composed of
the coalition of the following ﬁve parties: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Jamiat Ulema-e-
Pakistan (JUP), Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI), Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith, and Pakistan Islami
Tehrik (ITP). The number of votes secured by the MMA over the total votes casted is used
to determine the proportion of votes secured by the MMA in an electoral district.
9Infact when the President Clinton visited the South Asia in 2000, he spent only few hours out of a week
long tour in Pakistan, and refused to shake hands with Musharraf.[Rennack (2001)]
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The candidate from the MMA appeared in 171 out of 272 electoral districts in 2002.
Their representation is spread over all the provinces. The MMA is widely represented in the
provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They appeared in 13 out of the 14 elec-
toral districts in Balochistan, and 32 out of the 35 electoral districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
In the 150 electoral seats of Punjab and 61 electoral seats of Sindh, the MMA appeared in
90 and 36 electoral districts respectively. However, in the FATA the MMA did not contest
from any electoral district 10.
Before the 2008 elections, the alliance of the ﬁve parties was broken due to internal
power struggle among the parties. The split was not due to ideological diﬀerences, but
rather between the two major parties to gain more power within the alliance. This clash
also resulted in split of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) into Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Fazl-ur-
Rehman (JUI-F) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Samiul Haq (JUI-S). In order to associate
the votes secured by the MMA in 2008 (and subsequent election, i.e. 2013), the votes are
aggregated for these six political parties. There are electoral districts in which some of these
six parties do not have a candidate representation. There are electoral districts in which there
is no candidate from any of the six parties, while there are districts with candidate from all
the six parties. We compute the share of the MMA as the sum of the shares of the political
parties that present in that electoral district. We compute this share if two of the three major
parties of the previous alliance MMA participate from that particular district. That is, if in
any district less than the two major parties participate, we label it as if the MMA did not
participate in that particular electoral district 11. The data on the ﬂood of 2010 is gathered
from two diﬀerent sources: United Nation Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Aﬀairs (UNOCHA) and the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). We take
the details which areas were aﬀected by the ﬂood from the UNOCHA. UNOCHA reports
the areas which were aﬀected by the ﬂood at sub-district level. The maps published by
UNOCHA were processed and digitized for the analysis. The data on funding gap is taken
from the NDMA. NDMA reported the funding gap present in the ﬂood aﬀected and other
areas which were indirectly aﬀected by the ﬂood (for instance, due to rehabilitation in the
neighboring electoral district). They stored this information in form of a map representing
the funding gap faced by an area in form of categorical variable. That is, the funding gap in
10This is not that surprising. The politics in FATA are more localized than other provinces. Usually, the
representatives from FATA run without any political aﬃliation i.e. as independent candidates.
11We tried with other deﬁnitions as well. For instance, labeling MMA as not participate only if all three
major parties not participate from an electoral district; labeling MMA as not participate if two of the major
parties do not participate in the electoral districts. The results with these diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the share
of MMA are presented in the Robustness section. All the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the vote share of MMA
lead to the same qualitative result, and our consistent with our mechanism; the magnitudes are adjusted
accordingly.
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a categorical variable with following categories: 0− 20%, 20− 40%, 40− 60%, 60− 80% and
80− 100%. The maps published by NDMA were processed and digitized for the analysis.
3 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we provide brief overview of the empirical framework for testing our mech-
anism. For each natural disaster we compare the MMA results before and after a natural
disaster, between places that were aﬀected or not by a natural disaster. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate:
MMAit = αi + δPostt + β1(affectedi ∗ Postt) +X ′itγ + uit, (1)
whereMMAit is the proportion of votes secured by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal in electoral
district, i, at elections, t 12. The variable affectedit is a variable denoting whether electoral
district, i, was aﬀected or not by the natural disaster. For the earthquake we will use diﬀerent
measures of closeness to the epicenter while for the ﬂood we will use the deﬁnition provided
by the UNOCHA. Postt is a time dummy that indicates the election-year after the natural
disaster. In the case of the earthquake of 2005 this is the election of 2008 and in the case
of the ﬂood of 2010 this is the election of 2013. We can then potentially control for any
Xi,t district variable. The time dummies common to all electoral districts is captured by the
term δ. αi are the electoral districts ﬁxed eﬀects.
This methodology has several advantages. First, it controls for the preexisting diﬀerences
among the electoral districts through the electoral district ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, the speci-
ﬁcation allows for diﬀerences in the result of election result for the MMA between elections
through the term δ.
In order to obtain consistent average treatment eﬀect of the natural disaster on the
proportion of votes secured by the MMA in the election after, the treatment should be
independent of the unobserved error term 13. That is, the areas which were aﬀected compared
to the unaﬀected areas should not be systematically diﬀerent across the unobservables.
Formally, E(uit|affectedi = 1, Xit, αi) = E(uit|affectedi = 0, Xit, αi).
This expression might not hold in our case. A ﬁrst source of concern involves the speci-
ﬁcation of the 2010 ﬂood. The reason is that in Pakistan heavy monsoon rains and melting
of snow in the northern mountains in the summer produces often ﬂoods around the river
Indus. In fact, some of the areas are ﬂooded almost every year. Given that areas aﬀected
12Note that t = 2002, 2008, for the analysis of the 2005 earthquake and t = 2008, 2013 for the analysis of
the ﬂood
13For simplicity of the argument, consider that the natural disaster has similar eﬀect on all the aﬀected
areas. The argument presented below is valid for the heterogeneous eﬀects of ﬂood with minor changes.
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by the 2010 ﬂood are frequently ﬂooded also other years there may be systematic diﬀerence
in the people living in these areas. This would violate the above expression and generate
inconsistent average treatment eﬀects as the citizen of these areas may have diﬀerent voting
patterns independently of the occurrence of the natural disaster. In order to control for this
potential factor that can lead to inconsistent estimates, we control for the ex-ante frequency
of ﬂood for each given electoral district multiplied by the time dummy (frequencyi ∗Postt).
What this achieves is to allow for the possibility of trends in MMA votes to change depending
on the ex-ante frequency of the ﬂood and because of this our identiﬁcation of the parameter
β1 comes only from the fact that some places where aﬀected by the 2010 ﬂood while others
not.
Similarly the areas that are predominantly of Pashtun ethnicity (Located in the West of
Pakistan) were particularly aﬀected both by the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 ﬂood. This
may be a source of concern as the Pashtun ethnicity has been historically very connected to
the Taliban. This may cause them having very diﬀerent voting patterns towards the MMA
independently of the natural disasters. We solve this potential problem by allowing majority
Pashtun electoral districts to have diﬀerent MMA voting patterns (Pashtuni ∗ Postt).
The most complete speciﬁcation will then be:
MMAi,t = αi + δPostt + β1Affectedi ∗ Postt+
β2frequencyi ∗ Postt + β3Pashtun ∗ Postt + ui,t
(2)
where frequencyi denotes ex-ante propensity of ﬂooding for each electoral district and
Pashtuni is a dummy that takes value 1 if the electoral district is majority of Pashtun
ethnicity.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Results: The 2005 Earthquake
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of the earthquake on the vote share of the MMA. In the
baseline results presented here an electoral district is considered aﬀected by the earthquake
if it's located at less than 250Km from the epicenter. We will later show how robust these
results are to diﬀerent deﬁnitions. For all the estimations we use data from the 2002 and
the 2008 national elections.
As displayed in Table 1 the MMA lost many votes between 2002 and 2008 election.
Importantly for testing our mechanism they lost disproportionately so in the areas aﬀected
by the earthquake. Our preferred speciﬁcation is found in is column (2) were we control
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Table 1: The Eﬀect of the 2005 Earthquake on MMA vote shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share MMA Share MMA Share MMA Share MMA
250Km * Y2008 -0.135*** -0.160*** -0.137*** -0.136***
(0.0356) (0.0364) (0.0334) (0.0338)
Observations 336 336 336 336
Freq. Earth * Y2008 NO YES YES YES
Pashtun * Y2008 NO NO YES YES
Num. Parties NO NO NO YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported
in the brackets. The table shows the results from estimating the baseline spec-
iﬁcation using OLS. * denotes signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, ** denotes sig-
niﬁcant at 5 percent level, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
for potentially diﬀerent trends in voting pattern between Pashtun and non-Pashtun areas of
Pakistan. The results shows that places aﬀected by the earthquake experienced and extra
11 percentage points drop in the voting share for the MMA. This is more than one third
of the votes that the MMA had in the 2002 election in the aﬀected areas. This translates
to 730'000 less voters for the MMA between the 2002 and 2008 in the areas aﬀected by the
earthquake. In case our hypothesis is correct, and this is driven by the high level of state
capacity displayed by the Pakistani government in handling the 2005 earthquake, this result
shows that support for Taliban can be largely swayed by the presence of an eﬀective state.
In column (3) we additionally control by the number of parties that participated in that
election in each electoral district. Results remain stable providing evidence of how the loss
in votes are not driven but an increase political competition in some particular electoral
districts but by the bad electoral performance of the MMA. Speciﬁcation that control for
the number of parties are not our preferred speciﬁcation as they may incur in the bad control
situation because the natural disaster itself is aﬀecting the number of parties present in one
election.
4.2 Baseline Results: The 2010 Flood
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of the ﬂood on the vote share of the MMA. In the base-
line results presented here an electoral district is considered aﬀected by the ﬂood following
the deﬁnition by UNOCHA displayed in Figure 3. For all the estimations we use data from
the 2008 and the 2013 national elections.
Results found in in Table 2 indicate how in general the MMA won some votes between
2008 and 2013 election. What we are particularly interested for testing our mechanism
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Table 2: The Eﬀect of the 2010 Flood on MMA vote shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share MMA Share MMA Share MMA Share MMA
Aﬀected * Y2013 0.0453*** 0.0538*** 0.0302** 0.0302**
(0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Observations 336 336 336 336
Freq. Flood * Y2013 NO YES YES YES
Pashtun * Y2013 NO NO YES YES
Num. Parties NO NO NO YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported
in the brackets. The table shows the results from estimating the baseline spec-
iﬁcation using OLS. * denotes signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, ** denotes sig-
niﬁcant at 5 percent level, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
is that they won disproportionately so in the areas aﬀected by the ﬂood. Our preferred
speciﬁcation found in is column (3) were we control for potentially diﬀerent trends in voting
pattern between Pashtun and non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan while at the same time also
letting electoral districts with ex-ante diﬀerent frequency of ﬂood have potentially diﬀerent
trends. The electoral districts aﬀected by the ﬂood experienced an extra 3 percentage points
increase in the voting share for the MMA. This is almost a 40% increase in the votes of
the MMA compared to the 2008 election in the aﬀected areas. This translates to an extra
560'000 voters for the MMA between the 2008 and 2013 in the areas aﬀected by the ﬂood.
If we combine this result with the one found when analyzing the 2005 earthquake we can see
how the diﬀerence between a well manage and a badly managed natural disaster can move
more than a million voters away from an extremist party like the MMA.
4.2.1 Mechanism: Funding Gap
In order to shed more light on the mechanism underpinning these changes, we utilize the
funding gap data (the diﬀerence between needed and received aid). This funding gap data
is available for the ﬂood of 2010 calculated at the 12th of November of 2010 four month
after the ﬂood. Following the previous sections, we estimate similar diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
speciﬁcation:
MMAit = αi + δPostt + β(FundingGapi ∗ Postt) +X ′itγ + uit, (3)
where FundingGapi represents the funding gap in district i. FundingGapi is between zero
and one.
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One potential problem with the speciﬁcation above is that funding gap may not be
exogenous. The reason of this is that both the national government and international donors
may decide to strategically provide aid in places that are either gaining or losing support
for the Taliban or the MMA. Additionally, is possible that even if the donors are not acting
strategically they maybe just can't deliver aid in places where the Taliban or the MMA had
gained a lot of support.
The intensity of the ﬂood provides an exogenous variable that can be used to predict the
funding gap. First, comparing places aﬀected and not aﬀected by the ﬂood the funding gap
is higher for the one aﬀected as they are the ones that received most of the damage. Notice
even places not aﬀected by the ﬂood ask for some aid as these region had also suﬀered some
minimal damages. Added to this, places not aﬀected by the ﬂood also need aid in order to
help displaced people from neighboring areas. Looking at the aﬀected areas the ones that
were severely aﬀected are most probably the one that have the highest funding gap. This
areas need vast amounts of money and are generally diﬃcult to be reached. Finally, we also
use information about the ex-ante eﬃciency and capacity of the government in providing aid
proxied by the distance of an electoral district from the provincial capital. One potential
concern of this second instrument is that the distance from the provincial capital may be
correlated with many unobservable factors that aﬀects the patterns of voting for the MMA.
The instrument may provide us with less biased estimates than the ones we obtain from
OLS. However, there are several reasons which may aﬀect the validity of the instruments.
For instance, being aﬀected by the ﬂood may have direct eﬀect on political preferences
independent of the funding gap: people who are aﬀected by the ﬂood become more politically
liberal and vote for higher redistribution regardless of the funding their area receives. We
brieﬂy argue that since the nature of the shock was so big, and the funding was so scarce,
the decision to systematically assign funding was not rampant. In fact, the funding in many
electoral districts was assigned on basis of the need of the area.
Results in Table 3 show how a higher level of funding gap in the 2010 ﬂood resulted in an
increase in the votes for the MMA in the 2013 election. Result of our preferred speciﬁcation
in column (2) imply that every 15.8 percentage points increase in funding gap increases the
vote of the MMA by one percentage point. Similar results are displayed in column (3) where
every 11.8 percentage points increase in funding gap increases the vote of the MMA by one
percentage point. The overidentiﬁcation tests show how their is in-sample evidence of the
validity of the instruments.
We then estimate the non-parametric relation between the change in MMA vote share
and the funding gap. Similar to the DiD, we are comparing high funding gap areas to the low
funding gap areas and analyzing how much do the MMA gained in the high funding gap areas
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Table 3: The Funding Gap and MMA vote shares
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Funding Gap * Y2013 0.0679*** 0.0634*** 0.0846***
(0.0122) (0.0236) (0.0207)
Observations 336 336 336
Freq. Flood * Y2013 YES YES YES
Pashtun * Y2013 YES YES YES
Instruments . Moderate * Y2013 Moderate * Y2013
Severe * Y2013 Severe * Y2013
Dist. Capital * Y2013
F-stat . 38.28 39.60
Pvalue Overind. . .998 0.162
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are re-
ported in the brackets. The table shows the results from estimating the
baseline speciﬁcation using OLS for column (1) and IV for the remaining.
* denotes signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, ** denotes signiﬁcant at 5 percent
level, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
relative to the low funding gap areas. However, we are not imposing a linear relation between
funding gap and change in MMA vote share. Instead, we are calculating the eﬀect on MMA
vote share for each local value of the funding gap. Non-parametric estimation has several
advantages over the parametric one. The estimation does not impose any functional form on
the relation as in parametric estimation. Instead, it ﬁts the best polynomial which explains
the relation. Moreover, it ﬁnds relation at every point in the distribution of the dependent
variable i.e. local regressions throughout the distribution. This is more informative than the
average eﬀects.
Figure 4 plots the non-parametric relation between change in MMA vote share and the
funding gap along with the 95% conﬁdence interval. The ﬁgure shows that the relation
between change in MMA vote share and funding gap is concave with very close to being
linear. The relation is strongest in the interval where the funding gap is between 20 and
60%. Areas with funding gap of 40% experienced a three-fold increase in MMA vote share,
while areas with funding gap 80% experienced a four-fold increase in the MMA vote share
compared to the areas with no or very little funding gap.
The results clearly indicate that funding gap is an important determinant of increase in
the vote share of MMA. These results highlight the importance of funding gap as one of the
mechanisms through which the change in support for MMA is operating. The areas which
had higher funding gap witnessed greater increase in the vote share of the MMA in the entire
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Figure 4: Non-Parametric Estimation: Funding Gap and MMA Vote Share
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4.3 Alternate Explanations
4.3.1 Punishing or Rewarding the Incumbent
An alternative explanation that could generate the results found in the previous section is the
punishing of the incumbent after a natural disaster. It is documented in the literature that
individuals punish the incumbents for natural disasters and other shocks which the politicians
have little control over (Cole, Healy and Werker, 2012). According to this argument, the vote
share of the incumbent should decrease more in the areas aﬀected by any natural disaster.
An alternative theory is that voters can reward the incumbent in case of the good man-
agement of a natural disaster, as in the case of the 2005 earthquake. Instead, in the case
of the 2010 ﬂood, voters can blame the incumbent political party, for not providing proper
rehabilitation after the ﬂood. This can be true especially when the individuals hold the po-
litical party directly responsible for the recovery. Thus, the accountability or anger against
the incumbent can be thought of as a function of the management of the natural disaster.
These two mechanisms can then generate a change in the vote share of the incumbent
that could ultimately translate in a change in the vote share for the MMA.
Results in Table 4 show how the incumbent results are not aﬀected by the natural dis-
asters as described by this theory. In the earthquake scenario, as shown in column (1), the
incumbent was the PML(Q) that lost some votes between 2002 and 2008 but not speciﬁcally
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Table 4: The Eﬀect of Natural Disasters on Incumbents and Competitors
Earthquake Flood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incumbent Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Incumbent Competitor 1 Competitor 2
POST * Aﬀected -0.0174 -0.00356 0.0371 0.0822*** 0.0124 -0.0763***
(0.0305) (0.0242) (0.0333) (0.0298) (0.0324) (0.0286)
Observations 304 490 416 490 416 304
Pashtun * POST YES YES YES YES YES YES
Freq. Earth * Y2008 YES YES YES NO NO NO
Freq. Flood * Y2013 NO NO NO YES YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported in the brackets. The table
shows the results from estimating the baseline speciﬁcation using OLS. The dependent variable is the share
of MMA in the 2002 or 2008 elections for the earthquake and 2008 or 2013 elections for the ﬂood. * denotes
signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, ** denotes signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1 percent
level.
in the areas aﬀected by the earthquake. In the ﬂood scenario, as shown in column (4), the
incumbent was the PPP that lost many votes between 2008 and 2013 but actually won votes
in places aﬀected by the ﬂood.
4.3.2 Political Competition
Another natural explanation for the observed change in MMA vote share can be political
competition. This explanation is closely related with the previous one. In this framework
not only the votes for the incumbent could be aﬀected by the natural disaster but also
its main competitors. In the case of the 2005 earthquake given the good performance of
the government the main political competitor could observe a decrease in votes given this
political competition. Instead in the badly managed 2010 ﬂood we could see an increase of
votes for the main political competitor.
Results in Table 4 show how the two main competitors political results are not aﬀected
by the natural disasters as described by this theory. In the earthquake scenario, as shown in
column (2) and (3), the two main competitors were the PML(N) and the PPP. They both
won considerable amounts of votes between 2002 and 2008 but no party lost speciﬁcally in
the areas aﬀected by the earthquake as postulated by the theory of political competition. In
the ﬂood scenario, as shown in column (5) and (6), the two main competitors were PML(N)
and PML(Q). The PML(N) won many votes between 2008 and 2013 while the PML(Q) lost
many. None of the two competitors won votes speciﬁcally in places aﬀected by the ﬂood.
Only the MMA lost many votes in places aﬀected by a natural disaster when this was
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well managed by the government but won when it was badly managed. As described before
we claim that the main feature that diﬀerentiate the MMA with respect to other political
parties is their connection to the Taliban groups and their ability of providing goods that
compete with the formal state.
5 Heterogeneity, Robustness and Identiﬁcation
5.1 Intensity of the Treatment
In this section we ﬁrst look how the eﬀect of the natural disasters changes given the intensity
of the treatment. For the earthquake of 2005 we proxy the intensity with the distance from
the epicenter. For the 2010 ﬂood we use the severity of the ﬂood index created by the
UNOCHA that separates aﬀected areas in severely and moderately aﬀected as shown in
Figure 3. As an alternative measure we use the distance from the Indus river, the main river
crossing Pakistan that suﬀered from the ﬂoods of 2010.
Looking at Table 5 we can observe how the the baseline results are still present using al-
ternative deﬁnition of being aﬀected by the earthquake in columns (1) and (2). Results are
slightly lower than in the baseline speciﬁcation. We then explore how the eﬀect on the MMA
votes changes with the distance from the epicenter by estimating the following equation:
MMAit = αi + δPostt + Postt ∗ f(dist epii) +X ′i,tγ + Ui,t
Results of estimation were the function f(.) is a 4th degree polynomial are shown in
Figure 5 on the left panel. The MMA's lost votes are concentrated close to the epicenter. As
distance from the epicenter increases the eﬀects gets closer to zero. The eﬀect is statistically
not diﬀerent from zero if the electoral district is at more than 600Km. For a reference around
20% of the districts are located at less than 200Km from the epicenter. The median distance
is 400Km.
In column (4) of Table 5 we estimate the eﬀects of the 2010 ﬂood with potentially
diﬀerential eﬀects between moderately and severely aﬀected areas. Severely aﬀected areas
display a slightly higher increase in the MMA vote. Alternatively as a proxy for the severity
of the ﬂood we use the distance to the Indus river and explore the changes in MMA votes
by estimating the following equation:
MMAit = αi + δPostt + Postt ∗ f(dist indusi) +X ′i,tγ + Ui,t
Notice that the distance from the Indus river is a imprecise proxy for the severity of the
ﬂood because it will also depend on many other geographical factors including the morphol-
ogy of the terrain around the river. Still as can be partly observed in Figure 3 many of
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Table 5: Heterogeneity and Robustness
Earthquake Flood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
150Km 350Km Long-Run Dist Afgh Severity Dist Afgh
Aﬀected * Y2008 -0.0995** -0.113*** -0.127*** -0.372***
(0.0406) (0.0265) (0.0331) (0.0699)
Aﬀected * Y2013 -0.0798*** 0.106***
(0.0286) (0.0346)
Aﬀected * Dist Afgh * Y2008 0.113***
(0.0245)
Aﬀected * Dist Afgh * Y2013 -0.0280***
(0.00886)
Moderate * Y2013 0.0280*
(0.0157)
Severe * Y2013 0.0332*
(0.0171)
Observations 336 336 504 336 336 336
Pashtun * Y2008 YES YES YES YES NO NO
Pashtun * Y2013 NO NO YES NO YES YES
Freq. Distater * Y2008 YES YES YES YES NO NO
Freq. Distater * Y2013 NO NO YES NO YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported in the brackets.
The table shows the results from estimating the baseline speciﬁcation using OLS. The dependent
variable is the share of MMA in the 2002 or 2008 elections. In Column (3) the election data of
2013 is added. * denotes signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, ** denotes signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
*** denotes signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
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Figure 5: The eﬀect of the natural disasters on MMA vote share as a function of the intensity
the most aﬀected areas are close to the Indus river. Results of estimation were the function
f(.) is a 4th degree polynomial are shown in Figure 5 on the right panel. The MMA gained
around 5 percentage points in electoral districts at less than 200km from the Indus river.
After that the eﬀect decreases until it reaches zero at 350Km. The median distance is 112Km
with only 15% of the electoral districts being at more than 300Km. This is inline with the
fact that the ﬂood aﬀected a large proportion of the Pakistani population and consequently
letting the MMA gain votes in many electoral districts.
5.2 Long-run Eﬀects
Additionally for the earthquake scenario we can asses if the results we have observed in the
election immediately after the natural disaster are present also in the long-run. We can do
so for the earthquake scenario because we observe the results of two elections after the 2005
earthquake. In particular we estimate this, by running the baseline analysis with the sample
that include all elections and then let the earthquake have potentially diﬀerent eﬀects in the
short-run (election of 2008 three years after the earthquake) and the long-run (the elections
of 2013 eight years after the earthquake) by estimating the following:
MMAit = αi + δ11(Y ear = 2008) + δ21(Y ear = 2013) + β11(Y ear = 2008) ∗ Affectedi
+ β21(Y ear = 2013) ∗ Affectedi +X ′i,tγ + Ui,t
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Estimates are shown in Column (3) of table 5. The eﬀect of the earthquake decrease in
time but is still statistically signiﬁcant also in 2013 eight years after the earthquake. This is
further evidence of the power of state capacity for eradicating terrorist groups.
5.3 Distance from Afghanistan
The mechanism we propose depends on the level of support provided by the Taliban in the
areas aﬀected by the natural disaster compared to that of the state. The capacity of the
Taliban to provide support in a region greatly depends on their presence on the territory
before the natural disaster happens. One proxy for the ex-ante presence is distance of the
electoral district from the Afghanistan border. This is mainly because the Taliban originate
from the area close to the Afghanistan border and have many tribal connection with this
area. The Taliban have their headquarters in the North Waziristan and Mohamand agency
in FATA, next to the Afghanistan border.
This implies that the areas closer to the Afghanistan border are more likely to receive
greater Taliban support, everything else equal. This generates testable implication according
to our mechanism.
Places close to the afghan border usually receive many social services from the Taliban.
In the case of the earthquake a good performance by the state led to the crowding-out of
the Taliban in the provision of natural disaster relief especially in this areas and because of
this led to a substantial decrease in the MMA votes close to the Afghan border. Conversely,
in the case of the 2010 ﬂood, places close to the Afghan border managed to receive more
aid with respect to places aﬀected by the ﬂood that were more far away. This should then
lead to a disproportional increase in votes for the MMA in places close to Afghanistan. The
following equation captures the mechanism formally:
MMAi,t = αi + δPOSTt + β1Affectedi ∗ Postt + f1(dist_afghi) ∗ Postt
f2(dist_afghi) ∗ Postt ∗ Affectedi +X ′i,tγ + ui,t
(4)
where dist_afghi is the distance of the electoral region, i, from the Afghanistan border.
This can be also thought as a triple diﬀerence speciﬁcation were we compare places aﬀected
or not by the natural disaster, before and after this natural disaster and observe how the
results diﬀer between places close and far away from the afghan border.
In Table 5 column (4) we show the estimates for a linear f1(.) and f2(.) in the case of
the earthquake. The results are consistent with the mechanism we propose. As the distance
to the border to Afghanistan increases the negative eﬀect of the earthquake on the MMA
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Figure 6: The eﬀect of the natural disasters on MMA vote share as a function of distance
from Afghanistan
decreases. Similarly in Table 5 column (6) we report the results for the 2010 ﬂood scenario.
We can observe how the increase of vote of the MMA are concentrate around the Afghan
border. As the distance increases, and presumably the capacity of the Taliban to help
decreases, the gains for the MMA party get smaller.
Similar results are displayed in 6 were we plot the eﬀect of the earthquake (panel on
the left) and the ﬂood (panel on the right) as a function of the distance from Afghanistan.
We do so by using a 4th degree polynomial for the function f1(.) and f2(.). Again we can
observe how the gains or losses by the MMA are concentrate in the ﬁrst Km. In the case of
the earthquake the MMA did not lose any votes in electoral districts at more than 250Km
far away from the Afghan border. In the case of the ﬂood all the gains are concentrated in
the ﬁrst 100Km from the border.
5.4 Testing Parallel Trends Assumption
In the sections above, we employ diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation to establish the causal
eﬀect of being aﬀected by a natural disaster on the MMA vote share. Our identiﬁcation
strategy relies on the assumption that the trends in the aﬀected and unaﬀected areas should
be the same. That is, in absence of a natural disaster, the average vote share for the
MMA would have changed in the same way in the areas which were aﬀected by the natural
disaster compared to the areas which were unaﬀected. Since for the case of the ﬂood we
have electoral data for two elections before the treatment in 2010, we can provide evidence
of this parallel trends assumption. We do that by testing whether the vote share of MMA
changed diﬀerently between the 2002 and 2008 elections in the aﬀected areas relative to the
unaﬀected areas.
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Table 6: Testing Parallel Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share MMA Share MMA Share MMA Share MMA
Aﬀected * Y2008 -0.0526* -0.0776** -0.0431 -0.0455
(0.0284) (0.0303) (0.0318) (0.0315)
Observations 336 336 336 336
Freq. Flood * Y2008 NO YES YES YES
Pashtun * Y2008 NO NO YES YES
Num. Parties NO NO NO YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported
in the brackets. The table shows the results from estimating the baseline spec-
iﬁcation using OLS. The dependent variable is the share of MMA in the 2002
or 2008 elections. * denotes signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, ** denotes signiﬁ-
cant at 5 percent level, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
Table 6 shows the results of the baseline regression for the ﬂood using data before the
ﬂood occurred (2002 and 2008 election years). The results show, ﬁrst of all, that for our
preferred speciﬁcation found in column (3) there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in trends in
the aﬀected areas compared to the unaﬀected areas before the ﬂood. Interestingly, they also
show that controlling for Pashtun ethnicity and mean frequency is necessary for identifying
the casual eﬀect of the ﬂood. As explained in Section 3 it was to be expected that electoral
districts that are of Pashtun origin or that are regularly aﬀected by the ﬂood present diﬀerent
trends in the MMA vote shares. This is not a problem as we let Pashtun areas and areas
that are regularly aﬀected by the ﬂood have diﬀerent trends between election years. So the
identiﬁcation of our parameter of interest doesn't come from these diﬀerences but presumably
only from the fact that some areas were aﬀected by the ﬂood while others not.
5.5 Falsiﬁcations Tests
In order to test if there are any unobserved trends in the data driving our results, we carry out
one falsiﬁcation tests for each natural disaster. The falsiﬁcation exercise randomly assigns
the status of aﬀected by the natural disaster to electoral districts with the same proportion
as the actual natural disasters14.
Then we repeat 1000 times the following estimation:
MMAit = αi + δPOSTt + β(FAKEaffectedi ∗ POSTt) +X ′itγ + uit, (5)
14The 2005 earthquake aﬀected 22% of the electoral districts the 2010 ﬂood 41% of them.
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and rise of extremist groups in areas with weak institutions and extremism.
The estimates provided in our study show how extremely reactive support for violent
groups is with respect to changes in state capacity. In particular, our results shed a light
how powerful international aid can be as anti-terrorist tool. For a back of the envelope
calculation of the eﬀect of lack of state we can study the diﬀerence in funding gap between
the two natural disaster we are studying. In the 2005 earthquake around 45% of the aid was
already delivered after two months. In contrast in the 2010 ﬂood only 25% was delivered.
This 20 percentage points diﬀerence is equivalent to around $2 Billion. Given the estimates
we have found in Table 1 and 2 the $2 Billion not delivered in international aid moved more
1.3 Million voters to vote for the MMA. For a comparison in 2010 the US spent $181 Billion
for the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. These $2 Billion are equivalent to only 4 days
of war on terror while at the same time being extremely eﬃcient in reducing radicalization
of citizens in the region.
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Bringing War Home: Violent Crime, Police Killings and
the Overmilitarization of the US Police
Federico Masera
∗
Abstract
The withdrawal from the Afghan and Iraqi wars has led to the arrival of vast quantities of
military equipment to the US. Much of this equipment, now unused by the military, has been
redistributed to police departments via a program called 1033. In this paper, I study the
causal eﬀect on criminal activity and police behavior of the militarization of the police through
this program. I do so by taking into account that military equipment is stored in various
disposition centers. Police departments do not pay for the cost of these items but must cover
all transportation costs. I then use the distance to a disposition center and the timing of the
US withdrawal from the wars in an instrumental variable setting. Estimates show that military
equipment reduces violent crime and is responsible for 60% of the rapid drop observed since
2007. More than one third of this eﬀect is caused by the displacement of violent crime to
neighboring areas. Because police departments do not consider this externality when making
militarization decisions, they overmilitarize. Finally, I show that police militarization increases
the number of people killed by the police. Estimates imply that all the recent increases in
police killings are due to police militarization.
∗Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Email: fmasera@eco.uc3m.es - Address: Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid, Economics Department, C/ Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), España
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1 Introduction
Almost 70% of the US population lives under the jurisdiction of a local enforcement agency
that is equipped with military weapons. At least 200 operations are deployed by the police
each day with these items [Kraska (2007); Coyne and Hall-blanco (2016)]. Although the
US police has been partly militarized for many decades, this phenomenon has accelerated
quickly with the distribution of over one billion dollars in military equipment during the
last few years1. These rapid changes in the way public security is provided are not conﬁned
to the US. As terrorist threats have escalated recently, many police forces in Europe have
increased their use of military equipment2. In the developing world, police departments have
been heavily militarized for many years, and in some cases the army is directly used in order
to ﬁght crime3.
Although the use of military equipment by police has become widespread around the
world, very little is known on its eﬀects. In the US, police militarization has become highly
debated following the use of military equipment by police during Ferguson's infamous riots.
The debate continued in recent years after President Obama's executive order restricted the
use of military equipment by the police. After the killings in July 2016 of ﬁve oﬃcers in
Dallas and three in Baton Rouge, changes to police militarization are being discussed again
in the US Congress4. On one side of the argument are police departments, sheriﬀ's oﬃces
and pro-police movements who defend police militarization as a needed tool for eﬀective
1These estimates are calculated using only data from program 1033 the main federal program that al-
lows local enforcement agencies to acquire military weapons in the US. Alternatively, local enforcement
agencies could buy military weapons using their own ﬁnances or Department of Homeland Security grants.
Unfortunately comprehensive data on this type of acquisition of military weapons is not available.
2Operation Sentinelle was launched in France after Charlie Hebdo massacre of January 2015 with 10'000
military forces sent across France. In 2016 both Belgian and Dutch police forces were allowed to carry heavy
military guns when protecting high-risk sites.
3The militarization of public security is particularly present in Latin America. Examples can be found with
Mexico where President Calderon send 50,000 soldiers to ﬁght drug-traﬃcking criminals, PMOP initiative in
Honduras against street gangs and Venezuelan President Maduro's decision in 2013 of sending 3,000 soldiers
to combat crime in Caracas.
4For reference: The Executive Order 13688 reformed the use of military equipment by the police in
January 2015. As of September 2016 Amendment 1208 is conferenced with the Senate with the objective of
reversing the executive order.
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and safe law enforcement. On the other side of the debate are civil liberties and activist
groups who see police militarization as a violation of constitutional rights and fear that it
will increase police brutality.
In this paper, I contribute to this discussion by providing causal estimates on the eﬀects of
police militarization on criminal activity and police behavior. I do so by studying Program
1033, the main program that transfers military equipment to police departments in the US.
When the army began withdrawing from the Afghan and Iraqi wars at the end of 2009,
military equipment returned to the US and was then distributed to police departments
through this program. In order to estimate the causal eﬀect of this military equipment, I use
the fact that, when returning from war, military equipment is available at various disposition
centers across the US. I then show that police departments close to these disposition centers
are especially prone to be militarized. This was particularly true after the start of the
withdrawals from the Iraqi and Afghan wars, when military weapons became massively
available. There are two main reasons for this behavior. First, the only cost that police
departments have to incur when acquiring military equipment is the transportation cost
from the disposition center. Secondly, every police department must appoint an oﬃcer to
personally inspect the military items before this is requested. Inspections can be cheaper
and more frequent if the police department is located near a disposition center. I then use
the timing of the US withdrawal from the wars and the closeness to a disposition center to
construct an instrumental variable to estimate the causal impact of the militarization of the
US police. In the estimation procedure I take particular care of the fact that disposition
centers are not randomly located in the US but are a subsample of military bases. I do so
by controlling for the closeness to a military base, where a military base may or may not be
a disposition center, interacted with year dummies. Because of this the only cross-sectional
variation I use comes from the fact that some military bases were selected as disposition
centers in 1997, when Program 1033 was created. I then show how before the withdrawal
from the wars observables characteristics of places close to military bases are similar between
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those that were selected as disposition centers and those who where not.
With this instrumental variable setting I show that police militarization can reduce vi-
olent crimes. For each dollar per capita of military equipment in the possession of a police
department, violent crime is reduced by 7%. Estimates suggest that Program 1033 has pre-
vented almost 1.8 million violent crimes since its inception in 1997. Most of the prevented
crimes are concentrated in the last few years, when militarization has become particularly
widespread. Conservative cost estimates predict that 78 billion US dollars have been pre-
vented in costs to the victims of these violent crimes and the US justice system. Additionally,
I show how police militarization is an important factor in the recent acceleration in the drop
of violent crime in the US. Since 2007, violent crimes have decreased by an impressive 18%.
Estimates suggest that more than 60% of this drop is due to police militarization. Finally, I
show that at least one third of the eﬀect that militarization has on violent crime is through
the displacement of criminal activity to neighboring areas. This displacement eﬀects have
important implications for the optimality of the decision to militarize of each police de-
partment. When police departments decide on their level of militarization, they need not
take into account these negative externalities on neighboring areas. Because of this, police
departments are overmilitarized.
I then focus my analysis on one of the most discussed outcomes related to police mili-
tarization: police killings. The number of people killed by the police has rapidly increased,
rising from 400 in the year 2000 to more than 1000 in recent years. Instrumental variable
estimates show that the militarization of the police increases police killings. I show that
every 1.6 million dollars spent in military equipment generates an extra police killing per
year. My estimates imply that all the recent increases in police killings are due to police
militarization through Program 1033. In total, 2200 individuals have been killed due to the
militarization of the police caused by Program 1033. Using conservative estimates of the
statistical value of life, the total cost in life lost amounts to more than 17 billion US$.
This paper is related to the investigation of the causes and eﬀects of police militariza-
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tion. Balko (2014) provides a complete analysis of the history of police militarization and a
description of the policies and practices that led to a level of militarization unprecedented in
the history of the US. ACLU (2014) reports the results of sending public records requests to
260 enforcement agencies. The study shows how enforcement agencies have become highly
militarized due to the use of Program 1033 and that the major use of military equipment
is in drug raids. Closer my paper, ? investigates the eﬀects of Program 1033 on crime and
concludes that militarized counties experienced a reduction in street crime level. First, I
improve on the identiﬁcation the causal eﬀects of militarization. Instead of using average
military aid by the federal government to predict the cross-sectional variation police mili-
tarization I use some predetermined characteristics, namely the geographical distribution of
US military bases and disposition centers. This let me be sure that my results are not driven
by unobserved factors that the determine the propensity of receiving military equipment.
Second, I use more detailed data on police militarization at the law enforcement agency level
instead of at the county level. This allows me to study displacement eﬀects and ultimately
show the existence of overmilitarization in the US police. I can do that by focusing my
study on local law enforcement agencies instead of on the full set of enforcement forces in
the US. The main advantage of this approach is that local law enforcement agencies have
non-overlapping jurisdictions. Because of this, any increase in militarization in one juris-
diction should have no direct eﬀect on another jurisdiction. Additionally, with this new
dataset, I avoid the problem of overrepresenting policing resources in a county that includes
the state capital. This problem arises because most state and federal agencies are normally
located in the state capital, but their jurisdiction is broader than a county. Finally, I study
the eﬀects of militarization on a new outcome: police killings. This phenomenon has lately
entered public discussion in relation police militarization and I show that this is an impor-
tant dimension to consider when evaluating the overall impact of Program 1033. My work
is related to Dell (2015), which studies the eﬀects of Mexico's policy against drug-traﬃcking
that involved, among other things, heavy use of military equipment. Estimates show that
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this policy actually increased drug-related violence. In my paper, I isolate the eﬀects on
crime of having military equipment instead of the more diversiﬁed policy studied in Dell
(2015). Furthermore, I can provide elasticities of military equipment on crime, as I directly
observe how much police departments are militarized.
More broadly, my paper is related to the literature that studies the eﬀects of policing on
crime. The most recent literature review can be found in Chalﬁn and Mccrary (2015). Most
related to my analysis are studies that exploit quasi-experiments that attempt to uncover
the elasticities of crime to changes in policing. The main threat for credible identiﬁcation
in this literature is the endogeneity of policing. The main concern is that, when police
departments expect increases in crime, they boost their policing eﬀorts, thus confounding
any potential negative eﬀects of policing on crime. The ﬁrst paper attempted to address this
endogeneity problem is Levitt (1997), which uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial
elections as an instrument from changes in policing. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) and
Draca, Machin and Witt (2011) use terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires and London and the
subsequent deployment of police in speciﬁc areas of these cities as an exogenous shock to
policing to study the eﬀects on crime. Other papers, such as Machin and Marie (2011) and
Evans and Owens (2007), use the allocation of additional resources in certain cities in the UK
and the US to examine the eﬀectiveness of policing on crime reduction. This literature shows
that an increase in policing is generally eﬀective at reducing crime. My main contribution to
this literature is the study of a speciﬁc change in policing: the use of military weapons by the
police. Furthermore, I am the ﬁrst to provide causal evidence on the determinants of police
killings. Additionally, my study uncovers some geographical displacement eﬀects that are in
line with classical theories of rational criminals, but for which there has previously been very
little empirical evidence. Finally, it is important to note that my estimates are identiﬁed
from a completely new source of variation. In particular, an diﬀerently from the other papers
in the literature, I exploit an event that occurred many years before the activation of the
treatment to identify the causal eﬀect of policing. In fact, the cross-sectional variation I use
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is given by a combination of the position of military bases in the US that were mostly built
during the WW2, and the selection of storage facilities that were selected in 1997.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 I will present the data that is used
and how program 1033 works. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy, the main results
and discuss the validity of the identifying assumption. In Section 4 I explore the potential
mechanisms that could generate these results. Section 5 studies the eﬀect of militarization
on police safety and police killings. Finally, in section 6, I present concluding remarks.
2 The 1033 Program and Data
The defense and logistics agency (DLA) is an US combat logistics agency that provides a
wide range of logistics, acquisition and technical services to the army, marine corps, navy,
airforce and other federal agencies. Of particular interest to my analysis are the services
they provide under the reutilization, transfers and donation section. This section of the DLA
redistributes military equipment that the department of defense (DoD) declares as excess to
its needs. These items are then turned-in to one of DLA's disposition centers that serve as
a storage facility. Once these items are received they enter a one week accumulation period,
where the items are inspected and cataloged. Then DoD exclusive screening period starts
where only DoD agencies can search for military equipment. After that a 21 days screening
period starts where police departments and other enforcement agencies may search for excess
military equipment. In order to participate in the screening police departments must ﬁrst
join the 1033 program and the application has to be approved by the 1033 program state
coordinator and the DLA. After the approval the police department appoints an oﬃcial to
visit their local DLA disposition site. If interested in any item the police department places
the request trough the DLA website. The item must have a justiﬁcation and be approved
by the state coordinator and the DLA. The police department that receives an approval for
property transfer must cover all transportation costs but doesn't pay for the cost of the item.
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The DLA in their dataset provides information on the date, the name of the item, the
market value and the receiving enforcement agency for all the excess military equipment
transferred through the 1033 program5. Since the inception of this program in 1998 more
than 8000 enforcement agencies have enrolled in this program. Since 2010 there have been
a spike in the use of the 1033 program. As shown in Figure 1 the total value of the items
transferred to police departments by the 1033 program has passed from a few millions every
year to almost 600 millions dollars in 2014. Furthermore as reported by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU (2014)) in this period span no police department has ever returned
the military equipment back to the DLA. With this information I can build the value of
the stock of military equipment available to all police departments at any point in time by
summing up the value in dollars of the the military equipment received up to that point
by the police department6. The military equipment transferred through program 1033 is
extremely varied with almost 7800 type of items. Military vehicles make up almost 55%
of the total value that has been transferred. The most common vehicles are mine resistant
vehicles and armored trucks. Around 40% of the value is composed by military weapons and
equipment. Assault riﬂes, night vision equipment, camouﬂage and body armor are some of
the most common items. The remaining 5% is comprised of non-tactical items that include
computers, electricity generators, recreational and gymnastic equipment.
For crime data I use the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) statistics produced by the FBI.
This dataset have been published yearly since 1958 and collects data on violent crime and
property crime. I then link this data to the militarization data described before by matching
the agencies names.
5Throughout the paper the analysis is conﬁned to the lowest level of law enforcement in the US. These
local enforcement agencies include police department, sheriﬀ oﬃces
6In the baseline speciﬁcation for creating the stock of military equipment I sum up the value of military
equipment acquired up to that moment without taking into account any depreciation.
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3 Econometric Framework
3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
First I study the direct eﬀect of militarization of the police department on violent crime rate.
The ﬁrst outcome will violent crimes as these types of crime are orders of magnitude more
costly to society with respect to non-violent crimes as property crimes or possession of illicit
drugs. Formally I would like to estimate the following equation.
vci,t = αi + αt + β1mili,t + βXi,t + i,t (1)
Where i identiﬁes the police department, t the year, vcit is the rate of violent crime
per 1000 inhabitants and mili,t is the value of the stock of military equipment per capita.
A problem of this analysis, that is common to other studies that trying to ﬁnd how some
characteristic of policing aﬀects crime, is the clear presence of an endogeneity problem. First
of all, this happens because of a reverse causality problem where police department in which
crime rate will increase demand more military equipment. Secondly, there are many potential
unobservable characteristics of a police jurisdiction that determine contemporaneously crime
and the demand for military equipment. These include the demographic characteristics of
the local population, local economic activity, the political situation and many other. The
structure of 1033 program let's me uncover the causal eﬀect of the militarization of the police
of crime (β1) by exploiting some exogenous cross-sectional and time variation in the use of
the 1033 program.
First of all, I exploit the fact that the excess military equipment available to redistribute
via the 1033 program is particularly high when an US military missions ends. In the time
frame of interest the main US military operation is the Operation Enduring Freedom that
started in October 2001 with the invasion of Afghanistan and then expanded in March 2003
in Iraq. As shown in Figure 1 the military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan steadily
increased with a ﬁrst peak reached in February of 2005 with 181500 soldiers on the ground
(161200 in Iraq and 20300 in Afghanistan). After that the level of boots on the ground was
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maintained for a few year until the surge of US forces called in Iraq by then US president
George W. Bush in January of 2007. The number of military equipment and troops increased
rapidly again until August of 2009 when 240500 soldiers were on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan. From the end of 2009 the US started a slow withdrawal from Iraq that then
began a few years later in Afghanistan in early 2012. As shown in Figure 1 the return of
troops in late 2009 coincides with the start of the exponential increase in military equipment
distributed by the program 1033 to police departments. The timing of the withdrawal from
the war allows me to predict the time variation of aggregate military equipment distributed
in the US.
For solving the endogeneity problem I need a way of predicting also the large cross-
sectional variation observed in the data. In 2009 50% of the US population was living under
the protection of a militarized police department. This percentage increased to 65% percent
in 2014. Even between the police departments that are militarized there is a huge variation.
In 2009 the median militarized police department had 13 cents of a dollar per capita in
military equipment with only 15% of them having more than 1 dollar per capita. This cross-
sectional distribution rapidly changed after the start of the withdrawal from the war. In 2014
the median militarization is of 71 cents with 43% having more than 1 dollar per capita. For
capturing this cross-sectional variation of the militarization of the police I will exploit the
fact that police departments close to DLA disposition centers should demand more military
equipment from the 1033 program. The main reason for this is that the costs of acquiring
items are increasing with the distance to the disposition center. First because, when a police
department acquires a military item through the 1033 program the only direct cost it has
is the special transportation that has to be arranged from the DLA disposition center to
the police department. Secondly, before the acquisition of an item, the agent appointed by
the police department has to go to the disposition center to screen the item of interest and
inspect its conditions. Is important to remember that most of the items transferred via the
1033 program have been already used in the Iraqi and Afghan wars and their conditions
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may vary. Potentially these items may require some repairs and all repair costs have to
be sustained by the police department. The screening process is then essential for police
departments to not incur in unforeseen repair costs. Additionally, the process of screening is
rapid lasting by law a maximum of 21 days. Being able to quickly go to inspect the military
equipment of interest is of fundamental importance for a police department. Because of
these reasons police departments specially close to the disposition centers are prone to ask
more and receive more items from the 1033 program. Figure 2 shows the location of all
police departments and the 69 DLA disposition centers that participate in the 1033 program
in continental US. As shown in the map disposition center are spread out throughout the
US with the median distance of a police department from the closest disposition center of
106Km.
I then combine these two sources of variation (one in time and the other cross-sectional)
to try to predict exogenously the militarization of all police departments. This is done with
the objective of then using this ﬁrst stage estimate in a instrumental variable setting to
estimate the causal eﬀect of militarization on crime as shown in equation (1). The general
speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst stage is the following:
mili,t = αi + αt + β1eqpt ∗ closeness(disp. center)i + βXi,t + i,t
Where eqpt measures the availability of excess military equipment as proxied by the
diﬀerence from the peak of the boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan that was
reached in 2009 and the subsequent years. This measure eqpt has been then normalized to 1
in 2014. Formally eqpt is deﬁned below, where bootst is the number of boots on the ground
that the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan as shown in Figure 1:
eqpt =

0 if t < 2010
boot2009−bootst
boots2009−boots2013 if t ≥ 2010
The variable closeness(disp.center)i can be calculated in many way using the information
shown in Figure 2 of the position of the police department and the DLA disposition centers.
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Some natural candidates for the function closeness are the distance to the closest disposition
center or a dummy indicating if a disposition center can be found in a certain radius from the
police department or counting the number of disposition center around a police department.
The main identiﬁcation assumption behind this strategy is that changes in the violent
crime between years of high availability and low availability of equipment are not diﬀerent
between close and far away places from a disposition center other than through the military
equipment received by these places. The main threat to the identiﬁcation strategy comes
from the fact that disposition centers are just military bases that has been selected by the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1997 as DLA disposition centers for the 1033 program.
If police departments around military bases diﬀer, in unobservables that determine changes
in violent crime rates, with respect to places far away from military bases this will invalidate
the identiﬁcation strategy. This is a reasonable concern as places close to a military base
diﬀer on many characteristics (demographics, labor market structure, political preferences,
etc...) and potentially many are unobservable. For this reason in all my speciﬁcation I will
control for the fact of being close to a military base (where a military base may or may not
be a DLA disposition center). The military bases that are used as a control are the ones that
are currently still open and that could have potentially been selected as DLA disposition
centers in 1997. This doesn't include military hospitals, military training centers and joint
airports. There are 237 military bases that comply with these characteristics of which as
said before 69 were selected as DLA disposition centers.
Formally I will estimate the following 2 stages in an instrumental variable setting:
First Stage:
mili,t = αi + αt + β1eqpt ∗ closeness(disp. center)i + β2,tyeart ∗ closeness(mil. base)i + i,t
Second Stage: vci,t = δi + δt + θ1mili,t + θ2,tyeart ∗ closeness(mil. base)i + γi,t
With the following speciﬁcation the only excluded instrument is eqpt∗closeness(disp.center)i.
Because of this the only cross-sectional variation I use comes from the fact that some military
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bases have been selected to be disposition centers in 1997. Is important to notice that this
speciﬁcation discounts the fact that places disposition centers are also military bases and
because of this places close to disposition have potentially diﬀerent trends in violent crime.
Furthermore I let the closeness to a military base have a diﬀerent inﬂuence year by year.
Because of this I don't impose that the unobservable factors that happen close to a military
base happen at the same time as the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
3.2 First Stage
As described before there are potentially many ways of combining the information in Figure
2 to create a proper measure of closeness. As a baseline throughout the paper I deﬁne a place
to be close to a DLA disposition center is if it is located at less than 20Km (air distance)
from it. Throughout the paper I will show how results are robust to many other deﬁnitions
that can be used for closeness to a disposition center. The decision is useful for two reason:
First of all is one of the measures of closeness that has the best predicting power. Secondly
being a dummy makes let me borrow a lot of language and tools from the treatment and
control literature. In particular with this deﬁnition is very simple the to deﬁne which of the
police department are treated and which are not.
As a ﬁrst visual exploratory analysis in Figure 3 I compare the time-series of the value of
the stock of military equipment of police department close to a disposition center (I will call
this police departments treated throughout the rest paper) to places close to a military base
that is not a disposition center (denoted as placebo treated). First of all, we can notice
how as in Figure 1 that from 2010 onward there is a huge increase in the militarization
of police departments. Treated police departments are always more militarized than the
placebo treated ones. This diﬀerence is just of a few cents per capita until 2009. As soon as
the withdrawal from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan happened in late 2009 the diﬀerence
between these 2 groups of police departments diverged. In 2014 treated police departments
had more than 1 dollar per capita of diﬀerence in the level of militarization. That is around
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a 65% more than the placebo treated police departments.
More formally in Table 1 are reported the estimates for β1 for the ﬁrst stage previously
described. All regression results are estimated with sample from 2007 to 2014. Column 1
shows the baseline speciﬁcation that deﬁnes a police department as close if situated at less
than 20km from a DLA disposition center. The other columns show the robustness the ﬁrst
stage results to other deﬁnitions of closeness. In column 2 a police department is deﬁned as
close if situated at less than 40km from a DLA disposition center. In column 3 I use the
distance in Km and in column 4 the logarithmic distance in Km from the closest disposition
centers. In column 5 and 6 I use the number of disposition centers in a radius of 50Km and
100Km.
Table 1 shows formally what could be already noted in Figure 3. Police departments
close to disposition centers increase more than far away ones their level of militarization
after 2009. This is true using diﬀerent ways of calculating the closeness to DLA disposition
centers.
3.3 Baseline Results
With this identiﬁcation strategy I'm now able to estimate the causal eﬀect of the milita-
rization of the police on the violent crime rate. The baseline regression results are shown
in Table 2. OLS results shown in columns (1) and (2) are consistent with reverse causality
where police departments that predict to have increases in violent crimes tend to militarize
more. Columns (3) and (4) present the preferred speciﬁcations. Both show how milita-
rization per capita reduces the violent crime rate. In particular every dollar per capita in
military equipment decreases violent crime by 1.4 per 1000 inhabitant or as shown in column
(4) by around 6.4 percent. Finally column (5) shows with the reduced form estimates that
places close to a disposition experienced a drop in the violent crime rate after 2009 higher
than other places in the US.
For interpreting the marginal eﬀects found in Table 2 notice that in 2014 the average
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militarization of a police department in the US is of 3.2 dollars per capita. This amount of
money would be enough for a police department of 100000 inhabitants to aﬀord a 10 man
fully armed military squad7. A police department of these dimensions would have around 3.3
violent crimes a day. The estimates of Table 2 imply that without militarization the daily
crimes would be around 4.5 or 4.1 depending if I use the linear of the logarithmic estimation
respectively. As shown in this example the militarization of the police has a huge direct
eﬀect on the reduction of violent crime.
3.4 Plausibility of Identiﬁcation Strategy
The previous results hinge on the identifying assumption that violent crime rates between
years of high availability and low availability of military equipment are not diﬀerent between
police departments treated and placebo treated other than through the military equipment
received by these places. Another way of looking at this assumption is that in 1997 when
the program was created the selection made over which are going to be the military bases
that are used as disposition centers was not biased towards places that after 2009 will have
a higher drop in violent crime.
It seems reasonable to assume that the selection of disposition centers was not actively
biased towards places that will experience a disproportionately high drop in violent crime 12
years later. First, because if any we would expect the bias to be in the opposite direction.
Military bases could be selected as disposition centers if they are predicted to experience
an increase in violent crime around them. If this is the case I could interpret my results as
a lower bound of the eﬀect of the militarization on crime and the real eﬀect is potentially
even higher. Secondly, is not feasible to predict so many years ahead violent crime trends.
This is specially true in the US where the crime has moved spatially a lot in the last two
7Expenses for fully equipping a military squad highly depend on the type and quality of items. The
example of the 10 man fully armed squad I use includes 1 armored truck, 1 explosive disposal equipment,
2 night-vision googles and 2 thermal sights. Added to this a set of 10 assault riﬂes, sights and body
armor. Depending of the quality of these items it may cost around 320000 dollars of 3.2 per capita for this
hypothetical city of 100000 population police department.
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decades because of the intensiﬁcation of the war of drugs, the arrival of new kind of drugs
like Oxycontin and the decline of some prosperous industrial cities. Still it could be the case
that the places selected as disposition centers where selected because of some other reason
that ended being relevant in causing diﬀerent trends in crime in 2009.
To explore if this is in fact the case in Table 3 I ﬁrst provide evidence that police depart-
ments treated and placebo treated are similar in many predetermined observables that are
potentially related to crime. Column 2 and 3 show that treated and placebo treated do not
diﬀer in any substantial way. Is also important to notice how a treated police department
and ones that not close to a military base (denominated with "Other" in the Table) are in-
stead substantially diﬀerent. These police departments tend to be smaller in population and
bigger in area and have lower crime rates with respect to the treated ones. This observation
further validates the identiﬁcation strategy that is used throughout the paper that controls
for the distance to a military base as an included instrument.
As further evidence in favor of the identiﬁcation assumption I now explore the validity
of the parallel trends assumption. For my estimation procedure this assumption states that
trends of violent crime would have been parallel between treated and placebo treated police
departments in a hypothetical world where both of them would have not been militarized.
Even if this counterfactual world is not directly observable in the data I here provide evidence
that is consistent with the parallel trends assumption. First in Figure 4 I explore visually
if there is a basis to believe that violent crime rates are parallel before 2010, where both
treated and placebo treated police departments are practically not militarized. As observed
in Figure 4 for the decade previous to the withdrawal from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
Violent crime rates where slowly decreasing of around 4% in these 10 years. At a ﬁrst visual
inspection time series of violent crimes before 2009 seem parallel between places treated and
placebo treated. A more formal test of this important characteristic of the data is left for
later in this section. After 2009 police departments in both groups experienced a substantial
decrease in violent crime. Police departments placebo treated decreased crime by 11% in
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those 5 years while police departments treated experience a decrease of 19%. The main
argument of my paper is that this diﬀerential decrease in violent crime experienced after
2009 is due to the higher militarization of places close to disposition centers with respect to
places close to a military base that is not a disposition center. The diﬀerential treatment of
the police departments in these 2 groups has been previously visually explored in Figure 3.
As further evidence of the parallel trends assumption in Table 4 are shown the diﬀerences
between 2006 and 2009 of various criminal outcomes. These diﬀerences are computed for
the treated, the placebo treated and other police departments as deﬁned before. Of the
14 outcomes I report in Table 4 only 2 have marginally diﬀerent trends between police
departments treated and placebo treated. Importantly, violent crimes trends between treated
and placebo treated police departments do not have statistically diﬀerent trends. This is an
encouraging result as it means that in general there where no particular diﬀerences between
these 2 groups and any change in trends after 2009 could be plausibly attributed to program
1033.
As ﬁnal evidence of the validity of the identiﬁcation strategy I perform an event study
analysis. The intention here is to formally test the intuition displayed in Figure 4 by com-
paring in a ﬂexible way if there are any diﬀerences between places treated and placebo
treated. Then looking if these diﬀerences changed after start of the withdrawal of the Iraqi
and Afghan war. For checking this I estimate the following regression:
vci,t = σi+ σt+ σ1,tyeart ∗ 1(disp. center < 20Km)i+ σ2,tyeart ∗ 1(mil. base < 20Km)i+ i,t
The sample includes all police departments yearly data from 2000 to 2014. The com-
parison year has been set to be 2009 the last year before the start of the withdrawal from
the wars. The estimates of σ1,t are shown in Figure 5. Before 2010, there is no statistical
diﬀerence between places close and far away from disposition centers. As soon as troops, and
more importantly military equipment, returned to the US violent crime around disposition
centers starts decreasing faster than in any other place.
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3.5 Robustness
In Table 5 I show how the results are robust to the choice of the instrument. In all the
speciﬁcations the eﬀects of militarization per capita on violent crime are negative. The
eﬀects of an extra dollar per capita of militarization varies from -0.8 to a maximum of -1.7.
Is important to notice that results may vary because the complier subpopulation for each
instrument is diﬀerent. In particular the decision to use or not program 1033 because you
are in the 20Km or 40Km radius from a disposition center is potentially more binding for
small/medium disposition centers, as for them also small diﬀerences in transportation cost
may be very important for the decision of using the 1033 program. This may inﬂuence the
estimated parameter if we have that the eﬀect of militarization on crime is diﬀerent for small
and large departments. Is also important to notice that there seem to be some clear non-
linearities in the use of the program 1033 with respect to distance. Because of this reason
column (3) that includes distance from a disposition center linearly is the one the estimation
with less predictive power.
Secondly for showing the robustness of the main results I perform the main regression this
time including in the sample only places that are less than 20Km from a military base. This
regression directly compares only places close to disposition centers and military bases that
are not disposition centers without using any information from other police departments.
From Table 6 we can observe how all the main results are practically the same both in the
direction and the size. This is in part is to be expected as the variation the main regression
is using is the diﬀerent trends in crime post-2009 between places close to a DLA disposition
center and other military bases.
As further robustness check I perform the main speciﬁcation with two alternative way
of deﬁning the set of relevant military bases. First of all I include as military bases all
military bases in the US even if they are now closed. This add up to 389 military bases
as in the main speciﬁcation only 69 of them are actually DLA disposition centers. In my
second speciﬁcation I include all military bases that are now open even if they couldn't
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have been selected in 1997 as DLA disposition centers because of the type of activities that
are performed there. These include military hospitals, military bases devoted completely to
training or military airports that are joint with civilian ones. In total there are 290 military
bases in this speciﬁcation. In Table 7 results are shown. The main results all hold and the
magnitudes are very similar to the main speciﬁcation.
Finally, in the following econometric exercises I provide further evidence that there is
indeed something special that is aﬀecting crime after 2009 in places close to a disposition
center that is not happening in any other place in the US. Specially is not happening in
other comparable places around military bases that are not disposition centers. For doing
that I choose at random 69 military bases and assign them as fake disposition centers. I
them run the following reduced form regression:
vci,t = σi+σt+σ1eqpt∗1(FAKEdisp.center < 20Km)i+σ2,tyeart∗1(mil.base < 20Km)i+i,t
I repeat this procedure 1000 times and plot in Figure 6 the distribution of the σ1 with
the thick red line indicating the same reduced form parameter with the real 69 disposition
centers. As shown in Figure 6 in general there is no eﬀect on crime of being close to a
fake disposition center. Comparing results with the parameter of the actual reduced form
as shown by the thick red line in Figure 6 no combination of military bases assigned as fake
disposition centers can replicate the huge negative eﬀects on violent crime of being close to
the real disposition centers. The claim of the paper is that the diﬀerence between places
close to disposition centers and any other place in the US is the preferential access to the
program 1033 and ultimately the militarization of these police departments.
As a last check of the robustness of the main results in Table 8 are shown the estimates
of a set of IV regressions that do not include in the sample large police departments and
another set of regression not weighted by population. The ﬁrst purpose of this regression is to
see how much the results are driven by big police departments. Additionally this regression
will inform us on the complier population and if there are any heterogeneous eﬀects along
the population dimension. First thing to notice is that in all the regressions the main results
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are maintained: Militarization reduces violent crime. These eﬀects are substantially less
important with respect to the main results where all police departments are included but
the F-statistics of the ﬁrst stage are bigger. Looking ﬁrst at the size of the coeﬃcient we can
say that militarization is more eﬀective when carried out by big police departments. This is
in line with the idea that for eﬀectively using this equipment specialized training is needed.
This specialized training and the creation of a full-time militarized squad is only feasible by
big police departments that can aﬀord for this training and have at their disposal a bigger
amount of oﬃcers. Secondly F-statistics increase as big police departments are eliminated
from the estimating subsample. This is very informative over which are the compliers of the
instruments used in the estimation. What the change of the F-statistic suggests is that big
police departments are not part of the complier population. This is again in line with the
idea that big police departments do not have as many budgetary constraints when deciding
if they should get some military equipment. Because of this, in the context of my estimation
strategy, they can be seen as always-takers. In other words, big police departments can
aﬀord the transportation cost of military equipment even if located at more that 20Km.
4 Mechanisms
4.1 Displacement Eﬀects
In line with criminals as rational actors, criminals may react to increases in militarization in a
jurisdiction by moving there criminal activities to neighboring ones. Is crucial to understand
the presence and size of these displacement eﬀects especially for the evaluation of policing
policies. First of all, the eﬀectiveness of hot spot policing, that mandates to concentrate
policing eﬀorts in places where crime is pervasive, is conditional on how important displace-
ment eﬀects are. Furthermore, more speciﬁcally to program 1033, displacements eﬀects may
induce the overmilitarization of police. This is due to the fact that militarization decision
through the 1033 program are made at the police department level while, if displacement
108
eﬀects exists, spillovers will be suﬀered by neighboring police departments as well. Because
of this negative externalities not internalized by the police department when making the mil-
itarization decision we would observe that in equilibrium police departments are militarized
more than optimally.
In this section I'll investigate the presence of displacement eﬀects with the following
econometric framework:
vci,t = αi + αt + β1mili,t + β2Wimilt + βXi,t + i,t (2)
Where Wi is a weighting matrix that select the range and intensity of the displacement
eﬀects and milt is a vector of militarization per capita of all police departments at time t.
When evaluating displacement eﬀects as a baseline regression I study spillovers conﬁned by
the commuting zone where the police department is located. In average each commuting zone
has 76 police departments. So in this speciﬁcation Wimilt is the average militarization of
police departments in the commuting zone of police department i. The analysis of displace-
ment eﬀects adds another endogeneity problem as in equation (2) also Wimilt is potentially
endogenous because of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. First, neighboring police
departments may decide to increase their militarization because of a general trend in the
increase in violence of a certain commuting zone leading to a reverse causality problem.
Secondly there are potentially many unobservables that are common to a commuting zone
that cause at the same time militarization of a police department and violent crime changes.
Because of this I will also use as an instrument the average closeness to a disposition center
in the commuting zone.
As shown in Table 9 displacement eﬀects are present and seem to be relatively important.
For each dollar per capita spend in a police department commuting zone the violent crime
rate increases by 0.5 per 1000 inhabitants. In column (4) where the outcome of interest is the
logarithm of the violent crime rate we observe and increase in violent crime of 2.6 percent.
This amounts to around one third of the direct eﬀect that the militarization of police has on
violent crime.
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For interpreting the marginal eﬀects found in Table 9 I return to the example of a police
department of 100000 inhabitants that is able to aﬀord a 10 man fully armed military squad.
As discussed in the previous chapter a police department of this dimensions would have
around 3.3 violent crimes a day in 2014. The estimates of Table 9 imply that without
militarization the daily crimes would be around 4.2 and 3.8 depending if I use the linear of
the logarithmic estimation respectively. This shows how even if the eﬀect of militarization
on violent crime are still sizable the eﬀects as not as large as when the estimation was carried
not taking into account displacement eﬀects.
For getting a better sense of the magnitude of the results in Figure 7 I plot in blue the
violent crime rate (per 1000 population) from the year 2000 and in red the predicted violent
crime rate if there was no militarization of the police. The logarithmic regression shown in
Column (4) of Table 9 is used a for predicting this counterfactual scenario. First thing to
notice is that since 2007 there has be an acceleration in the secular drop in violent crime
in the US. From 2007 to 2014 violent crime has decrease by an astonishing 18.3%. What
the counterfactual analysis suggests is that the drop would have been much more contained
without program 1033. Violent crime would have dropped only 7.2%. In other words the
militarization of the US police trough the 1033 program contributed to 61% of the drop in
violent crime experienced between 2007 and 2014.
Another way of quantifying the results is looking at the total eﬀect of 1033 program
since it has been implemented in 1997. The estimates shown in Column (4) of Table 9
predict that this program has prevented 1.8 million violent crimes since it's inception. Most
of these prevented violent crimes are in recent years. Trying to put a monetary value of
to the prevented cost to society produced by the reduction in crime of the 1033 program is
not an easy task. First of all, the cost produced by violent crime depends by the type of
crime. Secondly, even when a crime is know diﬀerent methods disagree on cost produced by
each crime. An excellent review of the literature is given by McCollister, French and Fang
(2010). Using less costly violent crime (that is 42310$ for a robbery) as the most conservative
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estimate program 1033 has prevented is 76 Billion US$ in costs.
4.2 Incapacitation or Deterrence
The mechanisms by which more policing may lead to a reduction in crime can be very
broadly divided into two categories: incapacitation and deterrence. The ﬁrst eﬀect is just
a mechanical one, where more policing leads to more arrests, less criminals circulating on
the streets and consequently less crimes. Deterrence instead arises when rational criminals
observe the change in policing and decide as a response to change their amount of criminal
activity. From a policy maker perspective is important to understand which of the two
mechanisms has caused the drop in crimes. If the main mechanism at play is incapacitation
this would create two additional costs for the society: First, incarceration is expensive and
this especially true for violent crimes that generally require a long incarceration period.
Secondly, the productive possibilities of the individual incarcerated are diminished (both
during and after the incarceration). Instead deterrence is a much more desirable mechanism
as it doesn't involve any cost to the judicial system and potentially moves economic activities
out of the illegal sector.
For detecting which mechanism is at play is important to notice that, if the eﬀect was all
due to incapacitation, arrests would increase due to the militarization of the police. Instead,
if the mechanism was deterrence, we should observe a decrease in the arrests after a police
department gets militarized. As a ﬁrst way of investigating which mechanisms is at play in
Table 10 I look at the eﬀects of the militarization of the police on arrests of violent criminals.
Results seem to indicate that arrests have decreased but not in a statistical important way.
The eﬀects of the militarization of the police on arrests are always smaller than with respect
to the eﬀects it has on crime. This seems to suggest that the mechanisms at play are some
combination between incapacitation and deterrence.
For a better understanding of how these two force shape the dynamics of arrests and
crimes I study the following econometric framework.
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Arrestsi,t = βi + βt + β1,tyeart ∗ 1(disp. center < 20Km)i + β2,tyeart ∗ 1(mil. base <
20Km)i + i,t
Where Arrestsi,t is the number of violent crimes cleared by arrest per 1000 inhabitants.
I then compare these estimates to the one already reported in Figure 5 that studies the
same dynamics for violent crime. Figure 5 show in red the estimates for β1 for comparison
purposes the ﬁgures also reports the same estimates for violent crimes in blue. Arrest drop
is much less pronounced. Secondly, also the timing of this drop is diﬀerent. As seen before
violent crimes decrease immediately after the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan in late
2009. Instead for arrests the seem to start dropping two years later. This is perfectly in line
with a situation where when a police department starts being militarized crimes drop for a
combination of incapacitation and deterrence. Because of this arrests remain constant. After
a few year deterrence seem to be the main force driving the continuous drop in crimes. This
can be explained by a situation where criminals learn about the militarization of the police
by observing the arrival of this equipment and this learning process takes time to reach all
potential criminals.
4.3 Substituting or Adding Resources
In order to evaluate the cost-eﬀectiveness of program 1033 and understand what mecha-
nisms drive the observed decrease in crime is important to study if other police department
resources change as it become more militarized. For doing so I'll use employee data of police
departments across the US. The number of employees could decrease, as now with military
equipment the amount of work requires less policemen. If this was the case the previously
shown estimates where actually underestimating the eﬀects of program 1033 by just examin-
ing crime data, as it also would have the eﬀect of saving resources. Conversely, the number
of employees could also increase because with military weapons the police departments may
decide also to hire specialized trained oﬃcers to use this equipment eﬀectively. Indeed the
use of this specially trained oﬃcers is part of the recommendations given by the White House
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in their report studying program 1033. Table 12 shows the instrumental variable estimates of
the eﬀect of militarization on diﬀerent types of employees in a police department. Program
1033 seems to have no eﬀect. This fact is reassuring for the causal interpretation of all the
previous results. In particular, when a police department gets militarized given that the
number of policemen doesn't change we can assign all the eﬀect in reduction of crime to the
arrival of military equipment.
5 Police Safety and Police Killings
One of the main arguments for the militarization of the police is that may improve the safety
of police oﬃcers. This has become a problem especially in the last decades when criminals,
have become armed with more powerful weapons putting in danger the lives of policemen
[Police Executive Research Forum (2010)]. Additionally, in the last years there have been
some violent acts directly targeted at the police forces that have captured the attention of
the public. Just in July of 2016 ﬁve oﬃcers were killed in Dallas and three in Baton Rouge
in two attacks directly aimed at killing policemen. These and other previous incidents led
to the creation of a nation wide movement called blue lives matter for bringing attention
to the numerous deaths in the police forces in the US. One of the potential beneﬁt of the
militarization of the police, that the organization blue lives matter puts forward, is that
the police may do their job without risking of being injured or killed. The reason is that
policemen could better protected and are able to detect the presence of potential threats
easily with military equipment. On the other side, policemen may be more prone to be
involved in more aggressive and dangerous operations now that they are militarized leading
ultimately to a higher risk for policemen. Using oﬃcial FBI data I study the eﬀect of the
militarization of the police on deaths and injuries on the job of policemen. A ﬁrst look at the
data shows how each year in the US between 40 to 50 policemen are killed and more than
40000 are assaulted. Table 12 reports the eﬀect of militarization on the safety of the police.
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Results show how none of these variables is statistically aﬀected by the militarization of the
police. All estimates are positives meaning that potentially the militarization of the police
made police oﬃcers even more unsafe.
Another important outcome that is often discussed with the rise of militarization of the
police the use of deadly force by the police while in the line of duty. Unfortunately data
on these killing are either incomplete or come from unoﬃcial sources. One oﬃcial statistic
is provided by the FBI supplementary homicides report that documents an increase in the
last years of police killings, reaching a peak in 2013 of 435. Unfortunately agencies are not
required to communicate to the FBI about police killings and so any aggregate information
is severely unreported. More relevant to the estimation, this underreporting may be not
random as agencies may decide to not submit the report exactly in years when these type
of homicides are high. The quality of the data of the FBI data and other oﬃcial sources,
like the BoJ Arrest-Related Deaths, has been shown to be very poor [Banks et al. (2015a)].
A recent report commissioned by the BoJ [Banks et al. (2015b)] shows how at best these
oﬃcial sources have captured around half of all police killings with considerable variability
in quality between states.
Because of this unreliability of the oﬃcial data many non-governmental organizations
have tried to create alternative data sources of homicides committed by the police. Even
the head of the FBI, James Comey, admitted that unoﬃcial data are the best source of
information about police killings8. One of the main datasets is the one produced by fatal-
encounters.org a project that collects and aggregates data from various media news sources
and public records. This dataset reports that police killings had rapidly increased in the
last years passing from around 660 in 2010 to a peak of 1120 in 2013. These numbers re-
ported by fatalencounters are substantially higher that the one by the FBI but are in line
with other eﬀorts of other non-governmental organizations. The newspaper The Guardian
has estimated 1146 people were killed by the police in 2015. Similar numbers have been
8Declaration by James Comey the 7th of October 2015 at the Summit on Violent Crime Reduction in
Washington, DC
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estimated by the websites killedbythepolice.net and ﬁvethirtyeight.com. Using the fata-
lencounters.org data, Table 12 shows the eﬀects of the militarization of the police on the
number of individuals killed by the police (over 10000 inhabitants). Estimates show that
militarization of the police increase police killings. Each dollar per capita more of military
equipment increases the number of killing by the police by 0.08 per 100000 inhabitants. This
estimate implies that the militarization of the police can explain all of the recent increases
in police killings. Around 2200 individuals have been killed due to the militarization of the
police caused by the program 1033. Using conservative estimates of the statistical value of
life in the US the total cost in life lost amounts to more than 17 billion US$9. Another
important collateral cost of the increase in the number of police killings is that that police
as an institution may lose value and trust in the citizens. From Gallup polls we can see how
the conﬁdence in the police is the lowest since 1993 with only 52% of Americans trusting
the police. Finally studying the causes of police killings may also give us some insights in
an even more prevailing phenomenon that is people injured by the police. As shown by
[Miller et al., 2016] in 2012 55400 people where injured by the police. While no systematic
dataset is available for studying the causal eﬀect of militarization of police related injuries
is reasonable to assume that as police killings have increased due to militarization so have
injuries.
When looking at police killings in the US a very important dimension often discussed
by the general public is race. Most famously, the activist movement black live matter,
campaigns against what they see as systematic racism and violence by the police against
black people. The previously cited Gallup polls on the trust that citizens have on the police
show a marked racial gap in this statistic. While 58% of whites trusts the police only 29%
of blacks have the same feelings. Famously the DoJ has investigated the Ferguson police
department after the protests for the shooting of a black man called Micheal Brown. The
investigation indeed found a pattern of racial bias towards the black community. Exploring
9Estimates used by government agencies to asses the value of a life vary from 7.9 million dollars use by
the Food and Drug Administration up to 9.4 million dollars used by the Transportation Department
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if this patterns is present in the US as a whole or is isolated to a few police departments is
particularly hard because, as discussed previously, is very diﬃcult to have detailed data on
police killings. Unfortunately sometimes even when basic data on a incident is available the
race of the victim is not reported. For example, in the data provided by fatalencounters,
36% of the times race is not reported. Even with this partial information we can observe
how blacks are statistically overrepresented in the victims of police killings. Even if blacks
represent 12% of the population of the US 31% of the police killings are suﬀered by blacks.
These percentages are in line with other forms of overrepresentation of blacks in the arrested
population 28% and incarcerated population 38% 10. This statistical overrepresentation
even if worrisome is not proof of racism by the police. What these numbers may just reﬂect
some underlying phenomenon that is correlated both with crime and being black. With my
analysis I can study the possibility of racism in the use of deadly force by the police from
another perspective, by looking at the causal eﬀect of the militarization on police killings
only of black people. The intuition behind this type of analysis is that the militarization of
the police gives more opportunities for the use of the deadly force by the police. If the police
is racist they could disproportionately use force against blacks and when the police gets
militarized this could lead to an increase especially of police killings of black individuals. As
shown in column (4) of Table 12 militarization doesn't inﬂuence in a statistically signiﬁcant
way police killings of black people. So what the militarization seem to be doing is to mitigate
the overrepresentation of black people in police killings. Again is important to state that
this doesn't imply that the police are not racist towards black individuals. Because similarly
as what it was discussed before there may be some other underlying characteristics that
inﬂuence the reaction of police killings to the militarization that are correlated with the
race status. Still this result provides some new evidence concerning the important relation
between the use of deadly force by the police and race.
10Arrests data from the FBI 2013: 9.014 Millions arrests of which 2.549 to Blacks or African American.
Incarcerated population in state prisons for more than 1 year in 2013 from BJS: 1.325 Million people of
which 0.497 Blacks.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects of the militarization of the police through program 1033 on
police behavior and criminal activity. I ﬁrst document how program 1033 is a major factor
in the recent drop in violent crime, being responsible for 60% of the rapid drop in violent
crime observed since 2007. The empirical evidence suggests that it does so both by deterring
criminal activity and by displacing crime to neighboring areas. This evidence is in line with
a model of rational criminal that observe the level of militarization of the police and decide
where and how much crime to commit. I then show how militarization of the police increases
police killings and program 1033 is responsible for practically all of the recent increase. In
total 2200 people have been killed by the police due to the militarization.
Since the unrest that happened in Ferguson in 2014, that brought the militarization of
the police in the political debate, program 1033 has been under scrutiny. A congressional
investigation started immediately after the riots and in January 2015 program 1033 was
reformed banning the reutilization of some types of military equipment. After the ﬁve police
oﬃcers were killed in a Dallas shooting that happened in July 2016 another change of the
program is in talks in the Congress in order to reverse the reform of January 2015. This
paper provides some important insights for guiding the policy makers discussion. First
these elasticities imply that for preventing 818 violent crimes the militarization of the police
will generate one extra police killing. Secondly, police militarization seems not to make
police oﬃcers safer. Finally, the highly decentralized nature of the program leads to an
overmilitarization of the US police. This is the result of police oﬃcers not taking into
account the externalities that are created to neighboring areas when acquiring new military
equipment. Any policy that wants to deal with the overmilitarization of the police will have
to reform who decides how much to be militarized.
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Figure 1: Value of the items transferred by the 1033 program to police departments (Blue)
and Yearly average boots on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq (Red). To the right of the
dotted line (after 2009) starts the inﬂow of item from the withdrawal from the wars
Figure 2: Disposition centers and Local Enforcement Agencies in continental US
120
0
1
2
3
4
M
il.
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 in
 $
 P
er
 C
ap
ita
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Time
Treated Placebo Treated
Figure 3: Time series of the stock of military equipment in $ per capita. Blue line for
police departments that are at most at 20Km for a disposition center. Red Line for police
departments that are at most at 20Km from a military base that is not a police department
.8
.9
1
1.
1
V
io
le
nt
 C
rim
e
2000 2005 2010 2015
Time
Treated Placebo Treated
Figure 4: Violent crime rates of police departments close to disposition centers (treated in
blue) and police departments close to military bases that are not disposition centers (placebo
treated in red). Violent crime rates are normalized to 1 in 2009.
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Figure 8: The time series of the reduced form eﬀects β1,t (2009 as comparison year)
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Table 1: First Stage: Closeness to Disposition Centers and the Militarization of police
departments
<20Km <40Km Dist ln(Dist.) Num. 50Km Num. 100Km
β1 0.863*** 0.444** -0.00163 -0.254** 0.462*** 0.396***
(0.287) (0.192) (0.00135) (0.0984) (0.152) (0.130)
Observations 98846 98846 98846 98846 98846 98846
F-stat 29.46 13.63 5.29 21.69 23.65 33.69
Note: The table reports the OLS estimates of the ﬁrst stage β1 and clustered standard
errors at the state*year level (in brackets). The sample includes all police depart-
ments yearly data from 2007 to 2014. In the ﬁrst 2 columns a police department is
deﬁned as close if situated at less than 20km, for column 1, and 40Km, for column 2,
from a disposition center. In column 3 I use the distance in Km and in column 4 the
logarithmic distance in Km from the closest disposition centers. In column 5 and 6 I
use the number of disposition centers in a radius of 50Km and 100Km as a measure
of closeness. All regressions include police departments ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects
and yeart∗closeness(militarybase) and are weighted by population. * p-value<0.10,
** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
Table 2: Second Stage: Militarization on Violent Crime
OLS
Violent Cr.
OLS FE
Violent Cr.
IV
Violent Cr.
IV
ln(Violent Cr.)
Reduced Form
Violent Cr.
Militarization per Capita 0.00341 0.00121 -1.399** -0.0636**
(0.00476) (0.00192) (0.553) (0.0273)
Eqp. X 1(disp<20Km) -1.207***
(0.238)
Observations 99879 99570 99570 95216 99570
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police Dep. FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
1(Milbase<20Km) * Year No No Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 29.58 28.45
Note: In column (4) the dependent variable is the log of the violent crime rate. In all the other columns
the dependent variable is the violent crime rate per 1000 inhabitants. The sample includes all police
departments yearly data from 2007 to 2014. The ﬁrst 2 columns report the OLS estimates of mili-
tarization per capita on violent crime rate. Column 3 reports the ﬁrst stage. Columns 4 to 5 report
the IV second stage estimates. Finally Column 65 reports the reduced form evidence of the treat-
ment status. In all columns clustered standard errors at the state*year level are reported in brack-
ets. Regressions are weighted by population. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
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Table 3: Comparing Levels of Predetermined Observables
Variable
Treated
(1)
Placebo
(2)
Other
(3)
Diﬀerence
(1) - (2)
Diﬀerence
(1) - (3)
Sheriﬀ Department (2009) 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.03 -0.18???
Municipal Level (2009) 0.73 0.71 0.56 0.02 0.17???
Civilian Employees per Capita (2009) 0.89 0.96 0.88 -0.07 0.01
Oﬃcers per Capita (2009) 1.84 2.58 1.99 -0.74?? -0.15
Area (2009) 316.11 257.99 502.98 58.12 -186.87?
Juvenile Age (2009) 17.17 16.59 16.01 0.57 1.16???
Violent Crime Rate (2009) 18.12 14.94 13.24 3.17 4.87???
Property Crime Rate (2009) 36.89 31.33 29.07 5.56 7.82???
Population 60357 53518 19422 6839 40935???
% Male (2000) 49.31 48.75 49.10 0.56 0.21
% Latino (2000) 14.90 13.85 12.34 1.05 2.56
% Mexican (2000) 9.92 5.33 7.67 4.58 2.25
% Black (2000) 14.19 18.89 10.69 -4.71 3.50
Criminal Active Population (15-35) (2000) 29.49 30.82 27.58 -1.33? 1.91???
Unemployment Rate (2000) 3.85 3.98 4.08 -0.14 -0.23
% Less Than High-School (2000) 17.12 17.78 20.08 -0.66 -2.96??
Republican Governor (2000) 0.73 0.61 0.61 0.12 0.12
Republican Governor (2005) 0.58 0.71 0.62 -0.13 -0.04
Governor Election (2008-2009) 0.21 0.23 0.16 -0.02 0.04
Governor Election (2013-2014) 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.03 0.02
Participation Presidential Election (2004) 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.09 -0.01
Participation Presidential Election (2008) 0.65 0.54 0.64 0.11 0.01
Note: This table shows some predetermined observables for police departments less than 20Km from
a disposition center (Treated), police departments less than 20Km from a military base that is not
a disposition center (Placebo Treated) and all the other police departments more than 20Km from a
military base (Other). The last two columns tests it tests if there are diﬀerence between trated and
placebo police departments and betweeen treated and the other police departments. ? 10% ?? 5%
? ? ? 1% . The ﬁrst 9 variables (above the doble horizontal line) are at the police department level in
the year 2009. The other variables are at the county level. Demographic variables are from the 2000
Census.
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Table 4: Comparing Changes between 2006 and 2009
Variable
Treated
(1)
Placebo
(2)
Other
(3)
Diﬀerence
(1) - (2)
Diﬀerence
(1) - (3)
Violent Crime -0.595 -0.851 -0.817 0.256 0.223
Property Crime -3.798 -3.699 -2.961 -0.099 -0.837
Total Crime -4.393 -4.550 -3.778 0.158 -0.615
Murder -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 0.008? -0.002
Rape -0.015 -0.035 -0.018 0.020 0.004
Robbery -0.160 -0.335 -0.130 0.175? -0.029
Assault -0.412 -0.465 -0.662 0.052 0.250
Burglary 0.025 -0.379 -0.131 0.405 0.157
Larceny -1.328 -1.230 -1.649 -0.098 0.321
Motor Vchl. Thefth -2.495 -2.090 -1.181 -0.405 -1.315??
Oﬃcer Killed -0.000 0.032 -0.001 -0.032 0.001
Oﬃcer Assaulted -0.086 -4.068 -2.039 3.982 1.953
Justiﬁable Homicide 0.106 0.010 -0.009 0.096 0.115??
Fatal Encounters 0.072 -0.018 0.011 0.089 0.061?
Note: This table shows the change of various outcome variables between 2009
and 2006 for police departments less than 20Km from a disposition center
(Treated), police departments less than 20Km from a military base that is not a
disposition center (Placebo Treated) and all the other police departments more
than 20Km from a military base (Other). The last two columns tests it tests if
these changes are diﬀerent between trated and placebo police departments and
betweeen treated and the other police departments. ? 10% ?? 5% ? ? ? 1%
Table 5: Second Stage: Robustness to Diﬀerent Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline <40Km Min ln(Min) Disp. 50Km Disp. 100Km
Militarization per Capita -1.399** -1.667** -0.792 -1.053** -1.173** -0.792**
(0.553) (0.811) (0.804) (0.489) (0.511) (0.377)
Observations 99570 99570 99556 99556 99570 99570
F-stat 29.58 13.68 5.34 21.86 23.61 34.20
Note: In all columns the dependent variable is the violent crime rate per 1000 inhabitants. The
sample includes all police departments yearly data from 2007 to 2014. The table reports IV
estimates of θ1 and clustered standard errors at the state*year level in brackets. In the ﬁrst
2 columns a police department is deﬁned as close if situated at less than 20km, for column
1, and 25Km, for column 2, from a disposition center. In column 3 I use the distance in Km
and in column 4 the logarithmic distance in Km from the closest disposition centers. In col-
umn 5 and 6 I use the number of disposition centers in a radius of 50Km and 100Km as a
measure of closeness. All regressions include police department ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects
and yeart∗closeness(militarybase) as inclueded instruments and are weighted by population.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
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Table 6: Second Stage: Sample only includes police departments close to a mili-
tary bases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS FE IV LOG IV RF
Militarization per Capita -0.0146***0.000290 -1.402** -0.0639**
(0.00442) (0.00270) (0.552) (0.0273)
Eqp. X 1(dist<20Km) -1.210***
(0.237)
Observations 11431 11414 11414 11176 11414
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police Dep. FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
1(Milbase<20Km) * Year No No Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 15.46 15.10
Note: In column (4) the dependent variable is the log of the violent crime rate.
In all the other columns the dependent variable is the violent crime rate per
1000 inhabitants. The sample includes all police departments yearly data
from 2007 to 2014. The ﬁrst 2 columns report the OLS estimates of milita-
rization per capita on violent crime rate. Columns 3 to 4 report the IV second
stage estimates. Finally Column 5 reports the reduced form evidence of the
treatment status. In all columns clustered standard errors at the state*year
level are reported in brackets. Regressions are weighted by population. * p-
value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
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Table 7: Second Stage: Diﬀerent Deﬁnition of Military Base
All Bases Not Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV LOG IV IV LOG IV
Militarization per Capita -1.375***-0.0550** -1.612** -0.0632**
(0.526) (0.0260) (0.628) (0.0274)
Observations 99570 95216 99570 95216
F-stat 26.76 25.79 28.00 27.02
Note: In column (2) and (4) the dependent variable is the log
of the violent crime rate. In all the other columns the depen-
dent variable is the violent crime rate per 1000 inhabitants. The
sample includes all police departments yearly data from 2007
to 2014. The diﬀerence with the main results is which military
bases are selected as control. In the ﬁrst 2 the closeness to all
military bases, even closed ones are used as a included istru-
ment. Columns 3 to 4 all military bases that are not closed are
instead used as included instruments. In all columns clustered
standard errors at the state*year level are reported in brackets.
Regressions are weighted by population. * p-value<0.10, ** p-
value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
Table 8: Second Stage: Droping big cities and not Weighting by Population
Drop Big Cities Not Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pop<500K Pop<250K Pop>5K Pop>10K
Militarization per Capita -0.754** -0.511** -0.174* -0.623*
(0.352) (0.232) (0.0987) (0.326)
Observations 99186 98694 58017 40064
F-stat 37.71 48.81 68.68 23.81
Note: This table reports the IV estimates of the eﬀect of militarization on vio-
lent crime. In column (1) and (2) police departments with more than 500000
and 250000 inhabitants are dropped repectevely. Column (3) and (4) report
the results without weighting for population and dropping police departments
with less tahn 5000 and 10000 inhabitants respectively. The sample yearly
data from 2007 to 2014 at the police department level. In all columns clus-
tered standard errors at the state*year level are reported in brackets. * p-
value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
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Table 9: Displacement Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline CZ mil Baseline CZ mil
Militarization per Capita -1.399** -1.558** -0.0636** -0.0718**
(0.553) (0.696) (0.0273) (0.0348)
CZ Militarization per Capita 0.499* 0.0259**
(0.267) (0.0132)
Observations 99570 99540 95216 95190
F-stat 29.58 11.48 28.45 11.04
Pvalue Underindentiﬁcation .003 .008 .003 .008
F-stat 1st Stage mil 20.89 20.73
F-stat 1st Stage CZmil 110.33 110.11
Corr(instr.,CZ instr.) .064 .064
Note: In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the violent
crime rate per 1000 inhabitants, in columns (3) and (4) the dependent
variable is the log of this violent crime rate. The sample includes all
police departments yearly data from 2007 to 2014. The table reports
IV estimates of β1, β2 and clustered standard errors at the state*year
level in brackets. All regressions include police department ﬁxed ef-
fects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and yeart∗1(militarybase < 20km). Regres-
sions are weighted by population. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05,
*** p-value<0.01
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Table 10: Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS FE IV LOG IV RF
Militarization per Capita 0.00543** 0.000612 -0.438 -0.0581
(0.00270) (0.00137) (0.332) (0.0482)
Eqp. X 1(disp<20Km) -0.262*
(0.154)
Observations 94353 94087 94087 87181 94087
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police Dep. FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
1(Milbase<20Km) * Year No No Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 14.71 13.91
Note: In column (2) the dependent variable is the log of the arrests due to
violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants. In all the other columns the dependent
variable is the number of arrests due to violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants.
The sample includes all police departments yearly data from 2007 to 2014.
In all columns clustered standard errors at the state*year level are reported
in brackets. Regressions are weighted by population. * p-value<0.10, ** p-
value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01
Table 11: Employees Police
(1) (2) (3)
Employees Policemen Civilians
Militarization per Capita 0.0101 0.0201 -0.0100
(0.0325) (0.0203) (0.0317)
Observations 118626 118626 118626
F-stat 39.54 39.54 39.54
Note: The table reports instrumental variable estimates. In
all columns clustered standard errors at the state*year level
are reported in brackets. Regressions are weighted by pop-
ulation. The sample includes all police departments yearly
data from 2007 to 2014. The dependent variables the are
number of total employees, policemen and civilian employ-
ees every 1000 citizens. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05,
*** p-value<0.01
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Table 12: Police Safety and Police Killings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬃcers
Killed
Oﬃcers
Assaulted
Police
Killings
Police
Killings (Blacks)
Militarization per Capita 0.0250 4.529 0.0782** 0.0136
(0.0228) (4.195) (0.0391) (0.0147)
Observations 21156 21156 130536 130536
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Police Dep. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
1(Milbase<20Km) * Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 18.44 18.44 43.45 43.45
Note: The table reports instrumental variable estimates. In all columns clus-
tered standard errors at the state*year level are reported in brackets. Re-
gressions are weighted by population. The sample includes all police de-
partments yearly data from 2007 to 2014. The dependent variables are the
number of oﬃcers killed, oﬃcers assaulted, police killings and police killings
of black people every 100000 citizens. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, ***
p-value<0.01
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